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A STUDY OF THE RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND CHURCHES OF THE UNITED STATES[1]

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The following memorial, which I publish with the approval of the Prussian Minister of Worship and Education, is to inform the public at large of the establishment of an American Library of Theology at the University of Marburg. The scientific aims of this Library have the full approval not only of the Prussian government, but also of the theological Faculty of the University, of which I am a member. Thanks to a well-wisher, a German living in America, whose generosity made possible the founding of the Library, the Prussian government was in a position at the beginning of this year to call it actually into being, and to establish it at the University of Marburg as an official institution.

Established in connection with one of the seminars at the University, it has as yet, because of its modest resources, not been able to make any great claims, and must rely upon the active support of the Prussian government, and, above all, upon the help of friends and well-wishers in America. When, as head of the Library, I made public the document which brought unexpected fulfilment to a thought that occurred to me during my trip in America, it was not with the claim of wishing to make a scientific contribution to a religious understanding between Germany and America. It was much more my wish to give renewed expression to the deep convictions with which, under the fresh

[1] The translation has been made by Rev. W. H. Anthony (University of Pennsylvania '09) and Rev. J. M. Groton (Harvard '09), students at Marburg, winter semester 1912–13.

impression of the religion of a new land, I came to grasp the possibilities of a mutual theological understanding.

The conviction of the great value of an international religious understanding through the interchange of scientific ideas has not since left me; in fact, it deepens to its first glow as often as I discuss this subject or take pen to write of it. The work itself, however, will be done quietly, with no attempt to exaggerate either its significance or its possible results. Within half a year's time, I think, all vague enthusiasm following the establishment of the Library will have vanished, and the service to be rendered by it will be seen to be not only scientific but personal. For, no matter how religion may be viewed, it is always personal, and no scientific consideration can conceal this glowing personal element. It is for this reason that I regard the task of the American Library of Theology as that of rendering personal service as well as service in the realm of pure ideas.

Above all else, I consider of greatest value a collection of books from which may be gathered scientific information on the theological, ecclesiastical, and religious development and present-day conditions of North America. On account of the size of the field to be covered and the expense, only the most important works may be procured. Besides dogmatics, literature dealing with the psychology and the social aspects of religion is the most interesting which America just now has to offer us. These branches of the Library will be developed first, and brought into practical use by means of seminars, special courses, and lectures. Further, the Library offers free access to current scientific, religious, ecclesiastical, and political periodicals, which are important for a study of the continuous development of the religious life of America. In this way the Library will be of value to American students—to those who are willing to help us in our comparative studies of German and American forms of piety, and to those who, through American journals which elsewhere in Germany are not to be found, wish to keep in touch with the course of events at home. It may well grow into a common meeting-ground where German and American students of theology may learn to know one another. It should surely be the aim of both teacher and pupil to comprehend the international character of

religion in its widest sense, and to extend their examination to the religion of all civilized peoples, without in any way neglecting the sharply emphasized individual and national characteristics of the religious life. An impartial and intelligent introduction for foreign students to German religion would be a secondary aim, and could be realized in so far as we, as Germans, take pains to understand scientifically their own religious peculiarities and achievements. The publication of yearly reports, of papers in the Institute's special department, reviews, information on pertinent literature, these should go a long way toward completing our work, and above all should win for it in America the friends which it needs.

This small but fortunate beginning has its root in two lands. No land by itself can bring about a common understanding in matters of religion; the other must co-operate. The essence of all religion is its foundation in personality. The growth of this new institution may well symbolize the fact that only in the mutually unselfish undertaking of a common task and in mutual confidence is the progress of religious culture in the world to be sought. With firm confidence in the religious future of America the following memorial has its origin. It should lead the way for the work of coming years.

I should like to submit herewith the memorial, in which I made a report to the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship and Education in the fall of 1911 concerning my visit to America. In making this report I have in mind the suggestion to establish, in the department of the theological Faculty of one of the Prussian universities, a seminar for the study of religious conditions in the United States. I was so much impressed by the churches and their organizations in the East and Middle West that I feel I must not lose this opportunity to record my observations. As a result of my visit, I am more and more convinced of the importance of a thorough religious understanding between Germans and Americans. For these two peoples have doubtless a very important part to play in the future of Christianity and in the general development of culture. The task of bringing about this mutual understanding must, in my mind, devolve upon the university, and proceed along intellectual lines. It must nat-

urally have to do with the departments of (1) theology, (2) the churches, (3) the religious life. The work of such a seminar as I am suggesting will fall easily into these three main divisions.

Theology.—In the first place this seminar must have a library of distinctly theological works. The systematic theological branches should receive first consideration, since these express the most characteristic features of the religious development. I feel that a well-chosen collection of such books in English would be more valuable than the German translations of individual authors, which at best could give no more than a fragmentary survey. After all, how little do we really know of the theological literature of America! One looks for it in vain on the shelves of our university libraries. The leading theological periodicals ought also to be included. To supplement the use of this material, classes should be held with discussions, or now and then a lecture, on some such topic as the psychology of religion.

Church Organization.—In the second place and perhaps of greater importance, we should possess material relating to the history, teaching, organization, and present-day life of the different denominations, their leading periodicals, characteristic sermons, and books of instruction. There is much of such material available, as, for example, *The Congregationalist*, *The Churchman*, and many other periodicals, with the aid of which lectures on the creeds, history, *et cætera*, could be made of real and lively interest. Since those different denominations have a real and vital existence, their polity, forms of expression, and other externals acquire for us an ever-increasing interest and importance. A study of the organization and history of these denominations should prove of equal value with that of their theology and doctrine. The development of the church life and the fitness of the different forms of government must be of the greatest interest to our theologians, and even, may we not suppose, to students of law. For there is no doubt that we have suffered through our ignorance in this particular field. Therefore in some German university there should be easy access to abundant material for the study of such questions. This need our seminar could supply.

The Religious Life.—In the third place and finally, the general religious life in America must be studied. If we are to be

thorough, we must have the leading works of philosophy and ethics, politics and missions. Indeed, it is not difficult to see that a grasp of American philosophy and mental attitude is the only starting-point for bringing about such a mutual understanding as we propose. To this end I already held, in the winter semester of 1911–12, a seminar on the religion and philosophy of America, which I hope to continue. The scope of this seminar must be so wide as to include a study of the social and political periodicals, for example, *The Survey* and *The Outlook*. Of no less importance are books dealing with the social question, and the social work of the leading denominations, and reports of the Young Men's Christian Association. As the American government offers its *Statistics on Religious Bodies* (1906) to all interested, I have no doubt much of this material would gladly be placed at our disposal. Further, we must not overlook a study of politics, aesthetics, and *belles lettres*,—to mention only such writers as Whittier and Hawthorne. In short, it is here a question of so broadening the horizon that we may have a clear view of the development of the great underlying characteristics of American Protestantism, and at the same time come to understand the reason for the many religious divisions and their consequences.[2] Only in this way is a complete understanding of American Protestantism and a corresponding intercourse with it possible; the significance of which for the intellectual advancement of humanity and for the world's peace I assert in the strongest terms.

Indications point today to an international understanding of the sciences. For some time the interchange of the results of science and philosophy has been productive of much good. Political differences have been modified and a better understanding of the life of the nations brought about. Science, because of its objectivity and universality, forms a connecting link between nations; for the conclusions of logic are everywhere the same, and no one may disregard their scientific exactness. Hence may not science be a bond of peace between nations? The question must now be asked, should we content ourselves merely with this

[2] W. Müller's new book, Das religiöse Leben in Amerika (Jena, Diederichs, 1911), represents the beginning of such a collection in German. It could well have been more thorough and scientific.

interchange of abstractions? In every people we find a spiritual power which much more fully expresses its real being, namely, the power of religion. This, which reveals the very soul of a people, is individual, inimitable; nevertheless, it should play a unique part in international relationships.

The interchange of religious ideals is in itself a specific task. We realize that theology in many of its branches lacks that objectivity which is a common bond among the sciences. Religion, however, is not imparted by purely intellectual means. It is important to note that not only within the realm of the Christian religion generally, but even in a particular denomination whose members are made up of different nationalities, fundamental differences prevail in the forms and expressions of religion, which cannot occur in case of the sciences. The observations and impressions which I express here are based only upon the scanty material which I collected during my short stay in America in the spring and summer of 1911. As this has given me but a mere glimpse of the country, my effort will be limited to pointing out the necessity of religious intercourse between two peoples bound together not only by political and economic ties but, because of their pronounced Protestantism, by a common task in religion.

I must, in passing, strongly emphasize the fact that America has much to learn from Germany in theology and religion. But America has always followed with interest the course of German theology. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century her students have come to Germany, and in fact it is now quite the rule that the majority of those who receive foreign scholarships come to us to study theology at its source. We, however, have not been so ready to learn from them the condition of religion in their own country, but have contented ourselves with being willing hosts and disinterested teachers. The result has been that German influence is recognized more readily and with less prejudice in the universities and theological seminaries than anywhere else in America. Here the results of German theology exercise an undeniable influence.

But the time has come when we Germans must change our attitude. Friendships between peoples, as between individuals,

must be reciprocal, and such reciprocity must extend into the sphere of religion. The peculiar way in which America has developed and applied that which she has learnt from us makes it impossible for us to disregard her religious conditions. And we must be careful not to limit ourselves to the realm of pure theology, which is today so ably represented through the visits of German professors to America. For present-day relations call for greater depth and more soul; and these can only come from a thorough understanding of the whole religious life of America. Thus our attention is directed: 1. To American theology; 2. Church organizations; 3. religious ideals.

I.

After this general characterization it will not surprise us to find that Germany has little to learn from American theology. For we must remember that the theology of America is scarcely more than 150 years old, and it is only recently that it has shaken off the fetters of denominationalism. In fact, the fight for complete intellectual freedom is still going on. A few leading theological institutions, as, e.g., Union Theological Seminary of New York, the Harvard Divinity School of Cambridge, and some others, have acquired an interdenominational character and offer instruction to students of every creed. Only through this expansion has the complete freedom of professors of theology become an established fact; though they are of course benefited through friendly intercourse with affiliated universities. So broad has the teaching become that, in the more conservative denominations, some of their students have difficulty in gaining ordination. It is to be hoped, however, that these churches will, sooner or later, recognize the value of this radicalism, and through their own theologians and clergymen aid in this work of broader scholarship. A frequent combination of theory and practice in the seminaries—to point out the disadvantages of which is in itself a specific task and is here out of place—helps to develop this liberal movement.

My chief interest is in the theological seminaries, and of these only the more prominent are to be included in our study. We

must, however, mention the fact that the philosophical Faculties of different universities include men who have done excellent work in the field of religion. It should not be supposed for a moment, however, that all such professors are ultra-radical and dangerous to the Church. In fact, some of them occupy conservative positions and a few of the more radical ones have pastorates in orthodox denominations. That is indeed a good sign of tolerance.

Institutions and Scholars of Special Interest.—Among institutions which one would do well to visit I would mention the following: Union Theological Seminary in New York; The Harvard Divinity School, Andover Theological Seminary, and The Episcopal Theological School, in Cambridge, Mass.; The Yale Divinity School; The Divinity School of the University of Chicago; and others not affiliated with universities, such as Hartford Theological Seminary in Connecticut; Bangor Theological Seminary in Maine; and the Baptist Theological Seminary in Rochester, N.Y. I must also include the philosophical, psychological, pedagogical, and sociological departments of such universities as Columbia, in New York; Harvard, in Cambridge; Yale, in New Haven; University of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia, and others. Finally, I must mention, in psychology, the names of Stanley Hall of Clark University, Worcester, Mass.; J. Leuba of Bryn Mawr, Penn.; Edward S. Ames of Chicago; Irving King of Iowa; Geo. A. Coe of Union Theological Seminary in New York: in philosophy, J. B. Pratt of Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.; G. H. Howison of California: in sociology, Edward T. Devine and J. E. Russell of Columbia, New York, and others.

Now it is significant that the generally peaceful relationship between theology and church in America rests upon a more or less imperfect grasp of the former. I leave out of consideration the mass of traditional theology which, though unable to meet the demands of modern thought, is nevertheless very successful in practical work and still taught in many of the seminaries. Among its exponents one cannot fail to observe a lack of philosophical interest in religion,—a fact which is also true of many of the students. Even where German theology seems to wield a deep influence, the result is a superficiality and inability to comprehend

religion in its largest aspects. The scientific method, which is alone the result of time and careful study, is generally lacking in the treatment of American critical theology. With the disappearance, however, of Biblical authority and the introduction of radical criticism, the interest in scientific scholarship has grown. Along with this, history seems to have become frequently merely the object of negative criticism;[3] and hence, the many singular attempts to grasp the modern situation apart from its historical setting. It is not to be wondered at that only a few of the leading minds of America have recognized the importance of revising the conceptions of historical tradition; for, as a matter of fact, America has very few great traditions, and those which it has have been almost entirely disregarded. On the contrary, one meets occasionally with thinkers who hold that only in the complete breaking away from tradition and in the dream of a new religion can true progress be realized. In studying this religious radicalism we must recognize that the lack of a scientific theology is partly compensated by a belief in the power of religion and by an enthusiasm for Christian progress.

Biblical Theology and Church History.—Here I must observe that this criticism is limited strictly to that department which we must regard as of paramount importance, viz., systematic theology. To this field I have principally directed my attention, together with the allied sciences of psychology, history of religion, and philosophy. Only in these departments am I able to form anything like a correct estimate of American theology. In the departments of the Old and New Testaments there are in English philological and historical works which Germany has always readily recognized and used. Work in Church history in America has, until recently, confined itself almost entirely to the English Church; though H. M. Baird's book on the Huguenots and H. C. Lea's on the Inquisition are noteworthy exceptions.

Dogmatics.—The study of general church history, however, in which Harnack and his works are the standard guides, has not

[3] An extreme example of this is Thompson's article on the alleged persecution of the Christians at Lyons in 177 A.D., in The American Journal of Theology (July, 1912, pp. 358–384), and the withering criticism of the article by A. Harnack in the Theologische Literaturzeitung, Nov. 3, 1913, p. 74 ff.

been without valuable results. If we leave out of consideration the field of practical theology, which is not at all scientific and which is always stamped with denominationalism, there remains systematic theology taken in its widest sense. And if from this we extract its essence, viz., its dogma, we find little profitable to the German theologian. Many of the principal American works on dogma have been derived from England and Germany. One can still detect, for example, Hegel's influence. Many of the latest works, influenced partly by Ritschlian theology and partly by modern empirical interests, have no clearly scientific character. Nevertheless, the works of leading theologians, such as William Adams Brown of Union Theological Seminary, and Edward C. Moore[4] of The Harvard Divinity School, repay a careful study.

Ethics.—Much more original work has been done in the field of Christian ethics, which, combined with certain social ideas, plays an important part in religious education. Social ethics is studied in most of the seminaries. Especially to be mentioned in this connection is F. G. Peabody's seminar in Harvard, which is attended by a great many students. W. Rauschenbusch of Rochester, N.Y., represents a progressive type of this social Christianity. His book, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, has found a wide circle of readers and has been translated into German. Although as a whole American social work is far behind that of Germany, yet the latter must come to deal with these social questions in the scientific and progressive way which is characteristic of the Americans, and in many practical details must be willing to learn from them. It is very interesting to notice how American theology concerns itself with these present-day problems, although means for their solution may not always be at hand.

Philosophy of Religion.—The philosophy of religion affords a less satisfactory outlook. In this field, as in one of pure science, American theology has not felt very much at home, and has, for

[4] See E. C. Moore's recent book, An Outline of the History of Christian Thought since Kant. Prof. D. C. Macintosh has given an account of this book in The Yale Divinity Quarterly, January, 1913, p. 103 f. I do not think that his opinion about the future of Kantianism is in any way correct. Prof. Macintosh does not know sufficiently the modern philosophical development in Germany, which is as a whole founded on Kant.

the most part, taken over Höffding's empiricism or Pfleiderer's Hegelianism. James's original attempt to construct a philosophy of religion cannot, in its purely empirical aspect, be supported. Indeed, James himself and his followers admit its inconsistency and logical defects. These men have made use of previous works which were by no means sufficiently developed for a treatment of the philosophy of religion, but which, however, were recognized as rich in influence for a future religious philosophy—the psychology of religion. Nevertheless, I would strongly urge a study of James's philosophy, although scientifically it is fragmentary and inconsistent. No one has expressed more genuinely and popularly the real character of American thought.[5]

Psychology of Religion.—Of greater importance for us are James's religious convictions, which he has formulated in his psychology of religion. We must unhesitatingly admit that America has created and paved the way for the development of a religious psychology, as of modern empirical psychology generally. On the other hand, it is true that the religious psychology of America is in a period of such undue popularity and overestimation that the book-market is flooded with a mass of hastily drawn conclusions and pseudo-scientific works. It also suffers from the fact that it has too early acquired publicity and become little more than a means of public entertainment. Nevertheless, it has value in so far as it is employed in religious pedagogy. Both orthodoxy and liberalism make use of the unestablished results of an empirical psychology to support their own dogmatic tenets. This religious psychology has failed to adjust itself to the history of religion and of dogma. Rather the history of religion has been little more than the laboratory of psychology. It is to be hoped that the above-mentioned sensationalism, since it has no value for religion, will soon spend itself, and the psychology of religion will find its proper place in the sphere of religion generally.

No matter how foreign this whole movement of the psychology of religion may seem to us, it is nevertheless a reproach to German theology that it has, in the face of these extravagances, held itself

[5] See on James, Prof. Troeltsch's article in The Harvard Theological Review, Oct., 1912, "Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion," and articles by the present writer in Die Christliche Welt, 1910, No. 34, and 1913, No. 6.

too much in reserve. For it devolves, in the last analysis, on German theology to bring out, where others have failed, the results of this empirical science of religion. But German theology cannot accomplish this task until it has first collected and analyzed all previous results which others and especially America have furnished. Is not the time already ripe for such a collection, in order to sift materials, to criticise methods, and to effect, not only pastoral and practical ends, but a scientific embodiment of the psychology of religion in religious philosophy and dogma? In bringing this about, the work of such men as Troeltsch and Wobbermin must find more general acceptance; especially as that type of religious psychology which is represented by Vorbrodt and Runze, and which is but a copy of the American, promises no success. At any rate, German theology must realize that the psychology of religion, even if it cannot claim the definite position which the inventive genius of the American has given to it, must form the basis of theological study. We have here, in any case, a definite opportunity to learn from American criticism.

Comparative Religion.—The department in which we are most of all indebted to American theology is that of comparative religion. The painstaking collection of sources and the study of primitive religion are among the most valuable contributions in the science of history. The work of such a scholar as G. F. Moore of Harvard is enough to prove that this invaluable material has received in America thorough and careful treatment. German theology should not lose sight of this American movement but profit by it, even where it seems to lose itself in philological discussion and secular history. For the task is ultimately that of making the spirit of religious history effective for present-day needs, or, in other words, to develop it into a philosophy of historical religion. In this respect it becomes most important for German theology, since it forms an introduction to the study of dogma.

This rough sketch shows that the study and appraisement of American theology would not be without its value, quite apart from the great advantage we should have through a better understanding of the scholarly world of America.

II.

If it is possible in some cases only to point to the necessity of a study of American religion, it is, on the other hand, easier and simpler to bring home to German study the need of a fuller knowledge of American church history. The development of the American denominations, each in its own special way and independent of the others, and largely under the influence of peculiar historical and political conditions, has given to them, in form and administration, the appearance of new organizations, and is therefore of great interest for our investigation. Unfortunately, our knowledge of American church conditions is so limited that we have come to have, in some measure, the grotesque conception in regard to them of ecclesiastical anarchy. Exactly the contrary is true. The ecclesiastical life of the great denominations expresses itself in a systematic way, in which the individual members play a personal part, so that one may almost speak of a genuine church democracy. One cannot fail to note, however, that these denominations more and more assume forms of organization in which the direction is placed in the hands of smaller bodies of men chosen by the congregation. Thus the church gradually loses sight of the democratic ideal, according to which every member has a voice in all questions. Simultaneously there has taken place an enrichment of the forms of worship which would have been intolerable to the earlier Puritan. A type of church life has therefore been developed which, for example, makes the Presbyterian form of government approximate the Congregational, and in which elements of the worship of the Episcopal Church creep into the liturgies of other Churches. This is not the place to discuss these matters in detail, but it is important to note that in the great denominations we have a process of development which aids the German student in understanding them and makes a knowledge of them important for German Protestantism.

Church Unity.—Another evidence of this form of development is the effort which is being made to bring about a union of the principal Churches, which will at least draw together their social

forces in united action. This effort towards unity includes mainly the Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists, who through their joint decisions would direct the course of American Protestantism. Such a unity would mean not only a great conservation of energy, but also, notwithstanding the inherent differences of church organization, the possibility of acquiring very great influence, religious, moral, and educational. Rightly enough, American idealists see in the joint decisions of these denominations the genesis of an American Protestant *Volkskirche*, which, unhampered by any connection with the State, might play a very great part in the life of the people. Such a result can come only through Christianity and through Protestantism. The German Reformation has created this ideal; the American Church Union may be the first to realize it. It could not be a matter of indifference to German Protestantism if in America a church were formed which should represent the chief Protestant bodies of the world. Rather it would be our duty to have a share, in so far as we are able, in the realization of this unity, and to maintain a friendly relation with these denominations, which would make possible a universal bond of Protestantism. We dare not, in this day and age, live in ecclesiastical isolation, and we should only deceive ourselves if we concluded from present indications that either the church in general, or German Protestantism in particular, had finished its work. Who knows whether the German mind may not undergo a change, and, passing above individualism and intellectualism, fulfil the great obligation in regard to religion which it owes to our own people and to humanity! And so the church will be the means through which religious convictions find their practical expression. No religion without this social bond of the church is possible in modern life.

Church Life and Tolerance.—That the church in its social and religious activities can exercise an unlimited influence is proved in the case of America. It is incorrect to speak of the American Churches as having no influence. Equally true is it that German advocates of a separation between church and State are wrong when they point to America as a country where the church does not influence the government. The question of mere organization is absolutely irrelevant, when the spirit of the institution

begins to permeate the life of the people. One can hardly conceive that the representatives of the American people at Washington are there only as American citizens, and not also as Catholics and Protestants. Such a false idea would be dispelled through better knowledge. As well say that one Church can copy another.

German theology and the German Church, in considering the American denominations, are not to imitate them, but to learn what powerful religious and moral forces are at work in them, how these forces are nourished and made productive, what in our Church is essential and what accidental. Is it not astonishing that the Baptists, who used to consider all who practised infant baptism as pagans and would have no communion with them, today are uniting with all such "pagans"—Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and others? This means the renunciation of an earlier *conditio sine qua non*, a fundamental dogma of like importance with the verbal inspiration of the Bible. And this in a conservative Church, which in its orthodoxy is incomparably more fixed and well defined than any in Germany! The vision of practical Christianity is today in America so real that the fetters of dogma are being more and more loosened. Indeed, the thought of religious brotherhood is so potent in the Protestant Churches that men of different creeds gladly work together for the common cause of Christianity. The Evangelical Alliance already in the preceding century tried to bring about such an understanding between America, England, and Germany; but the dividing lines could not be done away with, and so the task remains. In Church and religion work unites, dogma divides. This fact Germany needs to learn from America.

German Lutheranism in America.—In this connection it must be mentioned that, unfortunately, the Lutherans in America have not been able to adapt themselves to this modern friendly feeling of the American denominations and to subordinate dogmatic differences. We must not overlook the fact, of course, that the Lutheran Church is made up of so many different kinds and classes of people that we cannot think of it as a unit. Connected with the Missouri Synod are the Synods of Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois, all of which form the Conference of

North America, and represent, especially Missouri, an inflexible creed. There is next the General Synod, which includes the Eastern States and contains many strictly American elements. Lastly we have the Evangelical Synod, which is the outgrowth of an effort for union. This Synod has a more liberal creed than the others, but is in fact conservative and dogmatically inflexible. Because of this a number of German Free Churches have separated from it and formed the German Evangelical Protestant Preachers' Union and Conference. As a result of their free thinking they find no support from the Germans, and because of their small numbers they are being gradually absorbed by the American denominations, especially the Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Unitarian. It is no injustice to designate the German Lutherans as irreconcilably positive and dogmatic.

This exclusiveness in orthodox theology has produced many disadvantages for German Lutherans in America, and it is high time for the Lutheran Church to enter progressively the paths of thought and action. Also for the German mother Church the connection with the German Church in America will thus be made easier. Theological work in German universities ought to help in bringing about a better understanding of church life in America and the future of German religion there.

It is only through a full understanding of American church conditions that we shall be able to use our strong influence in keeping the German Church in America in the line of religious progress. The important part which the church is to play in the future of America makes it necessary for us to know and understand the American denominations.

Value of American Denominations.—Such a task necessitates first of all a study of the history, tenets, and organization of all the American religious bodies. It is self-evident that we ought not to pick out merely the leading ones; it is rather a question of studying the whole extent of American religious life. After this we should consider the denominations individually, their forms and historical modifications, their educational institutions, their schools and seminaries, their doctrinal development to the present day, their ideals of government and how they are realized. Only after such a comprehensive study can we legitimately draw

our conclusions. Much will undoubtedly appear to be superficial, and of little value, and at times bordering on the sensational and ludicrous. However, far-reaching indications of a deep religious spirit and an unusually practical method of organization become all the clearer in the leading denominations. While this organization is the guardian of American piety, which devotes itself to practical, effective, and progressive work, it is, on the other hand, little fitted to nourish the inner religious life. All the more conspicuous is the social significance which these Churches increasingly acquire, their sense of obligation to the people, and their practical work for the public welfare. A study of the creeds of the American denominations enables us to judge directly to what extent they inspire morally and influence religiously the life of the people, and realize, in a new way and with new powers, the imperishable ideals of Christianity.

III.

The next point of importance is a study, from the point of view of religion, of American life generally, with special reference to the way in which its Christian life has developed. While this development in America is still in its beginning, and is so broad and unorganized as to admit of no detailed study, a careful and thorough investigation might result in a truer estimate than the American himself would be likely to make. For doubtless the foreign observer views the religious and social development more as a unit than the Americans, with their many divisions, are capable of doing. The material of special significance for this study may be classified according to the following divisions: 1. Academic; 2. Commercial; 3. Industrial.

1. *The Academic:* It is very interesting to the German who pays a visit to any of the leading American endowed universities of the East, such as Princeton, Pennsylvania, Columbia, Yale, Harvard, Williams College, to see what an important part Protestantism plays in them all. Everywhere he finds chapel services, at which Professors of the different Faculties make brief religious addresses, and, in institutions where attendance is not compulsory, he finds students of all kinds gladly and voluntarily

attending these exercises. How uplifting is the influence of the morning devotions in Harvard, for example, which some of the leading preachers and men of America conduct for one or two weeks at a time, while having opportunity in free hours for personal discussion with the students on every vital question! How helpful also for the young university preacher, near to the students in age and experience, preaching to them on Sundays and coming into social touch with them during the week by means of open evenings, visits, conferences, and small groups for discussion of religious questions! The presence, for example, of such a man as Columbia University has, is of the utmost significance, and forms just that bond between Professors and students which in Germany we lack. The intellectual unripeness and lack of independence of the American student encourages, perhaps, such religious relationships. And it is surprising that these can exist in a university even in such a giant city as New York. The result of this is a tendency to draw the denominations together.

Y. M. C. A.—Significant also in the life of the student is the way in which he is directed in the practical realization of his religious ideals. I have especially in mind the Young Men's Christian Association, which exists in every university and college and breathes a spirit of personal religion. The methods of its work in the University of Pennsylvania, for example, are astonishingly effective, and exemplary. The Y. M. C. A. in the Middle West, where I attended a very interesting student conference, is intellectually much less developed than in the East, where it numbers among its members some of the finest and most capable young men, who may rank with the best German students. All this tends to create in every university a fellowship of a high moral character which is at the same time a source of great help to the morally weak. The moral life of the student is further developed through practical work, which makes him realize his obligations to others. Both university settlements and Churches seek the help of the students in their institutional work. Students of theology are in this way often too heavily burdened and diverted from their studies. This is not true, however, with students of other departments. Rather this practical religious work in which they are often engaged makes them realize as per-

haps nothing else could the work of religion and the seriousness of their studies. The work of Charles Stelzle in New York City, which attracts many students of Union Theological Seminary, is a notable illustration of this student-activity.

Interest in Foreign Missions.—Still another indication of the religious spirit among the students is their interest in Foreign Missions, a work in which one recognizes the enthusiasm of the students combined with the maturer conception of religion on the part of their leaders. The way in which every university provides for its own mission-work and the willingness with which students contribute their own money, are most commendable. Some of the best-trained theological graduates gladly volunteer as missionaries. This interest in missions gives also a world-wide aspect to Christianity. Missionary work is being more and more carried on not only by the theological student but also by the engineer, teacher, chemist, and doctor, who through their Christian environment in the university have received, along with their scientific training, a simple enthusiasm and inspiration for the cause of Christianity throughout the world. This comes from a strong, unreflecting conviction rather than from a clear knowledge of the situation. With this enthusiasm is bound up a dream of world-conquest, which is perhaps only natural in a people so young and prosperous.

It seems to me that the United States can bring its influence to bear upon Japan and China through its missionary work much more quickly than through any political measures. Such a conception of world-conquest implies a genuinely modern belief in the universal mission of Christianity. The accomplishment of this task will help considerably the position and greatness of that people which has unselfishly recognized and undertaken it. The fact that the American people with its ingenuousness and intellectual vagueness is far-seeing enough to realize the great political significance of Christianity and to undertake without delay, although at first with ineffectual methods, the tasks involved, stamps them, it seems to me, more than do any commercial and technical accomplishments, as a people and nation with a future. This far-sighted national policy, the extension of Christianity, finds its origin in the university; and is not, as in our case, the

result of a traditional and child-like piety. How absolutely different from this modern world-wide conception is our whole traditional view of Christianity as a means of maintaining for the State and people, through the dissemination of National and Christian culture, prestige in the world! It is for the German universities to realize the importance of this matter.

It must be observed, however, that the idealism and unselfishness which are characteristic of all German missionary work, are in America, consciously and unconsciously, attended with national motives. Practical considerations urge the American to great accomplishment. But these considerations are able to demand from him as much personal self-sacrifice and devotion as foreign missionary work usually requires. It is a striking fact that America, in her missionary work, has singled out principally those countries which are important to her own political interests, and through their culture to the future of civilization, viz., Japan, China, and India. But it is only natural that missionary work should follow in the course of new international relationships with the Far East. And perhaps it is not irrelevant to ask if, with our present-day lack of idealism, such practical motives would not actuate our own people in mission-work to a deeper conception of religion and Christianity.

The Theory of Pragmatism in Religion.—It is interesting to note, in connection with this practical side of American religious life and its desire for conquest, how it has been influenced by the philosophy of pragmatism. This philosophy, with a true understanding of the American spirit, has drawn religion into the field of its speculations and has developed its metaphysics into a philosophy of religion. It is, in its theoretical contradictions and impossibilities and in its practical utility and popularity, a typical product of Americanism. More an attitude toward life than a philosophy, it has won for itself recognition in educational circles; it is supreme at such universities as Columbia and Chicago; it exércises the strongest influence upon morality and religion, since it directs popular idealism into thoroughly utilitarian channels. Through this philosophy, which has woven itself into American religion and has won for itself a place of prominence, American logic, ethics, and aesthetics are being more

and more subjected to religious pragmatic influences. In the field of logic it means an interpretation of truth in terms of faith; in the field of ethics it is shown in the practical application of all possible means for the attainment of religious ideals; in the field of aesthetics it has, up to the present, been of uncertain value, but will doubtless make its influence felt here as well; as evidenced by the drama of Miss Josephine Preston Peabody (Mrs. Marks), *The Piper*, and the popular religious shows. So in pragmatism we find the philosophical explanation of the practical spirit of America which has directed it to a higher Christian development. The philosophy of James and his school can, however, be regarded from our scientific standpoint only as the hybrid product of a period of transition. But it is the key to the understanding of the religious life of the universities, and its study is therefore necessary for all those who would understand fully the practical expressions of American religion.

2. *The Commercial:* In the business-world of America, which is ruled by commercial interests, religious influence is not so strong as in some of the more advanced academic circles. It is always to be borne in mind that the influence of the universities, especially as they assume a utilitarian character, which is in accordance with the practical bent of the American mind, becomes constantly stronger and of greater significance in industrial and commercial life. This is especially true of the State Universities of the West. Further, the influence, which countless graduates of universities now in business carry from their college days into practical life, is constantly becoming greater. As a result, settlements, Y. M. C. A.s, missions (alluded to under 1), are actively supported by business-men, who realize the practical work of religion. The interest of business-men in the Y. M. C. A., for example, is accompanied by the pragmatic principle that their employees, well cared for and religiously influenced, can be of greater service to business. It may often happen (unfortunately) that a leading merchant prefers to contribute largely to the Y. M. C. A. rather than to increase the wages of his employees. Railroads and States are concerned with the moral education of youth; the Y. M. C. A. makes special provision for railroad-employees and for the men in the navy. Ex-President Taft has

stated that only the religious influence of the Y. M. C. A. could improve the demoralized conditions in the navy; and this it actually does.

Men and Religion Forward Movement.—This religious interest among the laity has crystallized in a striking manner in the "Men and Religion Forward Movement," which, in regularly planned campaigns in the great cities of the United States, aroused religious interest among the men. If this work of the laity is more a piece of external organization than a religious deepening, it is nevertheless important to observe how strongly these laymen feel their obligations to their fellows and seek to fulfil these obligations. And since the Churches have taken a deep interest in the movement, the result may be, in spite of sensational and advertising methods, a great improvement in American religious and moral conditions.

Social Christianity.—With all this it is not to be forgotten that social work in America, for which the State does not hold itself responsible, falls in a very great degree to the individual citizen, and that the further prosecution of this has to be left to the conscience of the ruling classes. The pulpit exercises an obvious influence on business-men in bringing them to a realization of their moral obligations. In the last analysis social work is ever the result of the religious impulse. This is shown in the fight against intemperance, in which religion has been the great champion of prohibition; in the problem of child-labor, to which is opposed every fine instinct of the people; and in the case of the work and wages of women. When once the deadened conscience of the people is awakened, it is remarkable how quickly moral unscrupulousness gives way before it, how a new public opinion is created which is hostile to monopolies that trample on the rights or disregard the interests of others, and how promptly this sentiment makes itself effective by legislation and judicial decision, as in the case of the notorious Standard Oil Company. Further, new norms of business principles are established which, in their purely secular character, evince nothing of the religious motive which gave them being. How great is the influence, politically and ethically, which preachers such as Lyman Abbott and Parkhurst, in New York, have exercised, and a publication like *The Outlook*!

In the same way the religious social conscience extends, slowly but surely, to other fields. Since so much of the social work is left to the individual which is, in Germany, the work of the State, it is no wonder that America is still very far behind in the attainment of social and religious ideals. Both in academic and business-circles the "Social Gospel" is the watch-word, and the social worth of Christian teaching, the ethics of the Gospels, is so strongly emphasized that the importance of the inner life of the Christian is almost lost sight of. The program of preachers in New York, Chicago, and other large cities is Christianity in its social aspects; Christianity in the great cities is to become awakened through its social conscience. Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis* is not without good reason one of the most widely read books, and its sequel, *The Christianizing of the Social Order*, expresses in the title the practical direction which Christianity in America takes. In this same way we must explain the general disposition of the people, which in the United States has given rise to the peace movement. In the enthusiasm for world-peace, which must be regarded not so much from a political as from a purely religious point of view, there vibrate both religious and social chords. In general it might be said that it is not the social work, but the religious impulses prompting it which are of importance for us. For a task is involved here which with us has been neglected, viz., that of bringing religion into the life of the people.

3. *The Industrial:* Here we find certain conditions similar to those already mentioned in connection with the academic and commercial groups. These are settlements, wages, child-labor and woman-labor. In addition to these there are certain problems which are too often passed over—housing, the supply of food and water, and the religious education of children. The attempt to solve these problems may be designated as an effort to Christianize the whole life of America. Apart from the social work carried on by the individual denominations, in which, owing to the many divisions, much energy is wasted, and apart from the excellent work of the Y. M. C. A., the religious sense of obligation to the working classes has raised two problems: the immigrant-problem, and that of the people's amusements.

Religion and Immigration.—The immigrant-problem is becoming more and more the most difficult question for the American government. The great influx of Poles, Greeks, and Irish means a growth of Catholicism which is incompatible with the Puritan spirit. More serious is the accompanying influx of peoples either without religion or hostile to it, who recruit the ranks of the social democrats. The religious conscience is now so far awakened that obligation to the immigrant is not regarded as being discharged merely with the inculcation of the democratic spirit. In addition, the necessity is realized of instilling, by means of religion, a deeper sense of duty towards the community. The gross individualism which prevailed among the earlier immigrants must be socially and religiously modified and made to share in the general communal life. This care of the immigrant is rightly emphasized by the religious bodies. It is interesting to note how here also the Americans, who believe in religious equality, cannot dispense with religion for the attainment of its national aims. And may not religion itself, as it renders this service, in turn be greatly enriched?

Religion and People's Amusements.—The next problem is the supervision of the people's amusements. American individualism has produced in the past conditions of inconceivable coarseness. One has only to think of the Fourth of July, when every year hundreds are killed by fire-works. It is commendable, however, that in the last two years this celebration has been reformed, and milder forms of entertainment, such as parades, park-amusements, etc., substituted. Secular and religious institutions have worked together in this cause. As characteristic is the movement to provide a "People's Sunday Evening." Since the saloon is closed, other places of entertainment must be provided, and reading-rooms and church services do not suffice. Religious societies therefore endeavor to supply this need by lectures and instruction, and by an effort to arouse among the masses a real interest for religion, which with many has been quite lost. Such is the aim of Charles Stelzle in his Labor Temple in New York. His position as leader of the social work of the Presbyterian Church is illuminative. In all such work the American laborer is a congenial person to deal with, as he is not biassed by any

false philosophy of life. Nor is he a stranger to the ideals of religion. How otherwise would it have been possible for a social leader such as the Secretary of the Labor Union in America, Mr. R. Robins, during the strike among the miners of Pennsylvania in the summer of 1911, to gather the strikers together for a Sunday morning service, after having counselled and advised them the preceding evening in their fight against the company! Thus does religion assist the laborer in his social battles. It is also for him a real help in his daily needs. The Churches take advantage of these opportunities to guard jealously this religious disposition. Hence the zeal with which Christian communities take part in this work, and, being carried on in the name of social Christianity, it means a most telling extension of the Christian spirit throughout the nation.

If with such a large country and so young a people very little aid is at hand for the dissemination of Christian culture, yet it seems to me that great ideals are at work, which we perhaps can recognize better than the Americans themselves. If to the profit which we have gained from a study of the religious development of America and its meaning for us both ecclesiastically and religiously, we could add the possibility of helping in an intellectual way this kindred people, it would be but one further reason why we should investigate the religion, the theology, and the Church, of America.

In concluding, I should like to express the hope that a systematic study of the above-mentioned facts might be not without profit for our students of theology, for other students of our universities who take an interest in such questions, and finally to American Protestantism, which will gladly encourage such scrutiny. It must be left to the future whether, as a result of this scientific study of the development of a modern people, the practical spirit may not influence our own religious life—a spirit which we should make our own, and which would not bear the foreign stamp which we, in our intercourse with England and America, too often recognize in our people. On the other hand, only those results, which through the German scientific method can be thoroughly Germanized, are capable of being incorporated into German religious life and used as a means of teaching and helping the German

people. And if through a gradual filtration foreign religious elements are to be brought into our own life, where else than in our universities can this thorough work of adjustment be accomplished? These practical aims, however, must receive a secondary consideration. This does not prevent us from considering their realization. But the principal task is to make Protestant theology and the Church more intimately acquainted with American Protestantism, and in this way to insure the friendliest feeling between these two kindred peoples.

THE CHURCHES AND THE PREVAILING SOCIAL SENTIMENT

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Churches in the great religions have been allies of all ancient governments and most modern ones. The Emperor of Japan was believed to have, and in the popular mind still has, intimate relations with the heavenly powers. He used to be held in a seclusion suitable for this peculiar relationship to Deity. The Emperor of China for thousands of years under various dynasties was a high priest, whose offerings and prayers were peculiarly acceptable to Deity, and frequently procured for his people good seedtimes and good harvests, although he sometimes failed to avert pestilences, droughts, floods, and famines. The Indian castes are family clans and trades-unions with strong religious sanctions. The Koran contains the foundations of civil law as well as of ecclesiastical, and the Sultan claims succession to the religious as well as to the civil authority of the Caliphs. Under the feudal system there was a chaplain in every great noble's house, and the king ruled "by the grace of God," and by the same grace transmitted his office to his son. Both Napoleon the Great and Napoleon the Little claimed as Emperor the support of the Church; but Napoleon the Third never seemed to see the extraordinary pathos in the formula he used so much, "By the grace of God and the national will Emperor of the French." The French Revolution tried to divorce civil government from religion, but failed to do so. National established churches supported by the state exist all over Europe, although their tenure is frail in several European countries. The American Republic has carried into practice complete religious toleration and complete separation of church and state; but every now and then some one proposes to bridge the gap between church and state by a phrase such as "Vox populi, vox Dei," or to "recognize" the Divine Immanence by inserting the word God in the Constitution.

With the general increase of liberty which has taken place during the last hundred years both church and state have undergone profound modifications. The church, in some measure set apart from government, is thrown back on its original functions of cultivating virtue, promoting sympathy and good-will, conducting worship, administering sacraments, and energizing the motive power of love. The state, on the other hand, becomes more and more a business agency for getting the public work well done; and the public work is more and more the application of the new sciences to the promotion of the public welfare, the abatement of nuisances and injuries, the protection of the whole people from physical and moral contagions, the provision of the conveniences and securities which urban life imperatively needs, and the preservation of order and peace. The Constitution of the United States has promoted and encouraged the safe development of a form of government for the people which trusts everything ultimately to the intelligence, good judgment, and quick conscience of a majority of the people. It has developed a democracy which is the most complete representative in the modern world of the principles of the Protestant Reformation, with religious toleration added. The Reformation stood for the right of private judgment with individual responsibility. It transferred religious authority from an ecclesiastical institution to a book, the Bible, and hence made universal education a necessity. The free, responsible individual must be able to read, else not only the individual but society might go wrong. Cromwell built not only his army but his Commonwealth on the Congregationalists and Independents; and he was the "Protector" of liberty at home and abroad. Religion was paramount in the minds of both the Pilgrims and the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay, and for a hundred and fifty years the ministers of religion were the ruling class on New England soil, sharing their power, however, with the magistrates and ship-masters.

By the time the American Republic was fifty years old its fundamental principles of freedom, brotherhood, and equal justice had begun to develop a new kind of social state, and therewith a new relation of the numerous and diversified churches to the community as a whole; and by the time the Republic

was a hundred years old there had arisen in this new society a new kind of social sentiment which was really an adaptation and modification of the Christian sense of human brotherhood. Two forces in the industrial world hastened the development of this social sentiment—the corporation with limited liability, and the liberty of association of like-thinking or like-hoping people for the accomplishment of public objects which seemed to them good. Incorporation with limited liability has proved to be a powerful promoter of industrial efficiency and of co-operation by small or large groups of persons in industrial production, and also in carrying on private works of education, religion, and charity. Both the right to incorporate and the right to associate have proved to be invaluable aids and supporters of free institutions.

The new social sentiments developed in the last half of the nineteenth century are, however, by no means peculiar to the democratic society of the United States. Indeed, they have been more rapidly developed and carried to a greater extreme in European countries, where despotic or aristocratic government still lingers, than in the United States. Although they are modifications and applications of the Christian doctrine of human brotherhood, they did not originate in the Christian churches. In fact, many of the most vigorous exponents of the social sentiments have been men and women who had but slight connection with any of the churches, or who even thought of the churches as anti-social. The Greek Church, the Roman Church, and the great majority of the Protestant churches have not shown much active sympathy with the new social sentiment; and a considerable proportion of the men and women devoted to the social propaganda have been persons who maintain no connection with any church. The social sentiment has found active expression in efforts to improve by legislation the condition of the poorest and most laborious classes, to contend against the evils of alcoholism, gambling, and prostitution, to raise wages, shorten hours, improve lodgings, and to provide the crowded city populations with the means of innocent and wholesome enjoyment. Some of these objects have long been striven for by the trades-unions, and these unions have therefore been active in building up the

new social sentiments, although their own leading sentiment is an exclusive class feeling. New agencies have also been created to give practical expression to these sentiments, such as the "settlements" in poor quarters of cities, the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, and the numerous clubs of boys and girls, young men and young women, which undertake to supply guidance to satisfactory work and to good play, and to maintain in their members ideal standards of conduct. Some of these agencies may fairly be called religious; but many of them say little about religious topics, and take pains to avoid religious teaching which could possibly be called denominational.

Since the twentieth century opened, the churches have begun to take account of the social position thus created and to inquire into their own duties in connection therewith. They find that social service offers a new field for church activities; that it is something very different from the old forms of kindly relief for special cases of distress or disease; that the new social service deals with common conditions under which their livelihood is earned by thousands of persons, families grow up, and successive generations thrive or deteriorate. These conditions have in many cases been created by the factory system and by the transfer of millions of people from country life to city life. They have also been caused by the new liberties which the population as a whole now enjoy, and by the comparatively new reluctance to take life by judicial process, to imprison, or to exercise any physical repression on the ruder and more vicious elements of the population. Social service is no longer alms-giving, the providing of hospitals to die in, or poor-houses in which to prolong an unproductive and miserable existence. Modern social service means curing, remedying, finding employment, enabling a distressed family to resume self-support, defending the weak or defective against cruelty and oppression, catching and reforming the deserter from family responsibilities, resisting natural catastrophes, and repairing the damages they occasion. Almost all social service nowadays requires something more than sympathy and compassion. It requires knowledge of economics and applied science, and careful discrimination between those measures which break down diligence, frugality, foresight, self-reliance, and

family affection, and those which foster such virtues. The churches should all exert an active moral force. They should be fountains of religious emotion, but also steady sources of moral action on the part both of individuals and of society. They therefore should never support social undertakings which have a degrading effect on individual character, and should always be careful to discriminate between the good and the bad effects of philanthropic undertakings which clearly produce mixed effects, some good, some bad. Moreover, the churches should always insist that ample inquiry and discussion precede every effort at reform by or through legislation and the executive action of public officials.

The evangelical churches in the United States have lately manifested some disposition to unite in good works, prompted by the newly developed social sentiment. Having had ample experience of the impossibility of uniting on creeds, liturgies, and ecclesiastical polities, they cannot help hoping that they have found a basis of unity in their common purpose to render social service; that is, to engage in co-operative good works. Hence, federations, federal councils, and comprehensive commissions. Here, however, new dangers may be encountered. Seeing the dangers of exciting religious emotions which cannot be transformed on the instant into loving action, and feeling keenly the loss of influence which churches in general have lately suffered, individual ministers in charge of churches and other leaders may urge young people to take up some form of social service without adequate preparation and without competent direction or guidance, the ministers themselves having had no practice in the kind of work to which they urge their young parishioners, and possessing no trained judgment as to the probable results of the young people's labors.

I find a good example of rash and ill-considered action on the part of churches in the Principles adopted at Chicago, December 9, 1912, by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, which declare that the churches must stand for sixteen separate propositions, some of which are axiomatic but vague; some so lacking in precision of definiteness that they suggest no specific action; some grossly exaggerated, though of good tendency; and some positively mischievous, because they sug-

gest forms of collective action which are distinctly demoralizing to individual workers. It is of no use for the churches to declare that they stand for "proper" regulation of marriage, "proper" housing, and "proper" education and recreation for every child; for the real questions are, what *proper* regulation of marriage *is*, what *proper* housing *is*, and what *kind* of education and recreation every child should have.

One of these Principles is that the churches must stand for the abolition of "child labor." By child labor is probably meant precocious labor in unwholesome factories. It can hardly be intended that the churches should stand for the abolition of child labor on the farm and in the household, labor which is wholesome in moderation and altogether desirable for the bringing up of children and the safe and happy development of the family as a whole.

Another of these Principles implies that the physical and moral health of the community can be protected by the regulation of the conditions of toil for women. Now, legislation can improve the conditions under which women labor in factories and shops, and protect married women from overwork before and after confinement; but this kind of legislation will not "safeguard the physical and moral health of the community." That health can only be adequately protected by the development of sound character in the members of the community, both men and women.

This Declaration as to what the churches must stand for exhibits a strong tendency to attribute the moral evils in the community to poverty. One reads frequently in the public prints that the cause of prostitution is the failure of employers to pay young women what is called a "living wage." Must the churches stand for that doctrine? It seems to me a demoralizing and degrading doctrine in itself and in all its implications. To my thinking, poverty is a far safer moral condition than inordinate wealth.

Another of the Principles for which these churches must stand calls for the protection of the individual and society from the social, economic, and moral waste of the liquor traffic. The liquor traffic is a waste; but that fact is not the principal reason for

opposing it, and the churches ought not to put that motive forward as the principal one. The burning question about the liquor traffic is how to restrict it most wisely. Is prohibition the best policy, or local option? If local option, how shall the transportation of liquor by public carrier be regulated? The Principle for which the churches must stand, according to this proclamation, gives the voter no clear indication how he should use his vote, and dodges the real questions.

The Declaration says vaguely that the churches must stand for the conservation of public health; but what action shall the churches advocate for diminishing the ravages of the venereal diseases, and for suppressing the profitable commerce carried on publicly by both men and women to gratify the lustful propensities of men? These are practical and very difficult questions, calling for decision in action. A just conservation of the public health raises many questions concerning the use of the collective force and the collective resources of the community, in restriction of individual liberty, but in promotion of both public and private safety. Shall the churches support the public authorities in compelling vaccination and making free distribution of diphtheria antitoxin, or shall they resist these methods of conserving the public health? Shall the churches advocate the expenditure of public money for playgrounds, and the provision at public expense of illustrated lectures, dance halls, public concerts, and other means of popular recreation?

This Declaration of Principles by the Federal Council speaks of the "right of all men to the opportunity for self-maintenance," and of "encroachments" on that right. Who gave men that right? Against whom is it to be enforced, and by what means? Who are they who encroach upon that right, and how is the church to deal with them, if discovered? The sentence throughout suggests the existence of social wrongs, but does not specify them or indicate any clear line of action for remedying them. This is an injurious kind of incitement to unjust opinions about the existing industrial organization.

The churches must also stand, according to this Declaration, for suitable provision for the old age of workers and for those incapacitated by injury. Does this recommendation mean that

all old people are to be provided for at the expense of the public? Does it mean that the churches must stand for the demoralizing and enfeebling, non-contributary, old-age pension legislation? Does it mean that the churches are to become responsible for the neglect of children to take care of their old parents, or for that lack of industry, frugality, and self-control which brings people to old age without any provision for comfort in declining years?

The Principles adopted by the Federal Council include the following remarkable statement: "For the gradual and reasonable reduction of the hours of labor to the lowest practicable point, and for that degree of leisure for all which is a condition of the highest human life." One would suppose from these phrases that labor was always a curse and leisure a blessing, and that the progress of civilization depended on reduction of the first and increase of the second. The facts are just the other way. The progress of civilization depends on the steady, productive labor of the entire community. The hours of labor might be so far reduced as to diminish disastrously the total product of the community below the amount necessary to maintain the life of the community as it is and to provide for improvement and progress. Leisure in the sense of loafing, idleness, or inactivity is not necessary to the highest human life. What is necessary, or at least expedient, is variety in productive and pleasurable activities. The notions that labor is a curse and leisure the indispensable condition of contentment are both thoroughly mischievous, and if carried into practice would destroy civilization and make real happiness impossible.

There is also in this Declaration of Principles an apparent endorsement of the uniform, or minimum, wage, which is one of the most deplorable doctrines and practices of trades-unions, demoralizing to the competent workmen and cruel to the weak, the unskilful, and the old.

The final Declaration of the Federal Council, "For the most equitable division of the product of industry that can ultimately be devised," is one that the communist, the collectivist, the socialist, the individualist, and the nihilist might all think themselves entitled to subscribe to, so vague and elusive is it. Churches

which are invited to co-operate in social service ought to have at least similar aims and well-defined plans for the common work. It is doubtless desirable to secure the co-operation of many of the religious and philanthropic institutions called churches in common, helpful, social activities or good works; but that co-operation ought to be based on clear and specific propositions.

In regard to the directing of the young people connected with churches into the various activities called social service, the dangers of that policy may be avoided and its benefits reaped by either of two methods, both of which are already in use. The young workers may be given in college or in schools for social workers an adequate training for the special line of work they propose to follow before they assume any serious responsibility, or they may be put as probationers or apprentices under the direction of experienced paid workers, who will employ them as recorders and cataloguers, let them witness some of the daily work, and soon ascertain whether they possess the insight, tact, and vigor necessary for permanent service.

Before the churches can safely enlist for the new kinds of social service, the ministers who lead the churches ought to have devoted a considerable part of their professional study to subjects adapted to prepare them for social service, such as economics, government, and the inductive method of finding truth. They should have been specially trained to avoid broad generalizations from few particulars, and unlimited inferences from limited groups of facts. The traditional training of the minister in all churches of all religions has been chiefly deductive, speculative, philosophical, historical, literary, and emotional. There is the most urgent need of making a considerable part of it inductive, observational, and economic. Every minister and every philanthropist needs practice in scientific experimentation, in the selection of the promising experiment, and in the elimination from his selected experiment, if possible, of all irrelevant or uninstructive variables. It is in this way that the scientific investigator demonstrates his capacity and wins his success.

Such additions to the traditional training for the ministry will not make the ministers of the future any less spiritual, enthusiastic, devoted, or altruistic than the ministers of the past. The

strongest evidence existing today of the attuning of the human mind to the Intelligence which created and upholds the universe is the process by which the scientific investigator projects his imagination beyond the present limits of knowledge, and conceives an hypothesis which guides him safely to new truth. The hypothesis is not always verified; but the fact that it is not seldom verified by subsequent experimentation suggested by the hypothesis is the superb demonstration which the inductive method has supplied, that man's finite thinking and loving is akin to God's infinite thinking and loving.

It is imperative that the minister who is to practise social service himself, or to exhort others to it, should have obtained in his own person and through his own experience a thorough knowledge of the inductive philosophy and of its applications in the promotion of human welfare and of progressive civilization. The churches and all other philanthropic institutions must learn how new truth about human society is to be acquired, little by little, step by step, through thorough and candid inquiry into the existing facts, and then through careful study, first, of the causes of existing conditions, and finally, of the most promising remedies. For such work the churches are not yet well organized, and the ministers are not yet well educated. In the mean time, the churches may best give active support to the well-organized agencies which employ experts in social service and in scientific, social, economic, and medical research. There are many such agencies which are employing men of good will, sound judgment, and practised skill. Let the churches support them with sympathy, comprehension, praise, and money. Gradually they will learn how to employ experts themselves, and to co-operate with each other in so doing. The medical work of foreign missions illustrates the gains that will come to the churches through the exercises of these new powers. There will be no abridgement of the churches' ancient and imperishable function of teaching men faith, hope, and love.

LUTHER'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ONLY

PRESERVED SMITH

Amherst, Mass.

One of the best-known stories about Luther relates that while at Rome in December, 1510, he began climbing on his knees, for the indulgence to be thus acquired, the Scala Santa, but that, before he reached the top he remembered the text, "The just shall live by faith," and he desisted. If authentic, this anecdote proves that he had thus early attained to the fundamental doctrine of the Reformation. The source of the story is a reminiscence of Luther's son Paul, who says that he heard it from his father when he was eleven years old but did not write it down until thirty-eight years later. Such testimony to any fact is necessarily unreliable at least in details, and now that the same story has been found, in a very different form, in one of Luther's own sermons, Paul's version of it must be abandoned. In 1545 the Reformer relates that, while at Rome, he ascended the Holy Stairs with the purpose of getting the soul of an ancestor out of purgatory, but that when he arrived at the top he thought, "Who knows whether this prayer avails?" As this is assuredly no proof that he had by this time arrived at the *sola fides*, the only decisive reason for placing his acquisition of that doctrine prior to 1510 disappears, and we are thrown back on the earlier, contemporary sources, which in any case are more trustworthy, to trace the gradual development of that important dogma in his mind.

The road he travelled towards his ultimate goal was that of the contemporary scholastic theology. The old controversy between realists and nominalists, one of the deepest that has ever agitated human thought, and one which shows vitality in certain quarters even today, had given place, with the victory of the latter party, to a new alignment, of the "ancient" *versus* the "modern" school; the former supporting Albertus, Thomas, and Scotus, the latter Biel and Occam. The substance of the controversy was no longer, properly speaking, speculative but rather

literary, a hair-splitting and sophistical wrangling over the propriety of terms and even of syntax. "The flippancy and unreality of the later schoolmen were sins unto death which brought the inevitable penalty of the overthrow of scholasticism itself." [1] A little later Luther joined the humanists in decrying these "hog-doctors," but at first he drank deeply of their teaching, and, much as he revolted from them, the disciples of Occam left lasting marks on his mind. This master gave him his first taste of any kind of philosophy. At times he felt such pleasure in speculations on obscure points, such as that of Christ's divinity, that he seemed to be "among choirs of angels," but a sharp reaction always told him that he was rather "among devils." Again, rumination on the mysteries of predestination led him to so black a pit of horror and despair that ten years later he could hardly bear to speak of it. Even these thoughts seem to have had the morbid coloring of the young monk's neurotic diathesis.[1a] It is no longer fashionable to extol Luther as the apostle of free thought. In his own early experiences was founded his horror of the purely human reason as an arbiter of divine matters; as such, it was for him the *omni studio fugienda sapientia carnis.*

He was most interested, however, not in points of abstract divinity, but in what the doctors had to say on the concrete and vital question, What shall I do to be saved? The answer given was precisely the opposite of that which he later attained for himself. The theologians he studied told him that a man must win redemption by his own works. Brother Martin was in the main perfectly right when he asserted that the doctors believed that God would infallibly give grace to one who did the best that was in him. It is true that the almost miraculous learning of Father Denifle[2] can quote more than two hundred mediaeval

[1] Workman: Christian Thought to the Reformation, 1911, 242 f. A good example of this is Eck's statement at the Leipsic debate that a good work was due to God "totum" but not "totaliter." O. Seitz: Der authentische Text der Leipziger Disputation, 54.

[1a] This statement, and several others in the present study, will be elucidated by reference to my essay on "Luther's Development in the Light of Psycho-analysis" in The American Journal of Psychology, 1913, xxiv, pp. 360–377.

[2] H. P. Denifle: Luther und Lutherthum. Ergänzungsband. Die abendländische Schriftausleger bis Luther über Justitia Dei. 1905.

theologians, all of whom, save one, Abelard, certainly not known to Luther, interpreted the famous verse, Romans i. 17, "The just shall live by faith," much as did the Reformer. It is true that Father Grisar[3] can cite some of Luther's immediate predecessors, Biel and Proles, for example, as witnesses that the importance of faith was never entirely lost sight of. But against the theory of the Church, holding a delicate balance between faith and works, must be put her practice, and, in this case as in others, actions spoke louder than words. It is an undeniable, an obtrusive fact that, whatever was the doctrine of the Church, at this time her practice had reduced the economy of individual redemption to an almost purely mechanical process of debit and credit for evil and good works. Dr. A. V. Müller[4] has collected a large number of quotations from thirty-seven manuscript prayer-books in circulation between 1450 and 1550, all of them assuredly promising to the worshipper who would repeat such and such prayers or do certain pious acts, sundry temporal or spiritual blessings, the latter including indulgence and salvation. But the main proof of the thesis is found in facts so widely known as to need no verification by specific quotation from sources. The whole system of indulgences, for example, offered not only immunity from the pains of purgatory but all other spiritual favors, including forgiveness of sins[5] and the grace of God, in return for the performance of a good work or the payment of money.[6] The monastic system also encouraged men to believe that celibacy, fasting, privation and self-torture of all kinds, together with the appointed offices, were meritorious and practically certain to win salvation. Luther so believed, and acted on the belief in the best faith, hoping "to get to heaven by his monkery." Indeed, by these means he won the reputation of a saint, without attaining the least inward satisfaction or peace. In after-life he

[3] H. Grisar: Luther, ii, 470.

[4] A. V. Müller: Luthers theologische Quellen, 1912, 235 ff.

[5] Though contrary to the now accepted theory of the Church, indulgences were often represented as forgiving "culpa" as well as "poena." So the indulgence at Einsiedel quoted by S. M. Jackson: Zwingli, 99.

[6] See the sources published in B. J. Kidd: Documents of the Continental Reformation, nos. 1–10.

often stated the theory on which he acted while a monk, as for example: "They lead people from Christ to their own works, telling them to go into a cloister, or make a pilgrimage to Rome or Compostella, and live a severe, hard life, and choose the Virgin Mary or some saint as intercessor, that you may be saved." [7] And this theory, which he was afterwards so passionately to combat, was deduced correctly and logically from the general practice of the Church. Not that he was repelled by the duties and privations of the monastic career as such; rather his letters and other references to his daily life show that he found in it the joy of work well done. What he did *not* find was salvation.[8]

His extant writings for the years preceding 1513 are very scant, being confined to three letters, a receipt, and some marginal notes to works of Lombard and Augustine, but they are sufficient to show that he was still at the antipodes of his final conclusions—the bondage of the will, salvation by faith, and certainty of election. From notes to Augustine of 1509 it is clear that Brother Martin still held to the freedom of the will; from others of about the same time, to Lombard, we infer that, though even at this early date he had begun to consider the problem, he was yet far from the *sola fides*.

He was led to reverse his position by a variety of influences, partly practical, partly academic. One of these was a long and rather heated quarrel with that faction of the Order which laid most stress on the punctilio of the cloister. The German Augustinians were divided into two parties; the "Observants," of a stricter rule imposed by their Vicar Proles in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, and the "Conventuals," who had refused to adopt this reform. When John von Staupitz became Vicar of the German Province in 1503, he did his best to reunite the two congregations, and after long effort finally obtained a bull granting him the necessary power, the document being dated June 26, 1510, and published by him on the following September 30 at Wittenberg. This aroused a protest from the Observants them-

[7] Werke, Weimar, xlvi, 8.

[8] Luther's teacher, Dr. Usingen, testifies that in 1511 Luther was satisfied with his profession. Paulus: Usingen, 17. Other passages in his letters and in the Commentary on Romans show that this was true in 1515 and 1516. Römerbrief, Scholien, 318.

selves, the reason thereof being inferentially their unwillingness to have anything to do with the brothers whose practice was looser than their own. In October, 1510, two of the chapters, Nuremberg and Erfurt, sent an embassy to Rome to appeal from the action of their Vicar, the representative of Erfurt being Martin Luther.[9] The mission came to nothing, probably because while at Rome Luther became convinced that Staupitz was in the right, and therefore went over to his side. His action was naturally resented at Erfurt, which within a few months became too hot to hold him and his friend Lang, who also sided with Staupitz, and both of them were consequently transferred, in the summer of 1511,[10] to Wittenberg. This did not help matters, for Erfurt was jealous of the growth, largely at her expense, of the new university. The controversy was blown up afresh at a general chapter held at Cologne in May, 1512, at which Luther was present and at which Staupitz endeavored to carry out his plans for union. The Erfurters, indeed, were so incensed against their former brother that their leader, Dr. Nathin, represented his departure as a breach of faith and of oath to his *alma mater;* for at that time, when degrees were little more than licenses to teach, a man was required to lecture, for a time at least, at the academy at which he had prepared.[11] All this opposition came from men so

[9] The date of the journey to Rome is given as one year later in Köstlin-Kawerau: Martin Luther (1903), i. 89, and this is followed by McGiffert: Martin Luther, 37 ff. and by W. Köhler: s.v. "Luther" in Scheel's Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. But Professor Kawerau has now become convinced of the greater probability of the earlier date (Lutherkalendar, 1910) which is also given in Grisar: Luther, i, 21 ff., and in my Life and Letters of Martin Luther, 16. Its correctness is now settled by the recent discovery of a note of the Vicar General, Aegidius of Viterbo, dated January, 1511. Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, xxxii, 604.

[10] In August, 1511, Lang matriculated at Wittenberg. Paulus: Usingen, 16. That Luther's transfer took place at about the same time may be inferred partly from this, partly from the fact that he lectured three semesters at Erfurt, beginning November, 1509.

[11] Kampschulte: Die Universität Erfurt, ii, 8, note 1, says that according to the custom of the time Luther should have continued lecturing at Erfurt. The degrees he took there were "baccalaureus ad biblia" and "sententiarius"; the doctorate at Wittenberg, October, 1512, was another grievance. An oath to lecture at the university where a man had taken his degree, or had prepared for it, was administered at Paris until 1452. H. Rashdall: Universities of Europe, i, 455 f. See further, my translation of Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters, 1913, pp. 80 f.

strictly Observant that they abhorred fellowship with those living under a looser rule. They appeared to Luther like Pharisees straining at gnats. His anger against these "little saints," as he called them, found vent in a rousing sermon, almost a tirade, delivered at the general chapter held at Gotha, May, 1515, when he was elected District Vicar. Some hostility to him was also found at Wittenberg, for his lectures contain occasional sarcasms against those "Judaizers" who trusted in their Order, their saints, and their ceremonies. The controversy necessarily increased his sense of the futility of the works practised by men with so little inward rectitude.

His reading supplemented this impression. From the first days in the cloister he had heard Augustine read, and in 1508 he had acquired and annotated some of his works. This profoundest of all Christian philosophers had won from Paul, *via* the Neo-Platonists and Victorinus, the doctrine of justification by faith, which, as a living conviction, he had made his own, holding it in neither exactly the Pauline nor in exactly the Lutheran sense. From the Bishop of Hippo the Wittenberg student received a higher conception of God than he had hitherto held, for the essence of St. Augustine's genius is his feeling that God was the be-all and end-all of his life. From him, too, came the doctrine of the depravity of the human will, and a new realization of the nature of sin and of grace. What Luther did not and could not get from his master was the answer to what was for him the kernel of the whole problem; for, "with all his horror of sin, St. Augustine had not experienced the horror of uncertainty of salvation," [12] and, though he held the election to grace irresistible, he thought that no one could be sure of possessing that grace.

Augustine's most valuable element, his doctrine of grace and faith, was practically suppressed until the Sixteenth Century, but at that time there were several authors who began to take it up before Luther. Of these one certainly influenced him, the brilliant French humanist, Lefèvre d'Étaples, whose editions of the Psalms and of the Pauline Epistles Luther used in his university lectures. His copy, with notes in his own hand, of the Frenchman's *Quintuplex Psalterium* has survived, and the more

[12] Harnack: History of Dogma (English), v, 210, note.

closely it is studied the more nearly does the Saxon professor seem to have adopted his forerunner's doctrine. From this, for example, he borrowed his extremely complex method of interpreting Scripture in several senses, half of them literal and half of them spiritual. But he was far more deeply impressed by Lefèvre's *S. Pauli Epistolae XIV*, published in 1512. Luther did not get it until two or three years later, when it became the basis of his lectures on Romans. From it he obtained what linguistic material he used, until in March, 1516, the Greek New Testament of Erasmus appeared, when for the moment he deserted the older for the more recent authority. But the ascendency of the Dutch humanist was short-lived. A year later Luther stated that the more he read him the less he liked him, "because I fear he does not sufficiently promote the cause of Christ and the grace of God, in which he is much more ignorant than Lefèvre." The French scholar, indeed, was peculiarly congenial to him, anticipating several of his later doctrines, including that of the supreme authority of the Bible. Justification by faith only was also pointed out by him in the clearest terms. There are two ways of righteousness, "that of the law and that of faith, the one of works, the other of grace, the one human, the other divine." [13] Again: "It is almost profane to talk of the merit of works, especially before God. For a merit does not seem to ask for grace but to exact what is due; to attribute merit to works is to have the opinion of those who think that we can be justified by works, an error for which the Jews were particularly condemned. Therefore let us not speak of the merit of our works, which is little or none, but let us celebrate the grace of God, which is everything." [14] This doctrine was most clearly expressed in the *Commentary on Romans*, the Epistle on which Luther, too, first lectured: "Do you ask whether there was ever anyone justified without the works of the law, written or natural? There have been such, even very many. Who knows not that the penitent thief was justified by faith

[13] Romans iii, S. Pauli Epistolae, fol. 74, quoted by A. Humbert: Les origines de la théologie moderne, 283.

[14] 1 Cor. viii, fol. 118b, quoted by E. Doumergue: Jean Calvin, 1899, i, 82.

only?" [15] Finally: "By works without faith it is impossible to be justified; on the contrary, by faith without works it is possible." [16]

Such passages make it certain that Luther took his most famous doctrine bodily from Lefèvre. By "doctrine" I mean here the formula into which his theology was cast, for it must be noted and emphasized that it was but the form that was Lefèvre's; the personal experience which led the German friar to adopt this dogma and which gave it a new and deepened meaning were his own. On this more will be said presently; but the fact must here be underscored that what was borrowed from the Frenchman was but a marvellously apt formula to express the essence of a personal experience which the Reformer would have had in any case.

The formula indeed was so far from original with Luther that other men in his circle were grasping at the same thought. Staupitz and Carlstadt, for example, were not far from the *sola fides*, even before it was established by their greater friend. The essence of the thought is one of the oldest in Christianity, so that it is not hard to assert and to prove that in this respect Luther "was not an innovator but a renovator," that "all the opinions objected to by Denifle as specifically Lutheran were no intellectual discovery of the Reformer, but were known long before Luther, and found, during his life-time, both in and out of his Order, Catholic defenders." [17] Are ideas, indeed, ever originated or invented by great men? Do they not rather arise by a necessary evolution in the minds of a generation, being thought about, hinted at, half enunciated by many, until some one of masterful insight focusses the scattered rays and thus founds a new school of thought?

Luther's second call to Wittenberg in 1511, which gave so much offence to his brethren, was for the purpose of enabling him to take the chair of Biblical exegesis, hitherto occupied by Staupitz. He therefore took the degree of "doctor of the Holy Script-

[15] Romans iv, ibid. fol. 77a, quoted ibid. 83.

[16] Romans iii, ibid. fol. 75a, quoted ibid.

[17] A. V. Müller: Luthers theologische Quellen, Einleitung and passim. Something on the same subject in an article "A German View of the *Sola Fides*," by F. Loofs, in the Constructive Quarterly, no. 1, 1913.

ure" on October 18, 1512. The date marks the beginning of his real study of the Bible, which from this time on was undoubtedly the most potent purely intellectual formative influence in his evolution. It is true that he knew the work before, for at his entrance into the cloister the monks had given him a Bible bound in red, and moreover the Constitution of Staupitz, adopted by the Order in 1504, prescribed diligent perusal of the Scriptures.[18] But it was not until he became a doctor, sworn to defend and bound to teach God's Word, that he really applied himself to it and assimilated a portion of its contents.

Luther's exegesis is a subject that well might fill a volume, and yet a few words, inadequate as they must be, are necessary to explain it, for what a man gets out of the Bible always depends on his avenue of approach. Even in the sixteenth century it was noticed that this was the book in which everyone sought, and everyone found, his own dogmas.[19] The work of the Wittenberg professor has been much studied but little clarified. Certainly, the unqualified depreciation meted out to it by scholars blinded by the far greater achievements of modern research does not seem to me just. No one, I should think, can read Luther's criticisms of the Epistle of James or that to the Hebrews, or of some of the historical parts of the Old Testament, without feeling that he had on occasion insight and acumen superior to any of his contemporaries, even Erasmus. His translation, too, is really remarkable, not only as a masterpiece of style, but as a scientific philological achievement. On the other hand, a very superficial acquaintance with Luther's method is sufficient to show that his spirit was anything but scientific; that he was far less objective and open-minded than was Erasmus.

Few works of Biblical scholarship show a more hopeless lack of historical feeling and a greater waste of effort on a totally fruitless method than the first lectures on the Psalms, presently to be described. The subject is too large to be treated here as it deserves, but the key to this strange puzzle, this odd mixture

[18] T. Kolde: Die deutsche Augustiner-Congregation, 22. This provision was later repealed, probably as a consequence of Luther's example.

[19] Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque,
Invenit inque illo dogmata quisque sua.

of fine work and labyrinthine bewilderment, must at least be offered. The answer to the problem is found in the professor's dogma. The supreme interest with him was the establishment, or elucidation, of a preconceived body of ideas, the doctrine of the Church which he adopted so strictly, and which, even in his later days of rebellion against the hierarchy, he did so little to change. This interest was with him decisive. Any exegesis, no matter how far-fetched, any treatment of the text, no matter how violent, which harmonized with and supported the dogmatic system, was considered preferable to any alternative, however natural or reasonable, which seemed to contradict these ideas. This is why the method of Erasmus, in whom the dogmatic interest is at a minimum, and the impartial, critical attitude adopted, so promptly and decisively repelled him. But on the other hand, when his system allowed it, Luther was capable of achievement surpassing that of the humanists. In respect of his limitations it hardly becomes us to judge him too severely; the most famous Biblical scholars of the present show precisely similar tendencies. Not that either Luther or his successors consciously propose to themselves an apologetic method; rather they approach the Bible with the sincere wish to find out exactly what it has to say. It is only according to the psychological law of apperception that they see in the Bible that which they are told is there. The mind can only assimilate that for which it is in some degree prepared. It must be acknowledged, however, that Luther carried his dogma into his exegesis more boldly than do most scholars. He had the courage of his convictions. Thus he altered a text[20] in translating, to make it agree more nearly with the idea which he was convinced, on independent grounds, must be there. Thus also he rejected the Epistle of James because it contradicted his favorite idea of justification by faith; this, however, was much later than the period we are discussing. At that time he felt it incumbent on him to harmonize James and Paul, much as his followers have done since.

Luther's first lectures were on the Psalms; he then took up the Epistles to the Romans, Hebrews, and Galatians. It is significant that his so individual spirit was attracted to those por-

[20] Romans iii, 28. On this, my Luther, 267.

tions of the Bible which are, in either Testament, the supreme expression of personal religion. The dirges and paeans of the Psalmist, the temptations and fightings of the Apostle, struck in his troubled heart a chord deeper than that sounded by the Gospels; for the hero of the Gospels was on such a plane of God-like impeccability that he seemed unable perfectly to sympathize with frail humanity. Luther sought Christ in the Scriptures; indeed he sought him alone, but it was Paul's Christ, the Crucified, whose death and resurrection, rather than whose life, made reconciliation of man and God. All the Scriptures, he thought, spoke of Christ, and he therefore made them speak of him by allegory, if they did not do so directly. His later opinion, that he at first allegorized too much, will certainly be shared by most of his modern readers. Turning over his lectures on the Psalms (1513–16) we see that he found in almost every one some prophecy of Jesus, his birth or life or passion, including specific references to Pilate and Judas. From the modern standpoint it is impossible to imagine a worse method than his. He not only adopted from Lyra the fourfold interpretation of every text, historical, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical, but he improved on it by multiplying it by two; each of the said interpretations being understood in a double sense, the literal and the spiritual. The latter, which dealt with Christ or the Church, was the truer sense, the meaning which gives life while the letter killeth; the sense, in short, which made the true theologian. Anything can be deduced from any text by this method. It is of course hopeless to look for light on the original from Luther's lucubrations on the Psalms. The work on Romans (1515–16) is better, simply because it suited the professor's ideas to take Paul more literally. The Apostle really did speak of Christ, and there is therefore some hope of getting an objective inquiry into his exact meaning. But even here Luther did not at this time get very far; he really read his own ideas into Paul. Having learned from Erasmus and Lefèvre the trick of linguistic criticism, he seemed to make a sincere effort to get the original meaning of the words, but his research seldom went deeper into the context. Every sentence was treated as a premise, from which was deduced, by rigid Aristotelian syllogism, some truth of practical bearing on the question of salvation.

For our present purpose this subjectivity is an advantage; the less of the Psalmist and of Paul, the more of Luther. Read with this only in mind, the first lectures give a pretty accurate account of the road travelled by the Reformer during the years 1513–16. One of the most striking things in them is Luther's large and growing interest in public affairs—the evils in the Church, the tyranny of the princes, the disorders in the monasteries, the faults in the universities. These passages serve to remind us that their writer was rising to a responsible position in the university and in the Order, and that he was already a reformer; but as they have no direct bearing on our particular subject, which is the evolution of the doctrine of justification by faith, they may be safely disregarded for the present.

In the first lectures (1513–15) he has already arrived at a fairly advanced position. He no longer lays the whole emphasis upon works, as he apparently did in the first monastic years, but on the other hand he has not yet arrived at the *sola fides*. Faith without works is dead; a little later, faith is shown by works. The will is still considered free, though largely dependent on grace, but God is thought to give grace infallibly to one who did the best in his power. Indeed, God wants us to co-operate with him in working out our own salvation. Good works are therefore not to be disparaged, for they inevitably proceed from one who has been made just (justified).[21] In pondering the question of his own salvation, Luther is also wavering; he neither despairs of it, as previously, nor postulates it, as later. He relies only on God's mercy, which is our only righteousness;[22] he appreciates God's pity because he knows that he deserves nothing but evil;[23] he shuns blasphemy more than hell, striving to glorify the God who damns him.[24] Indeed, he even takes comfort in the thought that it is a sign of goodness to believe that one is reprobate, for none but those who know that they are most perfect can be free from this dread.[25]

These passages point to the ultimate predestinarian and solifidian doctrines of the lecturer, but they do not actually formulate

[21] Werke, Weimar, iv, 113 (1515).
[22] Ibid. 343 (1513–14), 496 (1514).
[23] Ibid. iv, 131 (1515).
[24] Ibid. iii, 73 (1513–14).
[25] Ibid. i, 41. Sermon of December 27, 1514 or 1515?

them. Faith, he saw, was needed, but how was it to be got, and what was it? How, in short,—for this was the secret thought hardly acknowledged to himself,—could a man have faith in a God who still seemed to him unjust? The answer was suggested by the German mystics, Tauler and one of his school, the so-called Frankforter, whose anonymous manuscript Luther himself first printed under the title *A German Theology*. Just as he was beginning to lecture on Romans, thus becoming more deeply involved than ever in the awful mysteries of predestination and redemption, these men came into his life to tell him, what they felt as few men have ever felt, that the essence of religion is the union of the soul with God, and that this is achieved only by complete abandonment to his will. With the glow of intense conviction Tauler urges the need of ever greater self-denial and of ever completer surrender, until, without the interposition of any external institution, the soul eventually finds herself at one with her bridegroom.[26] So little emphasis is put on the usual ecclesiastical works, that Tauler esteemed the holiest man he ever saw one who had never heard five sermons in his life. He tells of a woman ready to be damned for the glory of God.[27] "And if such a person were dragged into the bottom of hell, there would be the kingdom of God and eternal bliss in hell." In like manner the *German Theology* preached, "Put off thine own will, and there will be no hell."

The bearing of this on faith came to Luther as the answer to the problem he had been meditating day and night for many years. It came to him suddenly, with apparent casualness, as the answer to so many questions comes to us all; the attention hovering around a desiderated thought and dwelling on all known associations with it, until, as it were spontaneously, the new idea, so long wanted, surges up into consciousness. The subconscious self is regarded by William James as the particular seat of the religious impulses, in which a concept may be long maturing, until, sometimes at the end of a protracted struggle, it comes into the stream of consciousness. Now, as we have seen, Luther had

[26] This simile made a particularly strong impression on Staupitz, who worked it out in his Libellus de executione eternae predestinationis (1515) with a realism revolting to modern taste. See Staupitzens Werke, ed. Knaake, i, 137 ff.

[27] Luther was doubtless thinking of this in his Ninety-five Theses, nos. 29, 40.

almost arrived at the conception of redemption by faith when he began to lecture on Romans, in May, 1515. It was apparently soon after this time[28] that the fully formulated idea (with certain corollaries presently to be discussed) dawned upon him with such force that it seemed a direct revelation of the Holy Ghost, opening the door to paradise. It is strange, and yet certain, that this revelation was vouchsafed to him in the privy of the Black Cloister, situated in the little tower overlooking the town walls. One is tempted to connect this fact with the monk's neurosis, referring to parallel cases of obsession driving people to go through certain ceremonies at stated times, often ceremonies of a quasi-religious nature at times least natural for them. It is simpler, however, to recollect only that Luther was a busy man, with little leisure for private meditation, and that the rule enjoined spiritual reflection at these times.[29] In telling the story of the monk who prayed while sitting on the stool, and had a controversy with the devil about the propriety of so doing,[30] Luther probably referred to his own practice. It must naturally have seemed odd to him at the time, however, that such a revelation should come on such an occasion, and thinking over the reason, he symbolized it:[31]

[28] Luther's references to it are so frequent and specific that it is impossible to believe that there was really no crisis at all, as is apparently the opinion of McGiffert, who does not speak of it in his Luther. The dating is more difficult, and is placed in various years from 1508 to 1519 by H. Böhmer, O. Scheel, G. Kawerau, Loofs (Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1911, 461 ff.), and H. Grisar. I place it in 1515 or early in 1516 chiefly because the thought seems to me lacking in the writings of or earlier than 1515, but fully developed in the letters of 1516 (Enders, i, 28 ff. et saepe), and in other writings of this year, e.g. the Quaestio de viribus (Werke, Weimar, i, 142). Luther himself places it between his two courses on Psalms (1516–18, Scheel: Dokumente, 17), and says that it came to him while lecturing on Romans. Tischreden, Weimar, i, 335. Further he says the crisis came when he was "over thirty." Werke, Erlangen, xlvi, 78.

[29] A. V. Müller: Luthers theologische Quellen, 221.

[30] Colloquia, ed. Bindseil, i, 434.

[31] Werke, Weimar, iv, 448. In 1516. My dating of the lectures is based on a system of interpolation; the lectures on Psalms being assumed to have lasted from November, 1513, to October, 1516; those on Romans from May, 1515, to October, 1516. The dating, which I have worked out in great detail, is remarkably supported by parallels, but, even if not quite accurate, it is obvious that when the limits of a course are known, the first lectures must fall near the beginning, the last near the end of the term.

the greatest triumphs of the spirit are in the vile substance of the flesh, which is regarded by the spiritual man, and is stated literally to be, in a manner, a *latrina* and *cloaca*. Conversely, therefore, the *cloaca* might stand for the flesh, in which the message of the spirit was revealed.

Analyzing the content of this experience, we find that it was not, "The just shall live by faith," or any such words. No; this was but the later formulation of an idea totally different when felt. Here, as so often, theology or philosophy but furnished the formula into which a great experience was forced, and thereby cramped and distorted; for words are still so large a part of thought that when once a certain set of them is adopted, it modifies and alters the original conception. What relation does the definition of the word "love" in the dictionary have to the wild heart-throb of passion? But the dogmatic shell of the *sola fides* was, if possible, even farther from the empirical concept which gave it rise, for it did not even approach that experience as closely as language allows; it was not, in short, the primary form in which Luther described his message. The antithesis, faith *versus* works, has become so natural to most students of the Reformation that they forget there is absolutely nothing necessary about it. The natural opposite of "work" is "do nothing," and *this* was the whole essence of Luther's message. Pure passivity on the part of man is the only way to court the grace of God. The strong man, who was never weary of the battle and of striving, was weary of defeat. He had been trying, trying, trying to work out his own salvation—for he had believed this possible—by ridding himself of sin and lust, but all to no avail. He gave it up as a bad job, cried, "Lord, damn or save!" and found peace. The sudden relaxation of the overtense mind is in itself enough to bring it rest. The battle is not to the strong but to him who can yield himself most perfectly into God's hands.

The lectures on Romans are full of this idea; they grow eloquent to the point of passion when they treat of the mastering thesis. Paul's purpose in the whole letter, according to his exegete, is to destroy all one's own righteousness and wisdom, to show man his sins and folly and his deep need of Christ as his justification.

In fact, the more we seek salvation, the more God gives damnation. What, then, can we do to be saved? All we can do is to yield ourselves up with perfect resignation into God's hands, holding the soul as passive as a woman at conception,[32] who by no effort of her own is impregnated with the grace of her bridegroom. To express his idea, he invented the phrase "passive righteousness of God," meaning thereby the righteousness of God which he puts in or imputes to man without any merit or even effort of the latter. The word has naturally puzzled many scholars, even the thorough Köstlin, who knew it only in the Reformer's later reminiscence. According to this, the crux of the whole matter was to fathom the mystery of how God's righteousness could justify man, for by righteousness of God (*justitia Dei*) Luther had always understood "the formal or active justice of God, by which he is just and punishes sinners"; but in the revelation he is describing it came to him that by it the Apostle rather meant "the passive justice of God, by which he mercifully justifies us through faith." These words are indeed obscure as they stand, but they are amply elucidated by reference to the *Commentary on Romans*. There we read that the passivity is to be understood of man, who thus and only thus acquires God's grace. Another image to bring this truth home is that of the axe in the hands of the woodman and of the rod in the hand of a man chastising a dog. Neither the axe nor the rod can do aught of itself, but only the master. Now this "passive and active justification" is the same as believing in God, and the power to do even this is also his special gift. Again faith is defined as not merely believing in him—the writer's former position—but believing him to be just, for it is only his justice that makes us just. Consequently, "faith is justifying grace," and faith in Christ takes away the consciousness of sin.

The corollaries of this passivity, which, because it was so hard, was interpreted as the highest mark of faith, were drawn with strict logic. "Where now is our righteousness? Where are good works? Where are the freedom of the will and chance?" The will has no power to justification, but only to sin. Where God

[32] Römerbrief, Scholien, 206. This comparison of the soul to the bride of Christ was not of course original with Luther. It was the favorite simile of the monks.

does everything, man can do nothing; therefore his will is in bondage. This dogma, in fact, is but the reverse of the medal of which the doctrine of faith only is the obverse. That it makes God the cause of man's sin and damnation is frankly recognized, though it is stated that, as all belongs to him, he has a right to do as he will with his own. The doctrine is put very strongly, for God is conceived as dealing out redemption and reprobation with total disregard of the merits and demerits of individuals. As this idea, to our notions so irrational and mean, became widely prevalent among Protestants, it must be assumed to have had in it something suited to the mental constitution of the time. What this was, however, is hard to say. It can certainly not be explained on the overworked maxim that man makes God in his own image, for a capricious and tyrannical God was repugnant to the natural feelings of the Reformer. It was only by a supreme effort of faith that he could persuade himself that a Deity apparently so cruel and iniquitous could be merciful and just. The thesis of this article is that Luther's beliefs were deduced from his experiences, and yet it must be recognized that this key is too simple to fit all locks. Some of his beliefs were apparently but the logical deductions of others, although the corollaries occasionally ran counter to the emotions which prompted the primary propositions.

Another deduction from the main premise, and one which he was obliged to modify in practice, was the total worthlessness of good deeds, even those of ordinary morality. This in fact was the antinomianism with which the *sola fides* is often charged, and which, in fact, it often produced. The position he held in 1516 is more cautious than it occasionally was later, but it is sufficiently pronounced. Venial sins are thought not to prevent a man inheriting eternal life, and good works do not help him to it. Good works without grace are like the actions of a monkey imitating a man, but unable thereby to make himself one. Grace, and grace alone, is necessary. The negative side of the same teaching is cast into the form of caustic sarcasms against the "*justitiarii*" who rely on their own endeavors. Their righteousness is no righteousness, for man has none save that which is imputed to him by God. A man may be perfectly good (*rectus*)

without being in the least justified (*justus*). In short, the heroic virtues of Fabricius and Regulus no more savor of redemption than do sorb-apples of figs.[33]

The final corollary of the great message was: Certainty of salvation. "*The elect are saved* not contingently but *necessarily*."[34] These words, thus underlined by Luther, indicate the last stage in the development of his system, for they brought him the assurance of comfort and hope. He dwells on the concept at length and frequently. He never forgets that the new hope came to him through despair, that to win heaven a man must be resigned to hell.

This great experience was the beginning of the career of the Reformer. It was the corner-stone of his life and doctrine. The effect was almost instantaneous. "It is mine," said he, with superb self-confidence, shortly after, "to point out whatever I may see that is not right, even in high places." It was this feeling which made him thoroughly purge his university of the dross of Aristotelian ethics. It was this hatred of good works that necessitated the momentous protest against indulgences, and it was the comfort brought by the idea of faith and salvation that nerved its champion in the hard battle until the victory was won.

Once enunciated, the doctrine spread rapidly; faith as a grain of mustard-seed waxed a great tree; the morsel of yeast leavened the whole lump. In the secular twentieth century it requires a slight effort of the imagination to realize what enthusiasm a purely religious idea might arouse in the sixteenth. That it did so is certain; undoubtedly because multitudes were sick of the holiness of works offered them by the Church, and longed for a more spiritual religion. Admitting that the antithesis has often been exaggerated and stated, both by Luther and his followers,

[33] Enders, i, 64. October 19, 1516. This is of course from Augustine, recalling the saying attributed to him, that the virtues of the heathen were but splendid vices. Cf. also Römerbrief, Scholien, 323.

[34] Römerbrief, Scholien, 208. It may be of interest to note that at the Council of Trent, twenty-one theologians were for "certitudo gratiae," fourteen against it, and two silent. A. V. Müller, op. cit., 219. But the doctrine was rejected. Pastor: History of the Popes, xii, 345.

with gross unfairness,[35] nevertheless the popular idea remains roughly right, that the Reformation meant a movement from a mechanical to an individual and subjective conception of religion. It was the same need of doing away with externals and seeking an immediate relation to God that moved the mystics of the fourteenth century; but Europe was not then ripe for the idea. The explanation of Luther's success where Tauler failed is partly found in the timely elements with which he combined his original thought. His own experience was but the nucleus around which was gathered all that was most vital in the thought of the age—the return to the Bible, to Augustine and to mysticism, the protest against the sophistries of the schoolmen and against the corruption of the Church, and a simpler, more individual relation of the soul to God. Above all, Martin Luther was fitted to be the prophet of his age because he had the most searching experience in what that age imperiously demanded, personal religion.

[35] Luther says that the papists believed "Der Munch-Dreck besser quam fides." Werke, Weimar, xlvi, 296.

THE TEACHING OF ERNST TROELTSCH OF HEIDELBERG

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In these days of world-wide intercommunication, the hope of unity and demand for it among men are very strong, so strong that the optimistically inclined often think they already see the rosy hues of a dawn heralding the day of universal harmony. Perhaps these good people are right; but in no respect do modifying considerations appear more clearly than in matters of religion and religious thought. In these things racial as well as individual differences exist; and even between nations so near akin as Germany and the United States mutual understanding seems hard to attain. No doubt the average religious man in America looks upon Germany as a hot-bed of religious radicalism, opposed to all those principles of piety which good men wish to see preserved. There is ground for this opinion, in that German theologians have led the way in the application of the critical method to the facts of religion, and it is often still true, though far less than a few decades ago, that the theories advanced contain poison for the springs of pure religion. But this is not the whole of the picture. Besides the forces of stanch conservatism, which are as strong and as active in Germany as elsewhere, there exists also there at present a vigorous and increasing body of men, as much interested in religion as any conservatives, who are attempting to mediate the great truths of religion to the modern man, whose views are no longer in agreement with orthodoxy. To some these teachers may seem radical, but to those who realize that the great crux is the religious life itself and not this or that particular formulation of it, they convey a distinct impression of constructive renewal—renewal, because they reckon with the knowledge and forces of the new day; constructive, because they build upon and further the knowledge which the past has bequeathed and the forces to which man has ever turned for help and strength.

Such a man is Ernst Troeltsch of Heidelberg, too little known on this side of the Atlantic, but a man to be reckoned with in the future here, as he already is in his own land. That a new school will form itself about him is unlikely; his teaching is too individualistic for that. But many a student is attracted by his powerful reasoning, fearlessly critical of all the prevailing tendencies—orthodox, Ritschlian, Hegelian, pragmatic—and gets from him a deeper hold on the realities of the spiritual life and a stronger faith in Christianity as the permanent expression of that life. It is this broad aspect of Troeltsch's teaching which will interest us here rather than his views concerning the history of Protestant Christianity, which is his special field.[1]

The Hegelian school of evolutionary idealism[2] has sought to reduce religion to the "idea" which it postulates as the germ existing in primitive religions and developed gradually by evolution into its absolute manifestation in Christianity. Great as this conception is, and satisfying as it is to many, it is weak in every part. We do not know and probably never shall know enough about the real conceptions of primitive man to discover in them, in all cases, the germ out of which later developments have come; nor are we able to identify historical Christianity with the philosophic Absolute in the manner intended. Also, valuable and legitimate as the theory of evolution is, it will not stand the test when face to face with the great religious movements of the world. They defy the attempts to explain them by any theory of continuous development, for such explanations ignore the underivable, creative, and sovereign elements manifest in the great personalities which alone have given birth to the durable religions of mankind. Thus Troeltsch opposes such thinkers as Hegel, Schelling, Pfleiderer, and the Cairds, who

[1] The following presentation of Troeltsch's views is made from carefully taken notes of lectures and books, and undoubtedly many passages approximate closely to his actual words; but because of the uncertainty as to an exact verbal correspondence, the writer has deemed it wiser not to use quotation-marks, even in referring to specific books and lectures.

[2] (a) Lectures on "Religionsphilosophie" delivered in Heidelberg in 1912; (b) "Die Selbständigkeit der Religion" in the Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1895; (c) Das Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft. See Die Kultur der Gegenwart, I: 4: pp. 460–489.

would make religion subsidiary to philosophy. Philosophy is right and necessary; but it can reach only a logically postulated unity without content. To reduce religion to that would make it no religion at all, and complete knowledge of it would mean its end.

The same result ensues with those who would reduce religion to mere aesthetics, as is done by Feuerbach and similar thinkers. According to these religion is a practical human creation, the poetic deification of human needs; the wish is father to the thought; and comforting and helpful as the thought may be, it is still an illusion. Illusory also is aesthetic pantheism, which reduces religion to art and makes of it merely a sense of the harmonious and the beautiful in nature. All such systems presuppose an illusion as an objective reality. But do the facts of religion support such a theory of illusion? If the wish were father to the thought, then fear and anxiety would be the only feelings brought into play; but as a matter of fact friendly communion is quite as prominent an element in all known religions as propitiatory expiation. The powerful religions always contain a mixture of the gentle and the terrible, which is far better explained as responsive to objective reality than as an artificial creation. The frequent absorption of independent cultural values by the religious life is not an idealizing process, for religion is not an idealization of culture. On the contrary, religion has often, as in the case of Israel and in Greece, tended to separate from set cultural forms, and the view constantly recurs that culture is the enemy of religion. For religion sets its eye on the beyond. The touch of the Absolute is upon it, an experience of something higher, that creates needs by establishing a gap between the ideal and the actual. To reduce religion, therefore, to poetic fantasy, which creates nothing new but only reshapes what is, would be the reduction of its fundamental sense of the Absolute to pure illusion; and this would mean robbing the world of all worth.

More common and convincing today is the derivation of religion from morality, or at least the conception of religion as a mere hand-maid of right action. Religion is thought of as morality colored by the Absolute, or, as Matthew Arnold described it, "morality touched with emotion." It is no wonder that the

attempt at such an identification should be made in a time when so much emphasis is being laid upon the ethical side of all questions, and indeed the two fields lie very near each other. Kant maintained that a moral law-giver was the necessary inference from the moral law. That is, religion is not a process of clothing the moral law with authoritative supernatural garments, but is the necessary and logical result of the categorical imperative, a result of morality and derived from it. Others hold that religion is a fanciful creation of human weakness in its effort to attain morality, which is the main thing, but which the average man finds it hard to follow for its own sake. That is, God is introduced to drive or inspire us to the great moral task of life, which in itself has not compelling power sufficient for the case.

Is either of these derivations justifiable? Thirty or forty years ago the usual answer was yes, but historical investigation has enabled us to know and judge the facts better. Not even in the great religions, where the moral and the religious elements are closest together, is such a derivation or identification possible. In them the first commandment is not ethical efficiency or righteousness but union with God. The other commandment may be "like unto it" but is not the same. Religion is ever independent, and does not spring from morality nor exist for the sake of sanctioning it. The salvation of the Buddhist is in the beyond, in a remoulding of the soul, and not in ethics; while the neo-Platonic communion with God is independent of good or bad action. In all the higher religions there lies this contrast, often an opposition, between the religious element, looking at "the things which are not seen and eternal," and the moral element, looking at "the things that are seen," temporal, practical, worldly. Over against the natural appeal to the moral effect of their faith by defenders of religion must be placed many instances of strong religious feeling coupled with great lack of morality, fanaticism indulging in extremest acts of immorality. This is lack of development, of course, but not hypocrisy, and it is conclusive proof that the two, religion and morality, are not identical or derived one from the other, but are independent. Morality grows out of social life in all its varied forms. Religion springs out of experience with the superhuman, and originally was morally indifferent.

The only method of their union would be through a fusion of ethics and religion. This, Wundt holds, has been historically accomplished, and the object of religion therefore is now really the moral law. Such a fusion has of course taken place, though it has never become absolute, and if it were so, it would not prove the origin of religion in ethics any more than the converse. Furthermore, that the distinction has always remained along with the fusion is shown by the periodical outbreak of one or the other against its companion element. Through ethics indeed there has come a deepening and purification of religion; yet, as shown so clearly by Nietzsche in the case of Christianity, all universal religions have a double ethics, one eye toward the world and the other toward heaven, a worldly morality and a religious morality. Thus even here the two elements exist side by side and remain different from each other. So, Troeltsch contends, religion is not to be identified with or derived from morality, any more than morality is to be identified with or derived from religion.

Briefly put, Troeltsch's course of reasoning is this: All thought must start with an analysis of the facts of the human consciousness—a psychological investigation pure and simple. The mechanical-naturalistic and association theories are not without value, but they do not explain the facts of the mind. It is the structural theory which best solves the problem. The mind has its several capacities, mutually related to be sure, but each independent and sovereign in its own domain. The logical, aesthetic, and moral elements of consciousness are sovereign within their own spheres, each operating according to its own principles and judged by its own standards. But the facts of human experience demand the admission of the religious consciousness also into this hierarchy of equals, in that it too constitutes an independent element of human thought.

The peculiar characteristic of this religious faculty is its sense of the Absolute, generated primarily in the great religious leaders of the world, and from them reproduced by various means among the mass of men in whom such original productive powers are lacking. The question of the correctness of this belief lies beyond the realm of psychology, in that of the theory of knowledge. Is

the sense of the Absolute, which is the characteristic mark of the religious experience, valid? Does it correspond to an external reality which gives it rise? Is it, in other words, knowledge and in correspondence with truth?

Troeltsch's answer has already been indicated. The religious sense of the Absolute is grounded in and arises from an absolute objective reality, which manifests itself in human consciousness, and especially in those great leaders of mankind whom we may call religious geniuses or prophets. Troeltsch is emphatically a theist, and a thorough-going personal idealist. Theodor Kaftan, in his misleading brochure on Troeltsch,[3] accuses him of being a pantheist. This is undoubtedly due to the latter's insistence on "inclusive" supernaturalism against the "exclusive" supernaturalism of the orthodox view. But, as a matter of fact, Troeltsch is as far from pantheism as he is from positivism or pragmatism, or from materialism, to which, according to him, these systems all more or less readily lend themselves. His conception of God is not unlike the "*force créatrice*" of Bergson, whom he is wont to mention sympathetically—a great, inexplicable Power who has done much in the world that is beyond our understanding and who cannot be reduced to the measure of the expected; inscrutable, yet revealed in human history, especially in its loftiest personalities; a Being who, when we consider the age of the world, the possibility of other inhabited worlds, and the numberless human beings who have lived on this earth beyond the horizon of known history, cannot be thought of as limiting his self-revelation to any one place or time. He must be thought of in personal terms, even though he cannot actually be compassed by the mind of man; separate from the world and yet immanent in it, separate from man and yet coming into communion with him. This is theism through and through. In it the voluntaristic and apparently non-rational elements in God's nature are so emphasized that Troeltsch feels himself in greater sympathy with the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination than many Calvinists themselves. He has indeed put himself on record as believing that this doctrine is today unduly minimized and underestimated. It is undoubtedly this element in Calvinism together with its

[3] Ernst Troeltsch, 1912.

capability for modern social tasks, that leads Troeltsch to count it superior to the Lutheran Church, to which he belongs and by whose stanch adherents he is in consequence not wholly liked.

All this means that the religious consciousness has as much right and capacity to supply valid knowledge to man as any other phase of his mental life. We have been for years too much under the domination of those who have insisted on the legitimacy of the logical faculty alone. The result has been a dogmatism on the part of the mechanical-naturalistic or equally mechanical intellectualistic theorists, who will not see the facts which testify to the presence in the world of a creative spirit whose acts cannot all be forecast or reduced to known rules of reason. Logic has its method of procedure, its laws, and its validity. So has the moral consciousness, by which the validity of the categorical imperative is established; so also the aesthetic sense in matters concerning the beautiful.

In like manner the religious sense of the Absolute may be deemed valid. Through long experience and consideration of the facts of life one may reach the intellectual conviction that religious faith is justified; that a spiritual interpretation of the universe is the right one; that "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world." But this conviction is not proof and cannot be used to prove the proposition to others, though as a supplementary confirmation of faith it is not to be disregarded. The religious object can be apprehended only through the religious consciousness itself; and it is only by means of entrance into the religious experience, by coming into direct soul-contact with God himself, that certainty can be set up and proof established. In other words, we are here in the realm of the most highly personal of all experiences, one for which other experiences of a different sort may give the occasion or confirmation but which remains distinct from them, unique, compelling, and self-evidencing; valid just as our sense of logical unity, of goodness and right, of beauty and harmony, is valid. No one may substitute even this theory of religious knowledge for the knowledge itself. All must enter in by the same narrow door, which involves conversion, not in the way prescribed by traditional theology, but in a broad

sense none the less deep; a new birth, a turning from the lower to the higher life, from material, temporal, and earthly things to "the things that are above, eternal in the heavens"; a personal communion with the Father of Spirits, which conveys to the believer that sense of reality without which religion is no religion at all.

Thus we come to one of Troeltsch's fundamental emphases, in many respects the most fundamental—namely, the essential subjectivity of the religious process. This element brings him into close touch with the mystics of all ages, for whom he naturally expresses great regard; with Schleiermacher, whose teaching as a whole he more nearly follows than that of any other man; with the Pietists, in spite of his condemnation of their Biblical literalism and anti-social tendencies; and finally with Ritschl, through whom largely, I suspect, in the contacts of student days, this trait was developed in him. Even at that time, however, his many points of disagreement with the Ritschlian school began to show themselves. Like all his past and present subjectivistic *confrères*, Troeltsch has at this point been forced to run the gauntlet of otherwise opposed but here united foes—the dogmatists and systematics of every kind, theological and philosophical, conservative and radical,—who hate nothing so much as a sovereign individual.

These critics Troeltsch meets by bringing out the essential relation existing between individual faith and the facts of history. While the mystic hovers in the immediacy of the eternal, oblivious of mundane actualities, Troeltsch maintains that theism must be based on the whole phenomenon of religion and its evolution in history. That he is himself unusually well equipped historically and has carefully considered what has been thought and felt in the realm of religion, even a superficial reader of his writings can see. In his article "*Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums'*"[4] he rejects the three main solutions which have hitherto been offered of the relation of history to norms—the rationalistic, according to which all history is but a blurred expression of a human ideal; the supernaturalistic, which employs authority guaranteed by miracle; and that of evolutionary idealism, which

[4] In Die Christliche Welt, 1903, nos. 19, 21, 23, 25, 28.

is the absolute realization of the Idea in history. All these, he says, have been disproved by the criticism of the last century; and he concludes, "The only other solution is that of the purely factual and irrational connection of a Reality, recognized as necessary and true, with historic tradition and experience." Every new thought and experience bears witness to that connection, flowing out of preceding thoughts and experiences but not being comprehended in them. Therefore there will always be devotion to the past, new creation of the future, and personal appropriation. The historic object never lies ready merely to be appropriated, but is always newly created, maintaining its continuity in a mixture of the historical with conscious, personal expansion and modification. This is not mere unbridled subjectivism, but a conscientious historical subjectivism.

Several of Troeltsch's outstanding convictions may for convenience' sake be grouped here, convictions which touch directly and vitally this question of the relation of the subjective and the objective, of norms and their historical embodiment. Like most Germans, Troeltsch is very apt to shift the scene from facts to presuppositions; and he does not hesitate to admit the legitimacy, nay to demand the necessity, of a presupposition in estimating history. The only question is of the range and accuracy of the experience of which the presupposition is born and then of its ability to stand the repeated assault of the facts. He holds that we have a right to presuppose not only the possibility but also the probability of the existence of original, spiritual values in history, values which cannot be explained by the purely naturalistic hypothesis; furthermore, thinkers of the naturalistic class are quite as open as the idealists to the charge of being unduly *a priori* in their methods. His rule for passing judgment on religious history is this: "We must consider that religion to be the highest in which the religious *a priori* value comes to clearest expression," that is, that religion in which the sense of the Absolute is most satisfyingly embodied.[5] The goal for which Troeltsch here strives is, as he says, the same goal for which Hegel strove, an efficient unity and a norm; but the method is different in substituting a teleological law of evolution for the Hegelian dialectic.

[5] Das Wesen der Religion.

But, according to Troeltsch, the religious *a priori*, the sense of the Absolute, is a matter of great religious personalities; for all durable religions have had their origin in the "revelation" imparted to individuals. Hence his great emphasis upon the religious heroes of the race, the prophets of Israel—Jesus, Augustine, St. Francis, Luther, Buddha, Mohammed. One of his issues with the Ritschlians, however, is at this very point. In spite of this emphasis on the creative religious individual, which Ritschl makes the exclusive basis of his system, Troeltsch insists on the necessity of estimating a religion not by its founder alone but by the whole course of its development. In estimating Christianity, for example, it is not the teaching and the person of Christ that constitute the sole test, central and controlling as they may be. It is the whole course of that organic religious development which began with the Hebrew prophets, culminated in Jesus, was mediated and extended through Paul, the Catholic church, and the Protestant movements, and is still with us, a living, growing, creative force. Thus we necessarily reach the conception of a progressive revelation;[6] according to which the Bible may be considered central and yet allowance be made for a present-day revelation as well, a revelation which progresses, but is sufficiently close to the old lines to unite with tradition and to be called Christian. In many modern forces Troeltsch sees just such a Christian progress. He sees it in the emphasis on immanence and humanitarianism; in the recognition of the unknown elements in God's nature, with the fact of the immense size of the universe; in the objection to miracles, and in the consequent removal of the gap between the Christian and non-Christian worlds. He recognizes Christian kinship also in the modern belief in a dynamic rather than a mechanical revelation, and the resulting opposition to all sacramental ideas; in the rejection of the idea of a lost world, given over by its Creator, which should busy itself only with sin and its removal; in the abandonment of the demand for comprehensive, systematic formulations of absolute truth considered as final; and lastly, in the opening up of Christianity toward the world and toward the idea that all of life is to be controlled by the spirit, that "religious experience" means a

[6] Cf. Lectures on "Glaubenslehre," delivered in Heidelberg in 1912.

valuation and personal appropriation of all the elements of life. All these modern ideas should be looked upon as a real revelation of God himself in present-day life, the latest phases of God's self-manifestation to man.

Troeltsch recognizes the fact that most men in the world accept more or less willingly the authoritativeness of those views into which they have been born, but that for the increasing number to whom education is bringing independent judgment, religion is presenting an acute problem. With the outcry over the possibility of a new religion different from all that have gone before, or of a gradual disappearance of all religion, Troeltsch has little sympathy. The question for an educated man in doubt is not that of a new religion, nor of an intellectual sublimation of the religious experience, which would then be displaced by philosophy; nor yet again of a syncretism of various existing religious systems. The problem is rather one of estimating and choosing between the systems already before us in the world; not in the exclusive way of the Ritschlians and of many orthodox thinkers, who will allow no good outside of Christianity, but a choice, nevertheless, involving gradations and personal devotion to the religion of one's choice. The necessity of entering personally into the spirit of a religion in order to judge it and really to choose it is absolute. Troeltsch does not underestimate the difficulty of this task, but insists upon it and tries honestly to perform it himself. The historical judgment involved in this is something more than a judgment of facts, and something more personal and vital than a calm, unprejudiced, intellectual decision. It is contact of life on life, spirit on spirit; and the choice is an inevitable response of the whole man to the appeal of the vital force, the spirit, which is in the religion. This does not mean reading one's own ideas or ideals into the religion. It means rather judging each by its own standards, bearing in mind Ranke's famous sentence which Troeltsch is very fond of quoting, "Every age is direct to God."

This famous statement is all the more necessary because all religions and all prophets have been historically conditioned. All in history is relative. Both the universal and our idea of it find limitations and conditions in their historical manifestation.

An absolute is not to be found anywhere in history. So strongly does Troeltsch insist on this point that one is almost led to think he cannot find his way back to any norm, not to say the Absolute. But while he goes with Kant in emphasis on the relativity of history, he goes with him also in the method of establishing the religious norm, and still more with Schleiermacher in the necessity of overcoming this relativity by ontological, historical speculation. The norm lies beyond history, but it exists; and its existence, suggested by history, can also be traced in history. So Troeltsch says with Schleiermacher, "The spirit in mankind is not different from that which the Holy Spirit is also. We thus have in combination what appears to be both natural and supernatural."

Thus far we have been engaged chiefly with Troeltsch's historical method. It is time to call attention to his results,—to his own concrete judgments upon the course of religious history.[7] In this, as in most matters, his voice is clear and strong. Men's lives are really governed by a very few thoughts, and hence in religious history we have only to decide among a few great manifestations. The decision among religions is the more necessary, because of the increased significance of personally grounded religions and the decreased significance of individual production, which lessens the possibility of creating anything really new. The norm will have to be found in the strongest and best religion, appropriating only the best elements of the others. This means that we must root ourselves, if at all, in a historical religion, giving it at the same time the new emphasis necessitated by our new knowledge. We have to set up an end which can be seen in all the progress of history and to judge the different revelations by their depth, greatness, and power of drawing men to God. The norm, he repeats, is always subjective, a matter of personal conviction; but it springs out of a careful historical examination, conducted without prejudice, sympathetically and conscientiously. A final decision must come through personal conviction; knowledge must be bound up with earnest morality and piety. If the norm results from a comparison of religions, it implies a common relation

[7] Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte; Tübingen und Leipzig, 2te Auflage, 1912.

of all to a universally valid, immanent element; not to an abstract universal idea, but rather a goal or ideal—a transcendental goal recognizable in its main outlines but whose full meaning transcends knowledge, an ideal manifesting itself in history only in individual, limited forms. Our search in history then is not for the absolute religion, but for the clearest embodiment of the highest valid religious truth. Is this a task so difficult as to cause despair? Consider the simplicity and unchangeableness of pure religion as contrasted with the changes in cultural ideals, bound up as they are with nature; yet the content of culture is, in its main points, simple and constant. If we think we can discern a fundamental culture in the past and base practical action on its principles, why may we not in the same way determine the principles of religion and consider it valid to win in like manner connection and unity for the spiritual life? In other words, why may we not hold that in the greatest human religion we see the victory of the purest and deepest thoughts of God?

The question now arises, "Is Christianity the greatest human religion?" This is a matter of personal conviction arising from a broad, historical comparison and not from an isolated consideration of Christianity or from an assumption of its absoluteness. The latter methods may give to some men satisfaction, but they will not satisfy most modern minds. On the other hand, such a conviction is a confession of faith; which is always a matter of jest to strict and narrow scientists. But these have no monopoly of science, and their own peculiar views of reality are not unassailable. Hence the main thing is a faith based on an inner appropriation of the great spiritual movements of the world. Troeltsch does not hesitate to affirm that such a faith, based on such an appropriation, will confess Christianity as the greatest human religion, the highest manifestation in history of valid religious truth. We must, however, consider Christianity in its entire historical manifestation; as an organic union of Hebrew prophetism, the teaching and person of Jesus, Pauline mysticism, Stoic and Platonic idealism, the Catholic fusion of European culture and religion in the Middle Ages, the individuality of Luther, and the moral earnestness and activity of Protestantism. This has indeed been the main line of progress and may easily be defended as the historic ground of our norm.

The primitive forms of religion are comparatively unimportant because it is a psychological error to seek to derive the higher religions from the lower through an analysis of the latter. It is only the great universal religions which can come into consideration, and among these the legal religions, Judaism and Islam, are less strong than others. It is among the religions of salvation that the real contest lies, religions which make a clear break with actuality and then return to it again with God-given power; and indeed among these religions, between two main types: that represented by inclusive Christianity on the one hand, and on the other by Brahmanism and Buddhism, which in some respects resemble the neo-Platonic and Gnostic systems. In Christianity, God and the soul are freed from the world, in that they are personalities overcoming nature; eternal worth breaks out of the depths to overcome what is. In the Indian type, God is pure being and the world is evil; salvation is the end of the world-process and means absorption of personality in the being of God. In Brahmanism, God is the abstraction of being, and salvation is self-salvation through contemplation and asceticism. In Buddhism, God is at once the world-order and world-fate, and salvation is self-salvation through breaking the will and right knowledge. Christianity, on the other hand, is the strongest possible manifestation of religious personality. It means a complete break between the higher and the lower world. It changes and does away the lower, through souls in the world which are made strong through the love of God. In a sense, it denies the world, and yet it affirms it as from God; and the combination of affirmation and denial results in the greatest strength that has yet been seen in the world. The choice therefore lies between salvation through thought directed to super-being or no-being, and salvation through trustful faith, by which we share in the personality of God, the ground of all life and worth. All the great interests of religion, centring about the conceptions of God, the world, the soul, and eternal life, are more independently and vigorously conserved in Christianity than in the competing group. Here the idea of God tends always toward unity, spirit, morality, and distinction from both the world and the soul. The conceptions of the world and the soul tend to distinguish

them both from each other and from God; a separation which overcomes contradictions and makes possible salvation through a higher life beyond the sense-life. Outside of Christianity all of these tendencies are bound down by the primitive view of God as an essence or force of nature, and of men as being and not becoming. The legal religions give the law of God, but leave men to work it out. The non-Christian, self-salvation religions merge the world and man in God's substance, but lose thereby all content and positive meaning for the essence of God. Only Christianity has overcome the persistent naturalism in religion, and revealed a living God who is doing and willing, as opposed to merely being; who unites the soul with himself in order that, saved, comforted, and purified from guilt and pride, it may work in the world toward the upbuilding of the Kingdom of God which is the kingdom of pure personal worth.

Hence Christianity is the high point of convergence of all religious evolution and opens a new kind of life. It is not to be identified with the absolute, since it is historically conditioned and limited in every form, and so we are not able to prove that it will always be the highest religion, i.e. that it will never be surpassed. But its supremacy over all previous religions and the fact that all real progress since its inception has been upon its basis, may give us good ground for believing in its permanent supremacy. Thus we may consider it the plane on which all further spiritual life will move, and yet withhold our consent from the proposition that it is, historically, the absolute truth. Troeltsch contends that this position is not only demanded by the canons of historic thought but is also implied in one of the most central ideas of Christianity itself, namely, its emphasis on the future judgment of God as bringing absolute truth. In other words, according to Christianity itself, absolute truth lies beyond this world. We must consider of course the possibility of the downfall of modern Christian civilization and the rise of other historical forms not related to Jesus of Nazareth; but even in such an extreme case we may believe that the history of Christianity would only be re-enacted. Hence Christianity represents not only the highest that has been, but also the future, insuperable religion, the militant, triumphant Kingdom of God himself. Yet we can

employ the term "absolute" in connection with it only in a perverted sense, signifying highest worth and the certainty of being on the way toward complete truth. This is all we mortals can achieve, but it is also all we need.

The estimate of Christianity just given is of Christianity as a totality, including, as we have said, not only the teaching and person of Jesus, but also the antecedent forces of Hebrew prophetism and the subsequent developments within Christianity itself—its apostolic, Catholic, and Protestant forms.[8] In this respect also Troeltsch breaks with Ritschlianism and its exclusive emphasis on Jesus alone. But at the same time he values in his own way the founder of Christianity quite as highly, and with certain limitations is in close agreement with Ritschl in a common emphasis on the necessity of a personal appropriation of the spirit of Christ. Jesus is for him the central force of Christianity but not the sole element in it; for the picture we have of the Master is mediated to us through his followers, and hence we must consider subsequent events and hold steadily before us the wide, historic, Christian stream.

This mediation through Christian disciples, even in our very earliest sources, has created wide-spread historic doubt. What can we really know about the historic Jesus? Does not our modern idea of individual freedom make us disdain to build upon external authority, or to stake our all on the possibility of demonstrating a sole historic event? Does not faith look up and not back, fixing its gaze upon a present or future goal, eternal and timeless, and not on an event of the past? We must certainly admit that in all history we are dealing with probabilities, and that the chance of error is large, especially in such documents as those which constitute our Bible, for they sprang out of uncritical faith. Thus it is not strange that we find many conflicting views within the Christian church itself concerning the essence of Christianity. A common conception is hard to find, but the great common impulse is easy to see; and this stream of impulse is easily traced back to its source in the founder, Jesus of Nazareth. Here is our historic connection, and it cannot be excluded from faith. If it were excluded, no cult and no religious organization would be

[8] "Glaubenslehre," *ut supra.*

possible, and there would be no impulse toward practical activity in the world, only a mystic, religious individualism without any concrete, continuous, ethical content. This is what happens at the break-up of every great historic religion; and if this individualistic mysticism is to be the religion of the future, it means the end of Christianity and the end of religion, a powerless humanity.

The centre of a great religion is always a person, its founder; and the essential element in any organization of this kind is the attitude toward this founder. All else is secondary. The cult, dogmas, and creeds are only expressions of this relation; but they are necessary as a vehicle of the common conception of the founder, for we can have organization only by means of some acceptances in common. This historic connection is not contradicted by the fact of religious autonomy. As in the other fields of human activity—law, ethics, politics—so it is here. We cannot create everything ourselves but are dependent on the past, unless we choose to be barbarians. Autonomy means only our own way of appropriating what is not our own production, the progressive continuation of that which is already given. This implies not subjection to the mere historic fact but subjection to the ideal which is clearly incorporated in the fact; for we cannot make a purely temporal, historic event the object of our faith, but only the meaning of the event, the timeless element incorporated in the historical sequence but not identical with it.

We are obliged then to separate our historical investigation from the religious valuation of its results. We must decide independently what are historic facts and then independently estimate them. Thus in a measure faith is dependent upon history, though history can never tell us what we must believe. It can only tell us what we can or cannot believe; for the very facts which exclude certain beliefs always leave room for a variety of other beliefs. Thus we are forced to consider first the historic facts of Jesus' life before we can talk of faith. It is not the details that we need secure but the main points of his preaching and of his personality. Is the tradition good or is it unreliable? Faith cannot answer the question. Here, as everywhere, faith is dependent upon the scientific establishment of fact, and, as not every one can investigate these problems for himself, most men

abide by the authority of their leaders. Still, the Jesus of history makes a clear impression upon simple instinct and common sense that is sufficiently in accord with the facts. For highly educated and scientifically trained classes, however, an individual historic examination is essential.

How then does the case stand with the Gospel tradition? This is no longer a matter of details but a great fundamental question. Are the representations of Jesus, to be found on the one hand in the ethical, rabbinical Synoptists, and on the other in the more ecclesiastical, mystical writings of the Pauline-Johannine school—are these of different origin? In other words, how are the teaching and personality of Jesus, with their prophetic affiliations, related to the cult of Jesus which sprang up so early in the history of the Christian community? Was the cult of Jesus an inner Christian development out of this teaching and personality, or was it due to a non-Christian cult attaching itself to Jesus? Troeltsch holds that the latter explanation is unjustified except in its emphasis upon the hiatus and the distinction. Of just such a mystery-cult we have no knowledge. Cults of this sort are known, but none of a kind of quality to explain the Christian cult. The gap and the changes in it do not necessitate such a theory and at no point in the apostolic history do we find any point of union. The theory is improbable in itself also from the analogies of other religions and other religious leaders. Mohammed was made almost divine without the help of any such outside influence, and the histories of the Buddha and of St. Francis show how easily deification can arise among religious followers. We have here therefore an internal Christian or Jewish-Christian development, against which no inherent impossibility can be urged; for it is clear that Jesus was an extraordinary personality and a teacher of the highest originality, who strongly opposed the ordinary view of life. Consider the combined effect of his teaching and personality, his own lofty self-consciousness, his striking death and the resurrection visions.[9] Out of all these things it is easy to explain the rise of the cult of Christ in which Jesus of Nazareth was worshipped, not

[9] Troeltsch considers these visions to have been psychological results of the memory of Jesus' personality; though the possibility of a real intercourse with the spirit of Jesus is not excluded.

as God, for this was not the original idea, but as Messiah and revealer of God, the complete revelation of Jahve, the fulfilment of the prophets, the revelation of the Father. Here Christianity reached its self-consciousness as a religion distinct from Judaism.

Many important historic problems still remain and will remain unsolved, such as the question how far the picture of Christ in the Gospels is colored by the faith of the early community; what Messianic words should be ascribed to Jesus; the precise manner in which the Christian faith and cult of the first community arose; the origin of the Lord's Supper. Here we have results and can only guess at the processes. But in spite of all the uncertainty, we can be sure of the main trend of Jesus' teaching and of the nature of his self-consciousness. He shows us God the Father, gathering his children to himself through his messenger, preparing them by counsels of love and devotion of will for the speedy coming of that Kingdom in which the divine life was to be made completely manifest; a lofty world-indifference for the sake of ethical and spiritual values, and yet a marked emphasis on and a continuation of the old Hebrew faith in a God-given world; a high Messianic consciousness directed toward a positive, present, spiritual end, the like of which has never been seen in the world before or since. Out of this teaching and out of this self-consciousness arose the Christ-cult, a faith in Christ not as a new God but as the saving revelation of God the Father.

Briefly put, these are the facts. What is their significance for our faith today? Primarily, the recognition of the permanent value of the ethical and religious personality of Jesus as bringing about in us a change of inward life and imparting confidence and strength against pain and evil. If we wish to bring this religious significance under definite categories, we may distinguish three distinct elements—Jesus as the revealer, not of a law or of a dogma, but of a life, the divine life and spirit of God, which can be described only in general terms, but is clearly felt and recognized by the appropriator; Jesus as the opener of the possibility of salvation, by whom the way to God is made clear, and by whom we are led in that way through trust, simple and direct, as of children to a father; in other words, Jesus, the divine guide; finally, Jesus as

the head of the community into which believers are gathered, the "*caput mysticum*," the vine whose branches we are or may be, the leader and Lord who does not prescribe dogmas but is the source of the life of the community.

Troeltsch considers the old ecclesiastical terms for these three functions very apt, though he of course uses them with a different connotation; namely, Prophet, Priest, and King, for the revealing, mediating, and leading functions respectively. In all this he is undoubtedly indebted to Ritschl, who used these three terms in much the same sense. There is further agreement between the two in their common emphasis on the kingly element, the element of will or end. Troeltsch also treasures the title "Saviour," recognizing it in the phrase, "the opener of the possibility of salvation." While strongly emphasizing the fact of sin and the necessity of its removal, he is more interested in the positive phase of salvation, which he pictures as a new birth and a turning from a lower to a higher life. He is particularly out of sympathy with the whole scheme of redemptive theology which the Church has built up on the basis of a mythical fall of man and its equally unreal preceding state of perfection. There is evil enough in the world, but the world is not under any such curse as our orthodox theologians would have us believe. Hence the whole Pauline and post-Pauline over-emphasis on the single fact of the death of Christ, and especially the later emphasis on this fact as the death of the God-man, working a change in God—all this to Troeltsch is outworn and untrue. God is ever the same, seeking to draw us to himself. Not only has Jesus shown us this most clearly, but the power of his life and death constitutes, through many channels, a compelling power to enable us to turn from the lower self to God and the life of God. This is salvation, and Jesus therefore is the Saviour.

Out of this arises a need that goes beyond the mere historico-psychological effect of Christ, namely, the search for a metaphysical ground, for an answer to the questions "How" and "Why." The modern emphasis has been as much on the historico-psychological side as the earlier emphasis was upon the metaphysical. Schleiermacher felt and responded to this metaphysical need and assigned to Jesus a peculiar, essential relation

to God; that is, a unique relation of essential being. Ritschl used the term "Deity" in describing this relation. According to Troeltsch, the presupposition is the permanent, central place of the historic Jesus in human history. Therefore, just as the ancients, thinking in their own thought-forms, conceived of Jesus as "the first-born of all creatures" or as "the means of creation," so we, thinking in our modern thought-forms, can look upon him as the central man, the Absolute Man.

The early Christians had to think of God through Christ; but to them Jesus was not a new God, but the Messiah, the Son, the Mediator, the Prophet that was to come, who was, in spite of all connections, distinct from Judaism. This was the apostolic idea and the basis of all later developments—God the Father in heaven, in close connection with his historic revelation in Christ, a duality of Father and Son but with the Son subordinate to the Father. The influence of the demand for monotheism brought out the doctrine of "Homoöusianism"—oneness in essence with God. This was an Athanasian emphasis against the half-way monotheism that lurked in the idea of successive strata of divinity from God through the Logos to the human Christ. All this was in the interests of monotheism, and the result was a homoöusian duality. Then arose differences of opinion with regard to the unity of essence between the Spirit and God. The final answer to this question was the trinitarian formula.

In the apostolic age the "Spirit" denoted the "spirit of Christ," and in Paul's Epistles we have three passages in which the "formula of three" occurs—"Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." This is not a trinitarian formula in the accepted use of that term, any more than are the declarations of the Apostles' Creed in the same sense trinitarian. The position held in the apostolic age may be described as that of the "formula of three," or of an economic trinity; that is, a short description of the rule of God in the world and not by any means a hard-and-fast metaphysical formula. But through the medium of this "formula of three," on the basis of the homoöusian teaching of the duality of Father and Son, there arose the trinitarian formula. Here we have an immanent trinity. It is not a working formula, but a declaration concerning the eternal, essential, and substantial

reality within the mysterious nature of God. The historical emphasis of the apostolic age on Jesus and the Spirit is dropped, and a metaphysical emphasis replaces it. But though we may not ourselves adopt this way of thinking, we must not lightly reject its grounds or its justifiability for the age in which it arose. Notwithstanding the apparent cutting loose from history, we have, even in this highly abstract metaphysical statement, a legitimate connection with it through Christ as the revelation of God's love and through the Spirit as the spirit of the Christian community. So even in this immanent and most abstract trinitarianism, the historic foundation of Christianity is included and emphasized. The whole evolution is the result of an effort to unite religion and history.

But for us today the question is not whether this solution was justifiable for the early Church, but whether it really solves the problem for us. To this we must reply unhesitatingly, No. Such a cosmological solution cannot suffice today. The trinitarian formula stands or falls with the theory of Incarnation, and the latter is no longer a problem for us, for we base our faith not on an Incarnation but on a revelation bringing salvation. The only solution for us is to go back to the apostolic teaching, not because it is apostolic but because it is most satisfying to us as modern men—satisfying historically and satisfying religiously; back to the "formula of three," the economic trinity, a working formula of the rule of God in the world. "I believe in God the Father, in Jesus Christ, His Son, and in the Holy Spirit." This may be our final statement of historical religion. We need no special theories as to why it is so. In fact, we do not know.

A few words should be added concerning Troeltsch's views of the Bible and of dogma.[10] Since he considers Christianity as a great historic totality whose centre is Jesus of Nazareth, the historic source of that spiritual stream through which the world's greatest progress has come and will come, it is easy to understand his attitude toward the Bible. The Bible is the literary expression of the classical period of Christianity, and therefore is itself classic, central, unsurpassable, unless Christianity itself can be surpassed. Besides being the classic literary norm, the Bible is

[10] "Glaubenslehre," *ut supra.*

also a most important means of propagating the Christian life through the power of the personal elements in it. It is the personal element which really makes our modern Bible, for we now recognize authority and revelation chiefly through the personalities of men. In this way the Bible as a whole is significant, and a personal relation to it is far better than an intimate knowledge of critical theories. On the other hand, this does not mean any elaborate theory of literal inspiration. Look at this book with "*rein gewaschenen Augen.*" Catch the spirit of its prophets and apostles, and, above all, of its Lord. We need no further theory.

Troeltsch's break with the orthodox conception is very manifest in his idea of dogma and creed. We have seen how strongly he emphasizes the necessity of a historic ground for our faith, lest we float away into powerless, individualistic mysticism, which would mean eventually the death of religion. He is just as clear and strong in his recognition of the place of cult and creed in the life of a religion. Christianity could not have become a world-religion had it not evolved its own peculiar cult, and cult means dogma. In fact, there can be no cohesive organization without cult and creed, no perpetuation and no progress. The only question is, how are we going to estimate and judge our dogmas? Are they truth absolute, eternal, unchangeable? If not, what are they? This raises the whole question of the relation of faith to knowledge, of the much-discussed problem of the relation of religion to science and philosophy. We may be weary of the discussion; but as long as the problem remains so acute as it admittedly is, both for individuals and for organizations, just so long will discussion be necessary and so long should it be welcomed, especially when a solution is offered as clear-cut as that of Troeltsch. No dogma is, has been, or ever will be, the absolute truth, for the absolute lies ever beyond the confines of human history. Man's nearest approach to it is in his religious experience, in which God reveals Himself. But this experience, this revelation, especially in our great religious leaders, is not and cannot be the direct object of our faith. Faith ever seeks something more tangible and fastens itself upon the historic deposit of that inner, mysterious life. The essential characteristics of this faith are

presented by dogma in what are really symbolic terms, thus establishing a platform upon which the members of the organization may stand. We have here therefore the symbolic theory of dogma already made so familiar to us through Auguste Sabatier's *Philosophy of Religion*.

Dogma then is not a scientific product set up by the logical faculty through a process of mere reasoning. It is primarily a religious product, symbolically formulated for practical purposes. It is not, however, absolutely independent of all our other knowledge, for it has to do with a general world-view into which our other knowledge must enter. In particular must we reckon with the results of the individual sciences of astronomy and physics, as well as geology, biology, anthropology, and universal history. Here, in spite of many disagreements and uncertainties, we find a growing body of accepted fact which no theologian may ignore —the Copernican view of the universe, the size and age of the world, and the like. These facts do not tell us what we must believe, but they do tell us what we cannot believe. Our dogmatic symbols must be made to harmonize with all this knowledge, or else they will lose the very practical influence and hold they were created to exercise.

The influence of philosophy is far less than that of the individual sciences just mentioned. It attempts a general unification of all science, and so is less secure than the sciences and cannot be so insistent in its claims. One may ignore philosophy altogether without seriously invalidating his dogmatic beliefs, but one cannot so ignore the results of science. Nevertheless, there is a relation between theology and philosophy which is real and important. There are certain philosophies with which religion can fraternize, and others with which it must be at eternal enmity for its very life's sake. Among the latter are pessimism, materialism, and parallel pantheism, together with those pragmatic-positivistic schools which deny the possibility of metaphysics though themselves metaphysical. On the other hand, religion can work in harmony with any philosophy of the idealistic and teleological type, whether it have the critical, personal, or more speculative emphasis.

So, while our dogmas are necessarily more or less poetic symbols, formulations springing out of the independent religious consciousness of man, they must, in order to accomplish their purpose, continually take account of the results of science and the tendencies in philosophy; and the religious life, remaining fundamentally unchanged, must receive new symbols, or be pictured by old symbols with new meanings, as the changes in our non-religious knowledge oblige us to readjust our view of the universe.

This presentation has been limited to Troeltsch's general views of religion and Christianity. Even this phase of his thought and work has not been entirely exhausted, but enough has been given to bring out something of the faith, courage, virility, and originality of the man. His chief efforts hitherto have been directed to work more strictly historical, as in his *Die sozial Lehre der Kirche* and *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit.* The same breadth of view, scholarship, originality, and warm practical interest that we have already noted, manifest themselves in all his historical writing, making it vivid, interesting, and modern. We see that the sum of his thought is the personal appropriation of the great spiritual values of the outstanding religious personalities of the world, especially those of the Christian organism, and supremely Jesus Christ, Prophet, Priest, and King. While such men as Ernst Troeltsch live and work in Germany, religion will not die out, and just so long will seekers after truth from other lands be drawn thither, to return, not merely with a clearer vision, but with a warmer heart and stronger purpose.

THE PERIL OF A SAFE THEOLOGY

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The multiplication of safety appliances for the protection of human life is a marked characteristic of our age. No humane ministry to society is more consistently and forcefully urged than the providing of automatic safety-devices to supplant the older method of reliance upon personal attention and intelligence. "Such accidents will happen until we eliminate the whole human element by means of automatic provisions," observed a railroad operator after a recent disaster. He followed the statement with an informing discussion concerning the installing of safety-appliances on his own line of road, in response to the demands of the public conscience. There is always a position and a premium for the inventive genius who can substitute for fallible human attention an automatic response that works infallibly. The disabled switchman, the drunken watchman, the recreant employee, can be more and more dispensed with as his services are supplied by the mechanical device which never sleeps nor drinks whiskey, and whose integrity does not call for any subjective processes. Lives of employees and of patrons by the thousands are thus guarded and saved every year. And the principle is so humane and sound that we do not propose to halt while inventive skill is unexhausted or the reluctant employer remains unpunished.

Our object here is not to question the beneficence of these things; we are concerned rather with a by-product. What are the moral consequences of safety devices—their effect upon character? and what are the limitations of mechanical safety in the complex and responsible activities of human achievement? Does the elevator man become a more or a less responsible person when he feels that not his own skill and attention, but an automatic device, stands between his passengers and disaster? Do railway employees, when relieved of personal responsibility, develop the types of character that under the old system fitted them to advance as conductors, engineers, and managing officers? What is the effect

upon a board of directors of knowing that they have provided "every device for the safety and comfort of their patrons"? In short, does the movement contribute to responsible character or does it not?

These questions are not asked from a wholly academic point of view. I would not curtail practical efforts to reduce risks by safety appliances, but I am apprehensive of the results of safety produced at the cost of all human sentiment, and I raise the question whether in the long run it is not possible for the impersonal and the practical to defeat its own ends and suffer a practical revenge. For in the end the control of automatism is in the hands of personality, and real safety is secured for us only through the sentiment which is developed in the life of the men who own and control automatic devices.

The question is of course only a special aspect of the problem which the ideals of mechanism always create when they invade the realm of the personal. Wherever automatism carries its ideals too far, something very precious and fundamental in human life is threatened. In the boy set to watch the primitive steam-engine, who discovered that he could so attach the levers that they would operate the steam-valves mechanically and thus dispense with his attention to them, we have the symbol of a racial experience quite as fateful in its potential influence upon human kind as the experience symbolized by the venerable tradition of the forbidden fruit and its resultant catastrophe.

As the aim of this discussion is to investigate and not to dogmatize, we shall content ourselves with indicating certain points where the demand for automatic safety threatens to obscure or defeat some of the finer issues of life.

In a thoughtful piece of literature, "The Preliminaries," contributed by Miss Comer to the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, 1910, we have a convincing illustration, in terms of life, of the universal demand for automatic safety, and its intrinsic weakness. The story deals with the fortunes of two lovers who are held back from the consummation of their hearts' desire by prudential considerations urged on both sides. Fond parents, admitting the obvious fitness of the marriage, at the same time poison the atmosphere of the romance as well as the peace of their own lives by dread

apprehensions of possible miscarriage of plans or fatal taint or weakness of character. The objections raised are not definite and positive, but are only formulations of the general lack of certainty involved in all dealing with the future. They tacitly demand guaranteed insurance against all possible evil before life can be sanctioned and accepted as blessed. The apprehensions are aggravated by a grim tragedy of justice that has overtaken the head of one family and embittered life. The natural consequence is that all concerned are living on the verge of nervous prostration. All see life's problems through morbid eyes and with fretful spirits. All save one. The father of the woman, a convict behind prison walls, has learned in suffering and meditation the true philosophy of life—the philosophy of life's inevitable risks. He reverses the nervous prudential counsel of the others, with their nameless fear for the future. The highest point of the dramatic movement of the story is his counsel addressed to the youth, who visits him in prison on the delicate mission of asking for the hand of his daughter:

> They haven't the point of view. It is life that is the great adventure. Not love, not marriage, not business. They are just chapters in the book. The main thing is to take the road fearlessly,—to have courage to live one's life. . . . That is the great word. Don't you see what ails your father's point of view, and my wife's? One wants absolute security in one way for Ruth; the other wants absolute security in another way for you. And security—why it's just the one thing a human being cannot have, the thing that's the damnation of him if he gets it! The reason it is so hard for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven is that he has that false sense of security. To demand it just disintegrates a man. I don't know why,—it does. . . . The mastery of life comes with the knowledge of our power to endure. That's it. You are safe only when you can stand everything that can happen to you. Thus and thus only! Endurance is the measure of the man. . . . Courage is security. There is no other kind.

Very like in kind is the philosophy uttered in a "Sketch of Life on the Road" by a wandering philosopher:[1]

> How can any man look for true adventure in life if he always knows to a certainty where his next meal is coming from? In a

[1] David Grayson, in the American Magazine for November, 1912, page 6.

> world so completely dominated by goods, by things, by possessions, and smothered by security, what fine adventure is left to a man of spirit save the adventure of poverty?

Now I am not an apologist for the convict, nor for the picturesque, ecclesiastical, mendicant saint; nor yet for the less picturesque and unecclesiastical mendicant sinner. But the point of view of life as an adventure points to a principle of faith—faith and strength and insight born of the needs of the moment—which seems to me a neglected factor in many of our closed and rigid systems of interpretation of life. For every specific spiritual situation as it arises there is a new insight born of the new experience. No standardized interpretation expresses the whole truth of such an hour. Like the manna of the wilderness, if we try to preserve our spiritual truth for days ahead, it spoils on our hands. Faith is the only mental attitude that overcomes the world—not security! The voluntary acceptance of life seems somehow to precede and condition our proofs and certainties. We have in the citations given, if I mistake not, recognition of the subtle evil involved in an excessive demand to surround life with safety devices. Security, whether purchased by riches or rank or rationalism or other automatic means of safety, tends to create a sense of ease which is the menace of the soul. We must work out our salvation in any realm, if we want the distinctive reward of that realm. Certain personal capacities and creative moral insights and sympathies shrink and shrivel when they are over-subsidized by external securities.

One effect of the demand for automatic safety is seen in the history of the mightiest and most precious impulse of life, the religious nature. The larger half of Christendom is organized on the principle that we need an infallible guidance for life; that religion, with its issues of eternal life and death, is too fateful a matter to be trusted to the limitations of our hard-won wisdom; that here at least we must know before we act. We are all familiar with the mechanical logic by which J. H. Newman satisfied his soul that there must be somewhere an automatic safety-device for religious hearts longing for certainty. That logic led Newman into the only ecclesiastical fellowship which guaranteed infallible guidance. The guarantee of safety first, life and trust

afterward—millions of people nominally allege this principle as fundamental and inevitable in life's deepest concerns. Of course, history alone can vindicate or disprove its merits, and the history is open to us all.

On the other hand, the Protestant wing of Christendom is in nominal revolt against external religious guarantees, and avows its purpose to rest life upon faith, which shall win its own certainties. But alas for the logic of Protestantism, there is an unformulated dialectic in human nature which leads straight back to the safety-device. A hundred years or so after the Protestant movement had challenged the automatic safety of the Catholic church in the name of "salvation by faith," the Bible appeared in the light of "an infallible rule of faith and practice"; and either avowedly or nominally that is the rôle which the Christian Scriptures play in the religious life of the multitude today. We will have a safety contrivance to guard personal life in its deepest issues. We will have Authority as the highest court of appeal. Either Holy Church or Holy Bible must furnish a principle of infallible security. The consequences for Protestant theology of thus dealing with the Bible as a "divinely given revelation"—an authoritative text-book—and not as a transcript of the realities of human experience in its religious development have been immense. Surely the theologies of the future will trust the revelations of God that come to the moral heroes of old, even though we test their knowledge of spiritual things by the same psychological and epistemological canons that we bring to our own religious experiences.

We have protested against the flaunting of guaranteed salvation announced over church doors: "*Plena indulgentia quotidie.*" That smacks of commercialism and legalism. But many who shudder at the principle thus brazenly published, offer to furnish the same brand of safety in subscriptions to various orthodoxies, and thus to bring into life a sense of peace and security. For our constituency demand both security and large returns before they will invest. This is the underlying philosophy of every "safe" orthodoxy.

Again, in the very citadel of faith, where religion professes to achieve the personal assurance of unseen realities, this demand

for independent, safeguarding principles haunts us. With curious infidelity to the personal confidence in a supreme living Spirit which is the essence of the best religion, the church has yet cherished the intellectual "proof" of God as a buttress and bulwark of her faith, and we have felt secure only when the burden of our certainty was seen to rest not upon faith but upon an independent and universal basis. The "direct and fundamental proofs" have thus tended to supplant the faith upon which we once felt that true religion should rest. The moral consequences of theistic proofs have not been more salutary than those of the safety of infallible guidance, whether supplied by a church or a book. Thus one keen critic says:[2]

> It has grown clear to all thinkers, first, that the God and soul of religion cannot be proved with proofs that compel the assent of the intellect, and secondly, that by such proofs there is, in a serious degree, the destruction of the values which are sought to be demonstrated.

Now faith does not come at the suggestion of distrust, but of trust. A safety-device here seems an affront both to reason and to faith. The intellect must indeed offer its fortifying reasons, but the prior and deeper reason of faith takes precedence of all specific reasons. In living contact with spiritual reality the soul finds the irrefutable argument for God, and any proof which absolves the soul from this original vision of God weakens the case which it seeks to establish. No rationalism can take the place of the Moral Venture.

This study of the effect of a principle might be carried into nearly every department of life, for religion is not alone in this error. The field of education is likewise infested with the fallacy of orthodox methods, mechanical devices to guarantee that every child shall be pedagogically "saved." The "system" sometimes stimulates and sometimes paralyzes the individual response of the "Child." In the field of law, too, justice is often defeated rather than established by professional orthodoxies; while in politics machine methods are widely employed to relieve the individual of personal attention and responsibility,—to the demoralization

[2] Professor George Burman Foster, The Function of Religion, page 85.

of the citizen. These all illustrate the tendency to apply mechanical standards to life, to secure automatic safety, and to this extent to imperil and defeat the higher spiritual achievements of the race. The best condition of such achievement is the absence of these very safeguards and certainties, which are in no way wrung out of the deep experiences of life; for the law of the spiritual is faith. No absolutions or indulgences are known to the moral law. The paradoxical truth is that every man must bear his own burden, even though he must also bear the burdens of others. The certainties of spiritual reality do not rest upon independent ground, but are conditioned by our own moral response to life, and the highest spiritual discernment is not merely imitative: it is creative.[3] The interpreter of religion, of law, or of pedagogy must be something more than a copyist. Even a lawyer ought to be a prophet; but a theologian or a teacher must be one.

Now when in our preaching and teaching we so far disregard this principle of faith and freedom that we tacitly standardize our theology, we do so in response to the demand for an automatic safety-device. This substitution of a mechanical theology for a spiritual is based upon a fallacious theory of knowledge, and it works harm. It is founded upon a bad philosophy and a shallow analysis of the whole problem of knowledge. For when our interpretation of spiritual truth is conditioned upon all sides by theories of sacred history, inspiration, infallible sources, divine tokens, revealed truth, and safe standards of doctrine, we virtually so subsidize our thinking about spiritual reality that a healthy spirituality and a stalwart theology are hardly possible. A really safe theology, like a safe chemistry, is one which faces the facts of life and their laws, and gives the profoundest account of them of which the mind is capable. It recognizes that the law of life is growth, and asks no other guarantee than that of faithful living and faithful thinking.

We have thus far dealt chiefly with the intrinsic fallacy of the safety method in religious interpretation. But it would not be hard to show, on the practical side, that a mechanical ideal in

[3] Professor Bergson's characteristic and fruitful emphasis has to do with the essentially creative nature of the ethical.

place of a spiritual ideal of religious interpretation is a menace to religious effectiveness. We may here simply enumerate two or three points at which a "safe theology" imperils the interests of "the Gospel which is committed to our trust."

The christianizing of the Orient in this missionary age requires a recognition of types of mind and types of meaning which a rigid theological method does not recognize. If Jesus Christ and his message of God's love is to dominate and save Eastern civilizations with their millions of needy people, they must be allowed to reinterpret our blessed gospel in forms of life and thought which our orthodoxies do not know, and we must recognize the heterodox ways in which God is already manifesting himself in the hearts of these people. We imperil a world message by parochial thinking. "There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all." Does this not mean that the God who works in Islam and in Buddhism is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? It may well be that the truth of God and his Son will come back to us from the East with new depths of insight which our formulations never perceived. No rigid orthodoxy can deal sympathetically with this racial problem.

Again, a formal and safe theology is ineffective in dealing with the marvellous developments of ethical, social, economic, and industrial life about us. Christianity and the church are, measurably at least, losing the most splendid opportunity that history has offered to spiritualize life and bring to it the vision and the power of God in Christ, because we insist that the profound modern movements must conform to our orthodox interpretation of Christianity, formulated under the influence of other social ideals. Thank God for prophetic men in the ministry who get their vision of God and the spiritual meaning of Christ in the life of today; whose measure of the divine revelation and redemption is not a safe orthodoxy, but the whole range of human need, the whole development of human life. Thank God for ministers of Christ who see that the social life of today is as much God's as the social life of the past; who believe that God speaks to us and leads us as directly and authoritatively in our thought and life as he has spoken in the thought which we have inherited

from the past, so inspiringly set forth in our Bibles. When we face this truth squarely, we shall no longer raise such issues as "Christianity or socialism," and "Christianity or economic reform," but our Christianity will be seen to include all these problems and the principles for their solution as well. Christ will still be seen as our spiritual Leader and Inspirer.

There is also a peril to the highest life of the church in measuring its spiritual possibilities in terms of an orthodox theology. I will not speak of the formalism which so easily besets ecclesiastical organizations, but rather of the danger to creative spiritual leadership. In a conception of spiritual truth and of theology which absolves the minister from profound religious thinking upon the deepest concerns of life there is an intellectual menace which must affect also the preacher's spiritual vision and the character of his message. One cannot enter the deep original vision of the meaning of spiritual things without first thinking things through in terms of fundamental principles. We do not require mere dispensers of second-hand visions. We do not need preachers who can demonstrate that God was in the thought and life of the past so much as we need those who can reveal a living God in the thought and life of today. These fundamental things are matters of present insight, personally achieved. Theology needs to be moralized along the whole line of her doctrines, but at no point is the need so critical as in this matter of her angle of approach—the intellectual method—which shall control the religious interpreter.

There is a mysterious but very precious doctrine of our Christian faith which sets forth in a positive way the very truth of which we have been speaking; that is the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. "He will guide you into all truth." Theology must rely upon personal guidance, not mechanical control. Living guidance for living men, by the Spirit of the living God! The sin against the Holy Ghost is the great sin in the Christian list. *It is the distrust of present guidance that throws a man back upon theological safety-devices.* Real security in spiritual interpretation comes only from the present, free operation of the Spirit of Truth. Living guidance for thought and life can never harden into a code or orthodoxy. The only orthodoxy that is safe is this

same Holy Spirit, eternally at work in the interpretations of men, eternally deepening our vision of God and the meaning of life. The truth of the Holy Spirit, effectually studied and practised, would render unnecessary this earnest protest against a safe theology. But, alas, the tendency has been to measure and standardize the very doctrine itself, in forgetfulness of the truth that God "giveth not the Spirit by measure."

In conclusion, if there is a peril in a safe theology, what is the theological method which will best serve the church and its Lord? It is the method which speaks out of a rich and profound spiritual experience, which has a sympathetic and intelligent understanding of the spiritual history of the past and of the spiritual life of today, and which trusts the accepted methods of sound thinking to guide its rational interpretations of spiritual reality. Christian theology is the type of theology which makes Christ's spirit the supreme test and dominating principle in setting a value on the facts of history and of life, as well as in interpreting their spiritual significance. In the frank employment of this method, the standardizing method of a "safe theology" would have no place; and without the method of rational and spiritual freedom, no orthodoxy is safe.

AN INTRODUCTORY WORD ON NIETZSCHE[1]

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According to Professor Riehl of Berlin, the most widely read of serious writers in Germany today is Nietzsche.[2] German ideas require time to cross the Channel and still more time to reach America; but already translations of Nietzsche's numerous works are appearing in England, and within three or four years three books have been devoted to him in this country. Probably ere-long the thoughtful among us will have to attend to him, as we have had to attend to other German writers in the past. As yet very confused ideas are current about him; his disciples are more or less confused themselves. Nietzsche once half-humorously remarked that the first disciples of a doctrine really prove nothing against it.

Moreover, Nietzsche was a lonely, markedly individual thinker, caring more to express himself than to be comprehended by the ordinary reader, soliloquizing much; and he said many things that, unless we carefully, patiently attend, may mislead, have misled. I could easily quote passages from him that would offend you, as they did me when I first came upon them. No one needs to be studied more before he is judged. No one lends himself less to impressionist treatment, which is all he ordinarily gets from non-Continental writers.[3] Indeed, I sometimes think that Nietzsche is a philosopher for philosophers and a moralist for moralists rather than for the common run of us, so subtle is his thinking, such an acquaintance with the history and refinements of philosophical and ethical speculation does he presuppose.

Accordingly, it may be most useful, as well as most conformable to my abilities, to cover a quite limited field this morning; and

[1] An address to the Harvard Divinity Alumni Association, 19 June, 1912.

[2] Friedrich Nietzsche, der Künstler und der Denker (4th ed.), p. 8.

[3] Some of the exceptions are the late William Wallace, Professor Pringle-Pattison, Mr. A. W. Benn, Havelock Ellis, our own Dr. Everett, Professor Thilly, and, *mirabile dictu*, two women, Dr. Grace N. Dolson and Miss Emily S. Hamblen.

I shall content myself, after giving a few facts about his life and a very general characterization of him, to portray somewhat in detail his state of mind during one—the first—period of his career. What I say may thus serve as a kind of introduction to the subject; and happy shall I be if I interest any one sufficiently to take it up on his own account.

Nietzsche was the son of a Protestant pastor (indeed he came from a line of them), and was born in 1844 in Röcken, a small Prussian village. He had the best and strictest of school training at Naumburg and Schulpforta; at Schulpforta beginning a lifelong friendship with Paul Deussen, since well known as an authority on Hindu philosophy, a disciple of Schopenhauer, and now professor at Kiel. At twenty he entered the University of Bonn, removing later, with his "great" teacher, the philologist Ritschl, to Leipzig. His university studies were only interrupted by a period of military service. At twenty-four (in 1868) he was made professor of classical philology at Basel, becoming Ordinarius two years later. He also undertook work in the Pädagogium, or higher Gymnasium, of the city. Eight years later he was obliged on account of ill-health to relinquish his duties at the Pädagogium, and two years after, in 1878, he resigned, for the same reason, his university position as well. To his sister, who saw him in the spring following, he was hardly recognizable, "*ein gebrochener, müder, gealterter Mann.*" He was then thirty-five. His subsequent life was more or less spent in search of health; summers ordinarily in the Upper Engadine, winters on the Riviera. He lasted for ten years, when he had a stroke of paralysis, which affected his brain. His natural bodily vigor kept him alive for eleven years more, progressive paralysis ending in death in 1900.

Perhaps a special word should be said of Nietzsche's insanity. It came suddenly, with the paralytic stroke I have mentioned. There are no real evidences of it before. A commentary on the state of American criticism with relation to Nietzsche is furnished by the fact that two of our books are prefaced with likenesses of him after he was hopelessly deranged. All his work—sixteen volumes in the octavo edition—was done before insanity came on. That there are traces or warnings of it in any of these volumes is

at best a subjective opinion; in fact, it is a position that tends to be abandoned more and more.[4] Highly wrought Nietzsche often was, particularly in his latest writings; he said extravagant things and uttered violent judgments. So did Carlyle; so have many earnest, lonely men, struggling unequally with their time; but insanity is another matter.

The causes of his break-down were manifold. In attempting to mount a restive horse, when serving his time in the Prussian artillery, he suffered a serious rupture and was incapacitated for further service. Later he attached himself to the ambulance-corps of his country during the Franco-Prussian War (he could not be a soldier, as he was then living, and had become naturalized, in Switzerland), and had dangerous attacks of cholera and diphtheria, which were treated with strong medicines that deranged his stomach. Eye-troubles (he was always near-sighted) still further complicated the situation. Sick-headaches and insomnia became more or less chronic. His sleeplessness drove him to the use of drugs, and more and more powerful ones. All the time he was living the intensest intellectual life. This state of high tension, along with the other causes, seems sufficient to account for the final collapse.

By nature he was of vigorous constitution. He had been fond as a boy of swimming and skating, and at the university, until his disablement, he was an active horseback-rider. At Bonn he was described as a "picture of health and strength, broad-shouldered, brown, with rather fair thick hair, and exactly the same height as Goethe." [5] He was clean both in person and in thought. At school the boys called him "the little parson," instinctively repressing coarse language in his presence. He had a brief taste of dissipation at the university, but seemed to sicken of it. The delights of beer-drinking and duelling palled on him; and his openly expressed dissatisfaction with the "beer-materialism" (as he called it) and the strained relations with his fellow-

[4] Cf. Karl Joël, Nietzsche und die Romantik, p. 328; H. Liestinberger, La Philosophie de Nietzsche, pp. 83 ff.; R. Richter, Friedrich Nietzsche (2d ed.), pp. 91 ff.; H. Vaihinger, Nietzsche als Philosoph, p. 16; Ernst Horneffer, Nietzsches letztes Schaffen, p. 20.

[5] Havelock Ellis, Affirmations, p. 11, quotes this.

students that ensued, appear to have had something to do with his leaving Bonn for Leipzig. Once he allowed himself to be taken to a house of questionable character, but was soon speechless before what he saw there. For a moment he turned to the piano, and then left.[6] Deussen says of him, "*mulierem nunquam attigit*"; and though this may be too absolute a claim,[7] it shows the impression that was left on one of his most intimate friends. He was never married. He had, however, intimate relations with gifted women, like Frau Cosima Wagner and Malwida von Meysenberg, and his family-affections were strong and tender; so tender toward his mother that he strove to keep his writings from her for fear of giving her pain. He had a nature at bottom sympathetic. No attentive reader can fail to feel this. If he warned against pity, it was as much because he had felt the excess of it as for lack of it. In personal intercourse he showed marked politeness, and, it is said, an almost feminine mildness. All his life he was practically a poor man. He called it his happiness that he owned no house, saying "*Wer besitzt wird besetzt*"; liked to wait on himself; despised the dinners of the rich; and loved solitude, aside from a few friends and the common people. The sight of the latter, he said, was as necessary to him as that of strong and healthy vegetation: and some of them in the later days of his illness and comparative emaciation in Geneva spoke endearingly of him as "*il piccolo santo.*" He had remarkable strength of will. Once, as a school-boy, when the story of Mucius Scaevola was being discussed, he lighted a number of matches on his hand and held out his arm without wincing. He asserted himself against his later illnesses and depression in extraordinary fashion; and when he became mentally and spiritually disillusioned, he wrested strength from his very deprivations.[8] In general, there was an unusual firmness in his moral texture. He despised meanness, untruthfulness, cowardice, cunning; he liked straight speaking and straight thinking. He did not have one philosophy for the closet and another for life, as Schopenhauer

[6] It is Nietzsche's own story, as narrated by P. Deussen, Erinnerungen an F. Nietzsche, p. 24.

[7] Cf. Möbius, Nietzsche, p. 50.

[8] Also Sprach Zarathustra, p. 163.

more or less did, but his thoughts were motives, rules. In his thinking itself we seem to catch the pulse-beats of his virile will.[9] Noble in spirit he was, too. One of his sayings is, "A sufferer has no right to pessimism";[10] the thought being, of course, that such an one is too likely to be biassed by the personal point of view. Nor is he always dogmatic. At the close of the first book of his second or sceptical period, he asks his youthful readers not to take his doctrines at once as a guide of life, but rather as theses to be weighed; he throws the responsibility on them, urging them to be true to themselves even against him. Elsewhere he says:

> "It lureth thee, my mode and speech?
> Thou followest me, to hear me teach?
> Nay! Guide thyself—honest and fair—
> And follow me, with care! with care!"[11]

Well aware that his doctrine was a kind of adventure, he tells us, "This is my way, what is yours? *The* way there is not." "It belongs to the humanity of a teacher," he declares, "to warn his pupils against himself"; yes, a pupil badly recompenses his teacher, when he is always pupil and nothing more.[12] His ideal for the thinker as such appears in these lines:

> "Destined, O star, for radiant path,
> No claim on thee the darkness hath!
> Roll on in bliss through this our age!
> Its trouble ne'er shall thee engage!
> In furthest worlds thy beams shall glow:
> Pity, as sin, thou must not know!
> Be pure: that duty's all you owe."[13]

Yes, Nietzsche was aware that the thinker might contradict himself, as he himself did more or less in the successive periods of his mental evolution. "This thinker," he once says, evidently alluding to himself, "needs no one to confute him; he suffices to that end himself." Nor did he wish to be kept from following his own

[9] Cf. Riehl, op. cit., p. 161.

[10] Vermischte Meinungen u. s. w., (Vorrede, p. 5).

[11] Werke (Pock. ed.), VI, p. 42, (tr. by Thomas Common).

[12] Zarathustra, p. 114.

[13] Werke (Pock. ed.), VI, p. 56, (tr. by Thomas Common).

path by friendly defence or adulation. One must needs, he said, not only love one's enemies, but be able to hate one's friends. In short, there was a kind of unworldliness about him. Vanity he had little of; reputation, save among the selectest few, he cared little for; personal resentments, such as Schopenhauer cherished, he was incapable of. I do not mean that his language is not severe at times, even unwarrantably so; but he tells us almost pathetically in one place that we must not underscore these passages, and that the severity and presumption come partly from his isolation. A lonely thinker, who finds no sympathy or echo for his ideas, involuntarily raises his pitch, he says, and easily falls into irritated speech.[14]

Perhaps I should add that the aphoristic form of much of his later writing has partly a physical explanation. He was able to write only at intervals, putting down his thoughts at auspicious moments, oftenest when he was out on his walks or climbing. One year he had, he tells us, two hundred sick days. Such ill fortune was extreme, but he was more or less incapacitated every year.

Yet, despite the fragmentary nature of his work, Nietzsche was, one feels, a genuine thinker. He cannot of course be put into the same class with Aristotle or Kant; he is not systematic enough; his ideas, save in instances, are not sufficiently reasoned out. And yet he is more of a thinker (I mean more analytically and critically so) than writers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Carlyle, or Emerson. He has reasoned and deep-going opinions on almost the whole range of human interests, including metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics, art, religion, politics. It was the tendency at first to take Nietzsche as an artist, a man of letters, a "stylist" (to use a barbarous word imported from the German). Now he is often spoken of as a prophet. He once betrayed what he thought of style, when he said that the only way to improve it is to improve the thought. And as to prophecy, he was too remorselessly critical, too much concerned with ideas as such, to come exclusively under that category. The fact is, he was thinker *par eminence;* and had he known better how to work and

[14] I borrow here from Riehl, op. cit., p. 23.

how not to work, or even had he lived ten years longer, he might have justified the title of systematic thinker, for he was engaged at the time of his collapse on a work, *Der Wille zur Macht*, that was to present in elaborate scientific form his total view of things. There are, as it is, fragments enough of this work to fill a stout volume and a half.

And now, before attempting a partial portrait of the initial stage of his mental evolution, let me note the fact that his determination when a lad was to be a pastor, like his father and his grandfather, and that when he matriculated at Bonn, it was as student of philosophy and theology. It was only as his doubts increased or came to a head that he abandoned the study of theology, and something of the temper of religion remained with him always. His mind was essentially reverential. And here is the explanation of his craving for men beyond the men we know, higher men, superman (whatever the phrase is), something to satisfy, however inadequately, the instinct for the great and divine.

I have spoken of his mental "evolution"; and it is one of the most characteristic things about Nietzsche that he was a changing, evolutionary being, as contrasted with his master Schopenhauer, whose views crystallized when he was still young and never materially altered. First he was under the spell of Schopenhauer and of Wagner (Schopenhauer on the philosophical side, Wagner on the artistic), and, I might add, of the anti-Socratic Greek view of life, as he understood it. Later he became disillusioned about Wagner, more or less turned against Schopenhauer, was appreciative of Socrates and his rationalism, admired Voltaire and English positive science. It was his analytical, rationalistic, positivistic, many would say sober period, in which he dissected most of all his own earlier ideals, or, to use a phrase of his, laid them on ice. Last of all came a fresh idealism, sobered indeed and relieved of some of its early features, but none the less real and with magnificent forecasts. Nietzsche may be more interesting on account of this vivid life-history, but he is also more difficult of comprehension; we cannot always say, so Nietzsche thought, but so he thought at a certain time. And yet the later periods cannot be understood without an acquaint-

ance with the earlier, and I must doubt whether one can understand him at all without an acquaintance with his masters, Schopenhauer before all.

And now let me endeavor to bring before you in some measure Nietzsche's initial state of mind. He is professor at Basel. He is kindly treated by his colleagues. Particularly is he happy in the friendship of Jacob Burckhardt, authority on Greek culture and on the Renaissance. Happy is he also in a friendship with Wagner, with whom and Frau Cosima he often spends delightful week-ends at their villa above Lake Lucerne. His lectures are strictly professional. He had specialized, I should perhaps have said, in Greek philology, and only the few devoted to philological study attend his lectures.[15]

At the same time his interests are wide and he has an ideal beyond the training of capable philologists.[16] Occasionally he gives a public lecture, and now and then a little book or pamphlet appears from him. In these we find his ideas and ideals in general. A new note is struck, a fresh stream of thought seems to be forming itself, even his interpretation of Greek life is more or less novel; feeling, passion, strong preferences and aversions, make themselves heard and felt. He sees in Socrates the beginning of the rationalistic spirit that killed Greek tragedy. He writes about *David Strauss und Andere Philister*; and this polemic from a new point of view against an honored name makes a veritable stir in the intellectual world. *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* appears, and "On the Use and Harm of History for Life," and "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth." "*Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*" he calls them, i.e. considerations not in harmony

[15] Burckhardt said of him at the time that Basel had never before had a teacher like him (Lon Andreas-Salomé, Friedrich Nietzsche, in seinen Werken, p. 8).

[16] Cf. Werke (Pock. ed.), I, xxviii. Nietzsche had an early antipathy to those who dissolve themselves into "reine Wissenschaft" (Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 3). The "historische Sinn," so extensively cultivated in Germany at the time, struck him as almost a "Krankheit" (Werke, Pock. ed., II, xli). He reflects at length (Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 3) on the "Selbstsucht der Wissenschaft," i.e. of the learned class, as one of the forces, "von denen zwar die Cultur gefördert wird, ohne dass man doch ihr Ziel, die Erzeugung des Genius, anerkennt." He even says, "Ein Gelehrter kann nie ein Philosoph werden" (he means by this "not merely a great thinker but an actual man." Cf. what is said of Kant, Ibid., p. 7).

with the spirit of the time. It is a young fiery spirit that expresses itself, Professor Riehl remarks. A friend who visited him in Basel in 1872 says he appeared "fiery, elastic, self-conscious, like a young lion."

As I have said, he is a disciple of Schopenhauer. As a student at Leipzig he had chanced on his works. After he read one page, he knew he must read the whole, he felt Schoperhauer's full charm. It is interesting to see that Schopenhauer did not depress him. As against the scepticism and despair which Kant had bred in a man like Heinrich von Kleist,[17] Schopenhauer was to him a leader who took one up to the heights of the tragic view, with the heavens and infinite stars overhead. He gave him, he says, a view of the world as a whole, opened up to him the meaning of life, and made him feel the true consolation for one's individual limitations and sorrows, namely, in renouncing self and giving one's self up to noble aims, above all to justice and pity.[18] He echoed the words of Schopenhauer: "A happy life is impossible. The highest to which man can attain is a heroic course of life." This was to him a kind of battle-note. In seeking for happiness, he says, we do not go beyond the animal; yes, all our restless moving to and fro on the earth, our building of cities and states, our waging of wars, our restless accumulating and spending, our running amuck at people, our copying them,

[17] Cf. the Quarterly Review (Oct., 1896, p. 310): "Reason, made suddenly aware of its own impotence, so Nietzsche felt, would drive thoughtful men towards the wilderness in which, for example, Heinrich von Kleist had done himself to death." Kant, it must be remembered, reached the conclusion that we know nothing of things as they exist in themselves, our mind putting its shaping hand on every object; so that the world as we conceive it and the world as it really exists are separated by an impassable barrier. [Cf. the summary statement of O. Külpe, "Outer experience is bound up with space, inner experience with time, and they can be thought only in and through categories (space, time, and the categories being alike subjective, according to Kant). And so all realities of the several sciences, nature as well as soul, become phenomena. The knowing mind places on every object its stamp" (Philosophical Review, Jan., 1912, p. 8).]

[18] Ibid., p. 3. Cf. the description of his feelings after first reading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: "Here there met me the full, unselfish, sunlit gaze of art; here I saw sickness and healing, exits and a haven of refuge, hell and heaven" (Professor Pringle-Pattison's translation from the Leben, in "Man's Place in the Cosmos," 2d ed., p. 259).

our outwitting one another and trampling on one another, our cries in need and our shouts of joy in victory—all this, he says, is only continuation of our animality. It is, in a way, a picture of nine tenths of the content of human history; not only of the barbaric world, but of the world as it has now been going on for some two thousand years since the birth of Christ, yes, as it is going on at the present moment. Nietzsche at this time sees chiefly pain in it—pain, illusion, disappointment; he discovers little sense in it. The will plunges aimlessly forward, and does not know itself or the higher aims for which it exists. The world—this greater part of the world, that is—is to him full of gloom and contradiction. At bottom there is something terrible about it and something absurd. The terrible thing is that we live on one another; that forgetting our essential unity, imagining we are separate individuals, we prey on one another. Our human world is like the world outside. Animals prey on plants, we prey on animals; yes, animals prey on one another, and we men prey on one another. It seems to be a part of the order of things, the price of individual existence. A certain violence and wrong cleaves to life. This is the foundation of Nietzsche's tragic view of the world, as it was of Schopenhauer's. It is a mistake to think of Nietzsche originally, as of Schopenhauer, as having only the wish to put a slight thereby on morality. Both (Schopenhauer always and Nietzsche at the beginning) take their stand with morality, and it is life, not morality, that is put in the wrong. As Nietzsche afterward put it, "Before the court of morals (particularly Christian, i.e. absolute morals) *must* life forever and unavoidably be in the wrong, since life is essentially something unmoral."[19] It is this fact, that morality and right are violated in life, that makes the world to him enigmatic and terrible. It is the fight for existence and the necessities it imposes that are the terrible things. Only a sensitive, a profoundly moral nature would feel in this way. Hegel did not feel so; Bismarck did not; our masters in political economy (till recently) have not; nine tenths of the world do not. Commonly, men see nothing more immoral in fighting for existence, whether with animals or with one another, than the

[19] Versuch einer Selbstkritik, p. 5, prefixed to a 2d ed. of Die Geburt der Tragödie.

South saw in subjecting slaves to their masters, or than the ancient Greeks in making slaves of those they conquered.

Yet Nietzsche says (and here his view grows more tragic still), not only do we prey on one another, but we must; must, not merely for selfish ends, but to attain the things that make life worth while. By implication he asserts that the very means by which we rise above the sphere of animality, just described, are immoral means. For what are the things that make life worth while? Nietzsche answers, with Schopenhauer, philosophic contemplation, aesthetic appreciation, creation, the vision of truth and beauty; in short, philosophy and art. And how are these things reached? He answers, again with Schopenhauer, only by means of leisure. And how is leisure possible, since man lives by the sweat of his brow? Only as some men produce more than they need, thereby freeing others from the necessity of labor. That is, leisure is the fruit of surplus labor (Nietzsche uses Marx's term, "*Mehr-Arbeit*").[20] And as men are not apt to render this labor willingly, as they naturally want all they produce, some kind of necessity or force must be used upon them. Whether this be force of law, or of competition among themselves for the chance to work, is immaterial. In either case the men are without choice, i.e. are slaves.[21] Nietzsche knows that the slavery of the "free laborer" of today is just as real as that of the legal slaves in the ancient world. On this shameful foundation, then, does the higher culture, philosophy, art, arise. Nietzsche says it in so many words: "Culture and art rest on a terrible foundation. In order that a wide, deep and fruitful soil may exist for their development, the vast majority must be in the service of a minority, must labor beyond the measure of their individual needs, be slaves of poverty. At their expense,

[20] Der Griechische Staat in Werke (Pock. ed.), I, 210; cf. 211, "Das Elend der mühsam lebenden Menschen muss noch gestiegen werden, um einer geringen Anzahl olympischer Menschen die Produktion der Kunstwelt zu ermöglichen," and Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 18, "die alexandrinische [i.e. Socratic, theoretical] Cultur brauchte einen Sklavenstand, um auf die Dauer existiren zu können."

[21] Cf. Nietzsche's express language later: "Sklave (wie wir vielleicht jeden geistigen und körperlichen Lohnarbeiter bezeichnen müssen"), Werke (Pock. ed.), V, xviii; also Professor Simmel's language quoted, xxiii, and Morgenröthe, p. 206.

by means of their surplus labor, must the few rise to freedom."[22] It was so in ancient Greece (students of political science and political economy would do well to read his little paper on "The Greek State"). "To the nature of a higher culture slavery belongs;" and Nietzsche unflinchingly makes the statement, not at all because he favors slavery or fails to be outraged by it, but simply because he sees, or thinks he sees, the fact. Indeed, about the absolute worth of a scheme of things in which slavery can be necessary, there cannot in his estimation be two opinions. This world is not a divine world, and he praises Schopenhauer for squarely saying so.[23]

And yet there is no way out for mankind save through philosophy and art. The many must toil and suffer, and only incidentally for their personal good. They must live in relative darkness that a few may reach the light, though this will ultimately be of universal benefit. In other words, tragedy is inseparable from life at present; even those to whom the joy of life does come, the philosophers and artists, must live for ends beyond their personal selves, live to pass on their light and the beauty they create. And the highest man of all (for philosophy and art are at best preparatory), the saint, the hero-saint—he dies to himself absolutely, makes himself one with all, with their pain and suffering as well, marks out some great path for the good of all, and follows it unflinchingly and with firm-set face, like the knight in Dürer's picture, riding along his frightful way with Death and the Devil for companions, to the bitter end. For, it should be distinctly said, Nietzsche in this period puts the saint or hero above the philosophers and artists; and no one, he holds,

[22] Cf. Werke, XII (8vo. ed.), 206 (p. 439), "Aber haltet immer fest, dass diese ungeheure Bemühung [of Fürsten, Kaufleute, Beamten, Ackerbauer, Soldaten], dieser Schweiss, Staub u. Arbeitslärm der Civilisation für die da ist, die dies alles zu benutzen wissen, ohne mitzuarbeiten: dass es *Ueberschüssige* geben muss, welche mit der allgemeinen Ueberarbeit erhalten werden, u. dass die Ueberschüssigen der Sinn u. die Apologie des ganzen Treibens sind!"

[23] Cf. the admiration he later expresses, but no doubt early felt, for Schopenhauer's repudiation of theism or pantheism: "The un-divinity of existence was recognized by him as something given, tangible, indiscussable" (Fröhliche Wissenschaft, p. 359). Cf. "Der Atheismus war Das, was mich zu Schopenhauer führte" (Ecce Homo, "Die Unzeitgemässen," p. 2).

makes such sacrifices, accepts such obligations,[24] so absolutely parts with all self-seeking, as he. He once formally compares three ideal types of men: the Rousseau ideal man, easily a blind revolutionist, the Goethe ideal man, who too easily accepts the world as it is, simply glorifying it by philosophy and art,[25] and the Schopenhauer ideal type, the hero and saint; and he puts the Schopenhauer ideal man on top. He praises Schopenhauer for making the saint the final arbiter and judge of existence. He says, not victory in this world, but tragic death may be the highest thing; as we actually feel when we listen to old Greek drama and are lifted to the thought of being other than we know of here.[26] Yes, in the saint he sees the consummation toward which all nature presses and strives; for the saint is he in whom and through whom nature, the blind egoistic will working everywhere, is redeemed from itself. He is the solver of the riddle of the world. With him indeed we all have affinities and ties. He is *in actu* what we are *in potentia*. He points to the redemption toward which we all may strive.[27]

[24] From the start Nietzsche speaks of "Verpflichtungen" and "Pflichten" in a very different way from Schopenhauer (cf. Ibid., pp. 6, 8), though the difference may be more in language than in essential conception. Schopenhauer reacted against Kant's categorical imperative by going to an absurd opposite extreme.

[25] Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 7: he had said of the philosopher, "Denn das ist die eigenthümliche Arbeit aller grossen Denker gewesen, Gesetzgeber für Maass, Münze und Gewicht der Dinge zu sein" (Ibid., p. 3); but above the philosopher he puts the saint.

[26] Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 21; cf. Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 5, cf. II, 264–265, I, 155, 148 ("'Wir glauben an das ewige Leben,' so ruft die Tragödie"). Geburt der Tragödie, p. 16 ("'Wir glauben an das ewige Leben,' so ruft die Tragödie"); p. 17 ("am reinsten Tone vielleicht im Oedipus auf Kolonos der versöhnende Klang aus einer anderen Welt.").

[27] Cf. his recognition of Christianity: "Das Christenthum ist gewiss eine der reinsten Offenbarungen jenes Dranges nach Cultur und gerade nach der immer erneuten Erzeugung des Heiligen" (Schopenhaur als Erzieher, p. 6). In Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 11, he shows appreciation of the deeper side of Christianity, as contrasted with the lightness and surface cheerfulness of the later Greek spirit, so different from the serious and almost sombre views of the sixth century B.C., quite in the manner of Schopenhauer. Cf. Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 2, where he speaks of Christianity as surpassing in the elevation of its ideal the ancient moral systems "und die in allen gleichmässig waltende Natürlichkeit"; though he admits at the same time that Christianity went so far that it produced a reaction, and hence the vacillation of the modern mind. It was in the midst of his own perplexity over ultimate problems that he came on Schopenhauer (in 1865), and found relief (Ibid., p. 2).

Things being so, the whole aim at happiness is delusion. The final aim of our life is not in anything we can ourselves attain to, any passing success or satisfaction, but beyond us, above us, in producing or helping to produce those philosophers, artists, and saints through whom nature and man are redeemed; or, if we may, in producing the philosopher, artist, or saint in ourselves. "Humanity should continuously work to this end, to produce single great men; and this and nothing else is its task"—so Schopenhauer had said and so now Nietzsche after him. For such an end we are to strive; for it we are to make sacrifices. What accords with it is right; what clashes with it, wrong. Hence for every man to seek happiness, each in his own individual way, seems to Nietzsche folly. We do not exist for ourselves. The life of most of us has not significance enough to make it worth striving for as an end in itself. The purpose of our life is to serve higher life. In this way the lower gets a significance that it has not in itself.

Taken abstractly, a view like this may not offend us; but Nietzsche is in earnest with it. The slave class of ancient Greece did not exist for itself. How meaningless was their toil and drudgery, save as thereby Greek genius was set free! Suppose the slaves had risen and asserted their own individual rights to happiness, the "rights of man," as we say. Where would the age of Pericles have been? No more do the corresponding class, the working-class of today, exist for themselves; and Nietzsche comments on the unfortunate consequences in modern times of the general-happiness philosophy, that is, the idea that all may attain happiness on the earth, for culture, now as always, requires a class of virtual slaves as its foundation,[28] and if they rise, considering themselves wronged, culture will be destroyed.

[28] His sister says in summing up his views: "Man muss ohne Heuchelei zugeben, dass Sklaverei, oder wie man es nennen will, die schmachvolle und betrübliche Kehrseite *jeder* Civilisation ist! Man kann sie mildern, sie weniger schmerzhaft machen; man kann dem Knechte die Annahme seines Loses erleichtern—das Mittelalter mit seinen Feudal-System steht in dieser Hinsicht über der Neuzeit;—aber so lange es eine Gesellschaft giebt, wird es auch Mächtige und Privilegirte geben, deren Glück auf der Mühsal u. schweren Arbeit einer unterdrückten und zu ihren Günsten ausgebeuteten Masse beruhen wird. Das sind harte Wahrheiten, welcher nur der tragische Mensch in aller Unerschrockenheit in's Auge zu sehen wagt" (Werke, Pock. ed., II, xxxi–xxxii).

"There is nothing more fearful," he declares, "than a barbaric slave-class that has come to consider its manner of existence a wrong, and sets about taking revenge not only for itself but for all generations." From the start, he had little sympathy with the spirit of the French Revolution or with present socialism: "*Der gute Urmensch will seine Rechte: welche paradiesischen Aussichten*"! he ironically exclaims. Let Nietzsche not be misunderstood. The business-classes do not exist for themselves, either. They think they do, indeed, and there is just the trouble, for they are on top now and do pretty much as they like. The economic doctrine of *laisser-faire* which these classes virtually inspire, works injuriously, Nietzsche holds, on the morality of whole peoples today. The egoism of these classes, particularly since the period of the Reformation (for before that time the church had been a more or less restraining force), has become one of the determining factors in modern life. It, along with the egoism of the military class, is to be reckoned among the coarsest and most evil influences that work upon us. The selfishness of the new industrial wealth perverts the aims of culture itself, looking on it as a means to its own gain and happiness. It opposes culture that has no industrial value. It thinks man has a right to happiness on earth, and needs education for this end, but only so far. Nietzsche speaks with scorn of the gold-aristocracy, the banking lords of our day without country or home, who use the State for their own ends, and so oppose war and even favor the masses against monarchs—patrons of peace and the people, forsooth! He questions the notion that wealth of itself prepares the way for culture. He satirizes the Germans after the Franco-Prussian War, who said, "Now let us become rich and self-conscious, and we shall have culture." Their wealth and surface-polish have been rather the foe of culture. Some kind of a surplus there must be, of course, but not, Nietzsche holds, the kind that is being piled up in modern communities. No, the business-classes, like the working-classes, have worth and dignity, in Nietzsche's view, as they serve ends beyond themselves, as they consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, are the helpmeets of genius, as they too contribute to the production of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint. If he recognizes the necessity

of slavery for the workingman, it is not as the business-man or the economist might do so. He is ever a son of the muses, not a Philistine.

Undoubtedly, a certain hardness and severity come to the fore here. It is the beginning of the characteristic Nietzschean note. Life is a difficult business, and there is no easy way out. If we take a great aim into ourselves, we must be hard to all that opposes it.[29] Softness, weakness, become folly and worse. Even cruelty may be necessary. Might, rule, says Nietzsche, is always ruthless. Something of cruelty lies in the nature (i.e., at the basis) of all culture. The state which made slavery law and continuous was cruel. Nietzsche speaks of the shameful origin of the state. Indeed here, in this first period, Nietzsche begins his revision of moral notions. We cannot, he says, aim at the happiness of others, singly or collectively, any more than at our own. The good of the greatest number, as we now find them, is not the ideal. The development of great communities and states is not the ideal. Why should the many be more valuable than one? he in effect asks, quite in the spirit of Heraclitus, who said that one man was in his eyes equal to ten thousand, if he was the best. The aim of life, according to Nietzsche, is, I repeat, to produce those perfect specimens of the race, who by philosophy and art and heroic self-transcendence will redeem the race; and the aim of society at any given moment is to find out and establish those conditions that are favorable to the emergence of this higher breed of men. This is the end, and there should be iron-hardness in seeking it. We may have sympathy with men; we must;[30] but not to the extent of interfering with the conditions and arrangements that are necessary to the attainment of the higher end. To attempt to make the working-class or the business-class happy

[29] Cf. Der Wille zur Macht, 2d ed., p. 975: "Objektiv, hart, fest, streng bleiben im Durchsetzen eines Gedankens—das bringen die Künstler noch am besten zu Stande; wenn einer aber Menschen dazu nöthig hat (wie Lehrer, Staatsmänner u. s. w.), da geht die Ruhe und Kälte u. Härte schnell davon. Man kann bei Naturen wie Cäsar u. Napoleon etwas ahnen von einem 'interesselosen' Arbeiten an ihrem Marmor, mag dabei von Menschen geopfert werden, was nur möglich. Auf dieser Bahn liegt die Zukunft der höchsten Menschen, die *grösste Verantwortlichkeit* tragen und *nicht* daran *zerbrechen*."

[30] "Die Weisheit wendet sich dem Gesamtbilde der Welt zu und sucht in diesem das ewige Leiden mit sympathischer Liebesempfindung zu ergreifen."

in the way each would like to be, to relieve the one of surplus labor and allow the other to get and to spend as they choose, is against the evolutionary law. They must endure, and we must endure. The condition of things makes this necessary, the nature of the world, where good is won by pain, and Prometheus, the fire-bringer, the friend of man, suffers. Relief is only in freely accepting the tragic view, willingly making sacrifice (if we don't willingly, we may have to unwillingly), and feeling beyond us and above us the heavens and infinite stars, a super-earthly and super-human order of things.

In the tribute to Schopenhauer which I have so often quoted—Schopenhauer, who with all his melancholy was to Nietzsche a good and brave fighter—Nietzsche imagines a disciple of culture saying, "I see something higher and more human above me than I myself am; help me all to attain it, as I will help every one who feels and suffers as I; in order that at last the man may arise who is full and measureless in knowledge and love and vision and power, and who with his whole being cleaves to nature and takes his place in nature as judge and valuer of things."[31] Plainly, it is a self-confession. It lets us into the inner nature and soul of the man. He changed in many ways; but from this central aspiration or prayer, if I may call it so, he never wavered.[32]

[31] Werke, II, 267. The translation of the latter part of this quotation is not literal; the German is: "Damit endlich wieder der Mensch entstehe, welcher sich voll und unendlich fühlt im Erkennen und Lieben, im Schauer und Können, und mit aller seiner Ganzheit an und in der Natur hängt, als Richter und Werthmesser der Dinge."

Cf. "Ich habe von Kindesbeinen an über die Existenzbedingungen des Weisen nachgedacht" (X, 183, p. 987).

[32] "Meine 'Unzeitgemässen' bedeuten für meine *Versprechungen*; was sie für Andere sind, weiss ich nicht. Man glaube mir, dass ich längst nicht mehr leben würde, wenn ich diesen Versprechungen nur um Einen Schritt breit ausgewichen wäre! Vielleicht kommt noch ein Mensch, der entdeckt, dass von 'Mensch. allgem.' an ich nichts gethan habe, als mein Versprechen erfüllen" (XIV, 8vo ed., 381–382, p. 265).

THE BOOK OF ISAIAH: CRITICAL PROBLEMS AND A NEW COMMENTARY[1]

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Professor Gray's commentary on Numbers (1903) not only filled a vacant place in English exegetical literature, but had to do with a book that has usually been perfunctorily treated by serial commentators; and this made an intrinsically valuable work doubly welcome. Isaiah, on the contrary, competes with the Psalms for the distinction of being the subject of more commentaries than any other book in the Old Testament, and of some of the best. The inevitable question therefore is, Wherein does the volume before us mark an advance beyond its predecessors? To answer this question it will be necessary to indicate the problems with which the critical study of Isaiah is at present chiefly concerned, and to show what progress has been made toward a solution of them.

There are three clearly marked periods in the criticism of Isaiah: from 1778 to about 1820; from 1820 to 1880; and from 1880 to the present time.

The first period begins with Bishop Lowth's translation of Isaiah (1778). Lowth was interested primarily in the aesthetic appreciation of the prophet. It was the glory of Hebrew poetry which he wished to see revealed. This glory was often obscured by the corruption of the text. Hence much attention was given to the establishment of a better text, often by brilliant conjectural emendations which have become a part of subsequent exegetical tradition. Lowth's work was translated into German in 1779–81 by Richerz, and supplied with notes by Koppe. In these notes Koppe for the first time directs attention to the critical problems of the book. Are the connections between its various sections original and organic, or are they artificial and com-

[1] A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Isaiah, I-XXXIX. By George Buchanan Gray. Vol. I, Introduction, and Commentary on I–XXVII. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912.

pilatory? Koppe maintained the latter view. Again, are the historical backgrounds of the prophecies in all cases the real backgrounds, or are they sometimes assumed backgrounds? This question was most urgent in connection with what may be called the Babylonian elements in Isaiah.[2] The usual theory had been that Isaiah, projecting himself by inspiration into the future, had taken the point of view of the Babylonian exile, or even of later times. Koppe suggested that what was supposed to be only an assumed background was after all the real background. Koppe's hints were taken up and elaborated by several scholars at the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, of whom Eichhorn was the most influential. In *Die hebraischen Propheten* (1816) Eichhorn resolved Isaiah into some eighty-five fragments, dating from various periods in the history of Judah, and in his *Einleitung*, the fourth edition of which (1823–24) may be considered to close the first period of criticism, he summed up in precise form the arguments against the genuineness of the expressly Babylonian elements in Isaiah. By this time chapters 24–27 and chapters 34 and 35, out of the first part of Isaiah, had also been drawn into the critical stream and carried off to the exilic or post-exilic period. In the criticism of these chapters, especially in the case of chapters 24–27, not only the probable historical backgrounds had been used as arguments against their genuineness, but also their peculiar religious ideas; for example, the doctrine of the resurrection in chapters 24–27.

The second period in the critical Isaiah-analysis lasted above sixty years, say, from 1820 to 1880. In it fall the works of three great commentators: Gesenius, whose commentary appeared in 1821, Hitzig (1833), and Ewald (1840–41; last edition, 1867–68). Upon the philological, exegetical, and critical foundations laid by these scholars most of the other work in this period was based, either by way of strengthening and continuing their work or in the attempt to check further building operations on the lines they had laid out. Both Gesenius and Ewald represent a distinct reaction from the disintegrating tendency of Koppe and Eichhorn, while Hitzig carried on the work of the earlier critics,

[2] Primarily, 44–66; 13 1–14 23; 21 1–10.

though in a more tempered form. But the great authority of Gesenius and Ewald prevailed, and at the end of this second period there was general agreement among critics only in the elimination of the prophecies already mentioned,[3] though a feeling of insecurity was often expressed as to certain other chapters also.[4]

But with the removal of Isa. 40–66, or Second Isaiah, to the exile, a large part of the consolatory prophecies in the book had been taken away from Isaiah. Of the rejected parts of Isa. 1–39, chapters 24–27 and 34–35, also, were consolatory. The elimination of so many of the consolatory prophecies could not fail to react on the conception of Isaiah's outlook upon the future. A new problem thus emerged, namely, to determine what at different stages of his career the prophet Isaiah expected the future to bring forth, in distinction from the expectations of other men and other times which are embodied in the Book of Isaiah. This was to prove the central problem in the criticism of the book, into which all others finally lead. But until the end of the second period little had been done toward disengaging this problem from the multitude of critical and exegetical questions which had arisen in the progress of investigation.

The merit of having first grasped and formulated the problem of Isaiah's eschatology on the basis of the critical results generally accepted in the middle decades of the nineteenth century may fairly be given to Bernhard Duhm in his *Theologie der Propheten* (1875). Robertson Smith's *Prophets of Israel*, which has the same critical premises with the *Theologie*, did not appear till seven years later (1882). It is perhaps not so original as Duhm's essay; yet it has exerted an equally profound influence upon subsequent investigation, and still remains the most brilliant exposition of Isaiah's religious significance which we possess in English. At crucial points these two essays are in the sharpest antithesis, and the differences mark the lines of division in the subsequent criticism and interpretation of Isaiah.

[3] Isaiah 40–66; 13 1–14 23; 21 1–10; 24–27; 34 and 35.

[4] E.g. Ewald harbored doubts as to the genuineness of chapters 12 and 33. Hitzig's vigorous attack upon 19 16–25, in which he followed the lead of Koppe, had also made some impression.

If chapters 1–39 are closely examined, four great prophetic doctrines are found in them: The doctrine of the Day of the Lord; the doctrine of the Remnant; the doctrine of the Messianic King; and the doctrine of the impregnability of Zion, which last may be considered the obverse of the prophecies which foretell the destruction of Assyria. Of these doctrines Duhm lays the main emphasis upon the Day of the Lord, Smith makes the Remnant central. The difference between the two writers at this point had interesting consequences. The conception of the Day of the Lord, according to Duhm, approximates to the Christian conception of the Last Judgment. It is primarily a day of wrath (see ch. 2). At first Isaiah thinks of it as impending over Israel and Judah only, but later he comes to realize that all nations will be involved in the catastrophe. The present order of the world is to be changed. The future is in no sense a continuation of the present or an evolution out of the present, but the direct opposite of the present. The present must be totally destroyed in order to prepare the way for the future. The transition to the future is to be supernaturally effected, and the character of the future itself is supernatural. It is marked by a miraculous change in nature and the charism of the spirit (see chapters 11 and 32). Duhm's interpretation is based partly upon the implications of what may be called the anti-Assyrian prophecies,[5] partly upon the sudden, unmediated transitions from threat to promise, as seen particularly in chapters 28–33.[6] In all these prophecies the transition to the future era seems to be attributed to the direct intervention of God. Thus, if Duhm's interpretation be accepted, Isaiah's eschatology[7] in its most characteristic features is apocalyptic. And in proportion as it is apocalyptic, the historical and moral interest is absent. Duhm

[5] The most typical of these are chapters 10 and 18; but compare also the briefer prophecies, more or less fragmentary in character, 8 9 f.; 14 24–27; 17 12–14; 29 6–8; 30 27–33; 33; 37 22 ff.

[6] Compare 28 1–4 with verses 5 f.; 29 1–4 with verses 6–8; 29 9–15 with verses 16–25; 30 1–17 with verses 18–26 and 27–33; 31 1–4 with verses 5–9.

[7] The reader should be apprised that here and throughout this article the word "eschatology" is used, after the example of some recent German authors, for the prophet's expectations or predictions about the future of his people, without implying that these expectations were "eschatological" in the etymological sense or in the established English meaning of the word.—Ed.

himself is quite aware of this. He deliberately exalts what he calls the religious element in Isaiah's eschatology, by which he means the supernatural and apocalyptic element, at the expense of the ethical and historical. This involves him in difficulties, however, with the doctrines of the Remnant and the inviolability of Zion. If there is a Remnant, if Zion is not to perish in the final catastrophe, there would seem, after all, to be left something out of the present which passes over into the future. Even the figure of the Messianic king, who is a Davidic king, and so has historical connections, is not quite congruous with Duhm's apocalyptical interpretation of the future; and it is interesting to observe how little prominence Duhm gives to this conception. In particular the Messianic significance of Immanuel (7 14 and 8 8) is denied.

In contrast to Duhm, Smith lays the emphasis upon the ethical and historical. This is because he makes the idea of the Remnant central in Isaiah's teaching. For Duhm the Remnant is a future ideal; for Smith it is "a practical principle" in the present. The Remnant, accordingly, takes concrete shape: it is nothing else than the prophetic party which Isaiah developed out of a small group of his disciples[8] into an effective organization. This Remnant is to be the basis of the ideal kingdom of the future. It is the connecting link between the present and the future, and through it the transition from the one to the other is to be morally achieved. The future is not a wholly new creation, as Duhm would have us believe, due to the sudden irruption of the divine into history; the future is the purified, idealized present. There is continuity in Jahweh's work. The doctrine of the Remnant is in turn connected with the doctrines of the inviolability of Zion and of the Messianic King. "Because the community of Jehovah [the Remnant] is indestructible, the state of Judah and the kingdom of the house of David cannot be utterly overthrown. . . . The capital and the court appeared to him as the natural centre of the true remnant." But how does all this rhyme with the doctrine of the Day of the Lord in which Judah and Israel are to be destroyed? In general, Smith seeks to supply moral connections between the threats and the promises. The

[8] See 8 16–18, a passage hardly noticed by Duhm.

threats are recalled if, or when, king and people repent. But the difficulty is precisely that the ethical transitions have to be supplied by the reader. In the present form of the prophecies both judgments and consolations are expressed unconditionally. They are placed side by side, without any hint of an organic connection between them (see especially chapters 28–33, and note 6 above).

We begin to see our problem defining itself more sharply. How are we to reconcile those prophecies which unqualifiedly foretell the doom of the nation in the Day of the Lord with the predictions of a brighter future—the prophecies of the Remnant, the inviolability of Zion, and the Messianic King?[9] It is the problem created by the conflicting representations of the national future in Isaiah 1–39, a problem illustrated by the divergent expositions of Duhm and Smith, which has given rise to the new development that characterizes the third period in the recent criticism of Isaiah. Investigation and discussion in this stage have centred about the problem of Isaiah's eschatology.[10]

This period, which may be said to run from about 1880 to the present time, may itself be divided into three stages: the stage of critical disintegration, from 1881 to 1892; the stage of critical reconstruction, from 1892 to 1905; and the stage of critical reaction, from 1905 to the present time.

The first of these stages is represented by the work of Stade, Soerensen, Guthe, Giesebrecht, and Duhm. With the exception of Duhm, these scholars have dealt only with particular problems in Isaiah.[11] I shall not attempt at this time to give a detailed statement in chronological order of the various contributions which these scholars have made to our subject. I must

[9] Since the doctrine of the Remnant implies some sort of a judgment from which the Remnant escapes, this doctrine is not in such sharp contrast with the eschatology of doom as are the doctrines of the invulnerability of Zion and the Messianic King.

[10] See especially chs. 2, 10, 18.

[11] See the series of articles by Stade in the Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft (1881–84), supplemented by his Geschichte des Volkes Israel (Vol. I, 1881–85); A. Soerensen, Judah und die assyrische Weltmacht (1885); Guthe, Das Zukunftsbild des Jesaia; Giesebrecht's article, Die Immanuel-Weissagung, in Theologische Studien und Kritiken (1888), and his monograph Beiträge zur Jesaiakritik (1890); Duhm, Das Buch Jesaia (1892, 2d ed. 1902).

content myself with setting forth the logical relations of the questions which they have discussed, as these bear upon the criticism and interpretation of Isaiah.

In Isaiah 1–39 (after the elimination of 13 1–14 23; 21 1–10; 24–27, and 34–35), there are four main critical problems which overshadow all others in interest and importance: *first*, The genuineness and date of the anti-Assyrian group of prophecies; *second*, The historical credibility of the narrative section, chapters 36–38; *third*, The unity, genuineness, and date of the remarkable section, chapters 28–33, with which chapter 22 is also to be associated; *fourth*, The interpretation and date of the prophecies of the Messianic King, namely, the Immanuel prophecies, chapters 6–8, and 9 1–7; 11 1 ff.; 32 1–8.

Stade's criticism was concerned mainly with the first two of these problems, though important hints were also dropped with respect to the last two. The immediate subject of Stade's first studies was not Isaiah, but Zechariah and Micah. The genuineness of Zech. 9–14 and Mic. 4–7 was denied, and these important sections were ascribed to a period after the time of Ezekiel. The argument turned mainly, though not exclusively, on the agreement between these sections and Ezek. 38 and 39. In all three passages there is a conception of a great duel between Jehovah and the nations, in which Jehovah was to triumph, and thus vindicate his absolute supremacy as a universal God. Stade argued that in Ezekiel this idea is worked out in an organic and intelligible way, whereas in the disputed portions of Zechariah and Micah it is not worked out at all, but is presented in an allusive fashion which implied that the idea was already well-known and a part of prophetic tradition. Hence it was inferred that Zech. 9–14 and Mic. 4–7 probably followed Ezekiel. But it thereupon became evident that the assignment of these sections to post-exilic times put in question the genuineness of several of the anti-Assyrian prophecies of Isaiah in which substantially the same idea of a conflict between Jehovah and the world power, or powers, was expressed. Stade was thus led ultimately to reject, in addition to Zech. 9–14 and Mic. 4–7, the anti-Assyrian prophecies, Isa. 8 9 f.; 14 24–27; 17 12–14; 29 7; 33; 37 22 ff. It will be remembered that these prophecies teach by implication the doc-

trine of the inviolability of Zion. Stade's criticism is thus seen to make a large inroad upon those prophecies in which this doctrine is expressed or implied. Yet Stade still held to the genuineness of Isa. 10; 18; 30 27–33; and 31 5–9; and so long as this was done, the rejection of the other anti-Assyrian prophecies did not in principle affect the eschatology of Isaiah.[12]

In the rejection of 37 22 ff. the trustworthiness of the surrounding narrative section, chapters 36–38, in which the campaign of Sennacherib in 701 B.C. is narrated, became involved. Stade showed that, instead of one narrative of this campaign, chapters 36 and 37 contain two accounts of the same campaign, which differed in various ways and gave evidence of legendary accretion. Now critics had referred most of the anti-Assyrian prophecies, particularly chapters 10 and 18, to the time of Hezekiah's revolt and Sennacherib's invasion of Judah (705–701 B.C.), associating them chronologically with the campaign in which they were conspicuously fulfilled. But what would be the result when, on the one hand, the genuineness of the anti-Assyrian prophecies as a group began to be impugned, and, on the other, the credibility of the historical narrative was thrown into doubt? This question did not present itself to Stade, inasmuch as he accepted the most characteristic anti-Assyrian prophecies and also the truth of the central fact in Isa. 36 f., namely, the deliverance of Jerusalem. But it is evident that others who followed him so far might not stop where he did.

Stade's rejection of chapter 33, also, had far-reaching consequences. The close connection between chapters 32 and 33 was obvious, and this led Stade to include both in the same judgment. Now chapters 32 and 33 have two important characteristics. In content they are thoroughly eschatological, doom and deliverance alternating in unmediated juxtaposition, and the eschatology of hope predominating. In literary connection they had always been associated with chapters 28–31, as a kind of appendix. When they were abandoned, therefore, a considerable

[12] Stade sought to justify his retention of a part of the anti-Assyrian prophecies, while rejecting the rest, by pointing out that in the accepted group Isaiah was dealing with the one historical nation, Assyria; whereas the rejected prophecies dealt vaguely with many nations. The accepted prophecies were thus construed historically, while the rejected prophecies were vaguely eschatological.

body of eschatological material was further subtracted from Isaiah, and a breach was made in the integrity of the section, Isa. 28–33. This attack was advanced by Giesebrecht in a very thorough discussion of the opening chapter of the section. He undertook to show that the present sequence of the several prophecies in this chapter (Isa. 28 1–4, 5 f., 7–22, 23–29) cannot possibly be an original and organic sequence, and attempted to account for the present order as due to successive revisions by Isaiah himself at different periods of his life. To support this view he sought evidence of revision elsewhere in the book, and contended that 8 9 f. and 17 12–14 (prophecies against Assyria which had been rejected by Stade) were, indeed, incongruous in their contexts, but could be explained as later revisions by Isaiah himself of the earlier and gloomier prophecies that preceded.

The question whether Giesebrecht's theory of revisions by Isaiah himself or Stade's theory of later additions and interpolations by other writers is the more probable explanation in such cases of incongruous contexts, confronts us again when we turn to the main body of chapters 28–33. Here we find the most abrupt transitions from threat to promise (see above, note 6). These transitions are all the more inexplicable when the prophecies in which they occur are properly dated. As long as the integrity of Isa. 28 was maintained, it was common to let 28 1–4, which must belong to a time before the fall of Samaria (722), determine the age of the whole. But when the unity of chapter 28 was given up, it was easy for Giesebrecht to show that at least 28 7–22 was intimately connected with chapters 29–31, and the latter chapters, which are directed against an Egyptian alliance, were most naturally placed between 705 and 701 B.C., when it is known that Judah was negotiating with Egypt against Assyria. The alliance with Egypt was, however, in direct opposition to the advice of the prophet in chapters 28–31. We should therefore expect in these chapters, as Giesebrecht himself points out, threats, not promises; and this expectation is justified by 22 1–14, which very clearly reflects the situation in 701, and contains only denunciations. Thus, both from the point of view of their literary connections—or, rather, lack of connections—and from the point of view of the historical situation, the position

of the hopeful prophecies in Isa. 28–31 is seen to be increasingly difficult; and it is not surprising to find Soerensen denying that these prophecies belong in their present connections at all. His observations, however, were casual, and made little impression at the time.

It is more important for the present to note the effect which Giesebrecht's criticism and his dating of Isa. 28–31 has upon the anti-Assyrian prophecies. When it has been shown that a group of prophecies predominantly threatening in tone belong to the time of Sennacherib, and that it is menacing prophecies which are to be expected in the circumstances, what is to be judged about the anti-Assyrian prophecies, which are all unqualifiedly consolatory and encouraging? Giesebrecht accepts the genuineness of these prophecies, but removes them all (with the exception of 37 22 ff. and the two oracles, 30 27–33 and 31 5–9, which lie within chapters 28–31) to an earlier period in Isaiah's life (711). By this proceeding the prophecies of hope in chapters 28–31 are left in a still more isolated and unaccountable position. It is evident that, when once chapters 28–31 are included in the discussion, the problem of Isaiah's previsions of the future in the days of Sennacherib becomes increasingly perplexing. Are the anti-Assyrian prophecies genuine? If so, are they to be assigned to the time of Sennacherib? What is their relation to chapters 28–31? What is the relation of the threats in chapters 28–31 to the promises? These are the questions which press for a solution.

Stade's rejection of chapters 32 and 33, which began the work of disintegrating Isa. 28–31, also initiated the criticism of the Messianic prophecies. Isaiah 32, in which the Messianic prophecy, 32 1–8, occurs, had usually been placed in the later years of Isaiah's career. Chapter 11 was supposed to be organically connected with 10 through the contrast between the felled forest of Assyria (10 33 ff.) and the revived sprout of the stump of Jesse (11 1). Hence 11 1 ff. was also assigned to Isaiah's latest period. Guthe rejected chapter 32, with Stade; but he went a step farther and denied that the connection between chapters 10 and 11 was original: it was, as he had no difficulty in showing, compilatory and not organic. With the separation of chapter 11 from 10,

the Messianic prophecy in chapter 11 became chronologically homeless. Guthe found shelter for it by associating it with the closely kindred prophecy, 9 1–7. The latter was apparently organically connected with chapters 7 and 8, which were securely anchored in the period of the invasion of Judah by the allies, Syria and Israel (734). The effect of denying the genuineness of 32 1–8 and of shifting 11 1 ff. to a place beside 9 1–7 was that all the prophecies of the Messianic King, including the Immanuel prophecies in 7 14 and 8 8, which Guthe interpreted messianically, fell in an early period of Isaiah's ministry, whereas the figure of the Messianic King disappears altogether from the later prophecies. In the latter the doctrines of the Remnant and the inviolability of Zion take its place. Guthe's reconstruction of Isaiah's eschatology may thus be regarded as a kind of synthesis of the theories of Duhm and Smith. In the early period Isaiah is supposed to have entertained a more supernaturalistic conception of the future, which centres about the ideas of the Day of the Lord and of the Messianic King, who, according to Guthe, belongs to the new order, after the old things have passed away. In the later period of his life Isaiah's view of the future is shaped by his doctrine of the Remnant and the invulnerability of Zion, and is consequently more historical and ethical than his earlier conception. Guthe's labored attempt to account for these changes in Isaiah's anticipations of the future need not detain us; for no sooner had this theory been built up than it was undermined, though unawares, by Giesebrecht. Giesebrecht also rejected chapter 32, with Stade, and, with Guthe, severed 11 from its connection with 10, ascribing it to the same age with 9 1–7; but he followed Duhm in denying the Messianic import of Immanuel in 7 14, and by textual criticism eliminated Immanuel from 8 8. Now, the strongest link by which 9 1–7 is united with chapters 7 and 8 is the supposed identification of the Messianic child in 9 1–7 with Immanuel (interpreted messianically) in 7 14 and 8 8.

If Immanuel is not the Messiah, this link is broken, and only one slender filament connects 9 1–7 with chapters 7 and 8, namely, the verse 9 1 compared with 2 Kings 15 29. The latter describes the devastation of Gilead and Galilee by the Assyrians in 734,

and the reference to the same events in Isa. 9 1 might seem to fix the date of the following prophecy in the same period. If this connection with chapters 7 and 8 were broken, the Messianic prophecies in 9 2–7 and 11 1 ff. would be set chronologically adrift. On what unknown shores would they finally land?

The disintegrating work of the scholars mentioned above reached its climax in the commentary on Isaiah by Bernhard Duhm (1892). This commentary makes an epoch in the criticism and interpretation of the prophet. In the influence it has exerted it ranks with the commentaries of Gesenius, Hitzig, and Ewald. Yet I have ventured to assign Duhm's commentary to the era of disintegration rather than to the era of reconstruction. As a matter of fact, the theory of the significance of Isaiah advanced in the commentary differs in no essential particular from that presented in the *Theologie der Propheten.* But Duhm perceived clearly and applied consistently the great critical principles of which previous investigators had only caught glimpses, or which they had been able to apply only in isolated instances. In so doing he brought all previous criticism to a head, and prepared the way for an entirely new conception of the significance of Isaiah's teachings.

Three things distinguish this commentary from its predecessors. *First,* Duhm attacked the literary sequences in the Book of Isaiah in a more determined way than had ever been done before. The book was analyzed into a large number of unrelated sections. This was in effect a return to the fragmentary hypothesis of Koppe and Eichhorn. But, as would be expected after nearly a century of study, Duhm's analysis was much more systematic and discriminating than that of the earlier critics. *Secondly,* in separating the fragments from one another, the principles of Hebrew poetry were employed. It was shown how changes in rhythm often concurred with a change of subject. The fragments stood out formally distinct from each other. A great gain! At this point Duhm revitalized the work of Lowth as he had revitalized the work of Eichhorn and Koppe. The great commentaries of the nineteenth century had given too little attention to the poetic structure of Isaiah's oracles. But Duhm saw, as his predecessors had not seen, the great importance of this criterion

for textual and even for historical criticism. The result of Duhm's analysis was to demonstrate more forcibly than had ever before been done that the Book of Isaiah is the product of centuries of compilers and editors. This had, of course, long been acknowledged to a certain extent, especially since the time of Stade, but it had commonly been supposed that Isaiah had a considerable share in the work. It had been tacitly assumed that Isaiah was an author; in Duhm's view Isaiah was a preaching prophet rather than a writing prophet, and took little pains to preserve his utterances.[13] It follows that the more or less fragmentary oracles that have been preserved to us are not ordinarily to be interpreted by the contexts in which they now stand; the order and connection are secondary and artificial. Each fragment must be interpreted by itself. This principle is not stated by Duhm in so many words, but it underlies all his exegesis. *Thirdly*, closely connected with this more purely literary criticism is Duhm's historico-religious criticism. He supposes that the final redaction of the book was made largely in the interest of eschatological dogmas which prevailed among the Jews in the last two centuries before Christ. The eschatological problem which, though not always recognized, gave direction to the criticism of Isaiah, is now brought to the front with full consciousness of its central importance. In these three particulars—the adoption of the fragmentary hypothesis, the employment of the principles of Hebrew poetic form to support it, and the emphasis upon the eschatological problem—Duhm's commentary lays the foundation for the further development of criticism. It is beside our present purpose to exhibit all the results at which, in the employment of this method, Duhm arrives. We must confine our attention to those which bear directly upon the questions we have been considering.

If we turn to Duhm's criticism of chapters 28–33, we find that the unity of this section, which had been attacked at its end (chapters 32–33) and its beginning (chapter 28) by Stade and Giesebrecht, is now thoroughly shattered. The transitions from threats to promises in these chapters are recognized to be impossible,

[13] Only chapters 6–8 and 28–31 (in their original form) are allowed to have been composed by Isaiah.

and the genuineness of many of the promissory passages is denied.[14] They are held to represent a later eschatology than Isaiah's. The threatening nucleus of chapters 28–31 is placed in the time of Sennacherib (705–701), with Giesebrecht. On the other hand, most of the great anti-Assyrian prophecies are retained, and ascribed to the same period. The difficulty which Giesebrecht sought to avoid by assigning the anti-Assyrian predictions to an earlier period, Duhm attempts to dispose of in another way. He thinks that the threats in chapters 28–31 are directed publicly to the people, whereas the promises in these chapters whose genuineness he defends, and the promises in the anti-Assyrian group, are given privately to the Remnant. But there is no hint in these consolatory prophecies that they are addressed exclusively to an inner circle. Further, Duhm does not tell us how both the threats and the promises can be realized at the same time. If Zion is to be destroyed on account of the sinners, how is the righteous Remnant to be saved? If it is to be preserved for the sake of the Remnant, how are the sinners to be destroyed? Could not the ungodly also find refuge in Zion? As criticism advances, the contradiction between the eschatology of hope and the eschatology of doom becomes more and more apparent, and it would seem as if a choice between them must be made.

Again, Duhm takes the step in the criticism of the specifically Messianic prophecies for which Guthe and Giesebrecht had prepared the way. He treats 9 1 as a gloss, and thus breaks the one remaining link between the Messianic prophecy, 9 2–7, and chapters 7 and 8. This leaves 9 2–7 and its companion piece, 11 1 ff., without chronological anchorage. Duhm combines these two prophecies with 32 1–5, which he accepts as genuine, and 2 2–4, which is similar in form and feeling though not in subject-matter, and thinks that they were uttered toward the close of Isaiah's life; 9 2–7 is assigned to the time of Sennacherib's campaign; the other prophecies are placed vaguely in Isaiah's old age and regarded as "swan songs." Duhm's arguments for these dates are very inconclusive, and the real reason for attributing them to the

[14] Among these are 28 5–6 (a gloss upon verses 1–4); 29 16–25; 30 18–26; 31 5–9, in its present form; chap. 33. On the other hand, 28 23–29; 29 5–8 (substantially); 30 27–33; and all of chap. 32 are accepted.

latest years of Isaiah's career would seem to be that Duhm is unable to find a convenient place for them anywhere else. This is not at all reassuring. If we can find a place for these prophecies, 9 2–7 excepted, only by locating them in a period of Isaiah's life about which nothing is known, the question inevitably arises, Are they prophecies of Isaiah at all? Thus in the criticism of the prophecies assigned to the time of Sennacherib and in the criticism of the Messianic prophecies, Duhm's positions cannot be regarded as final. They raise problems which they do not solve. In another respect Duhm leaves the student in doubt. His criterion for distinguishing between early and late eschatology is often vague. He holds that Isaiah was the creator of the eschatology of hope, and in consequence his eschatology is usually fluid in character, whereas the eschatology of the later writers is allusive, implying fixed dogmatic ideas. This criterion is interesting, but often fails to carry conviction. For example, it is difficult to see how Duhm can accept 32 15–20 or 30 27–33 but reject 30 18–26; or how he can accept the nucleus of 31 5–9 but reject 10 33 f. It would appear as if the passages which he accepts and those he rejects were often too similar in character to warrant such different treatment; and the question presses whether the disintegrating process which culminates in Duhm's commentary should be brought to a stop, and the passages which he rejects be defended on the basis of the passages which he accepts, or whether criticism should push still further and, on the basis of the passages which Duhm rejects, abandon many passages which he still accepts. The latter is the course which criticism actually took in the next stage of its development. The result was a new positive construction of the religious significance of Isaiah.[15]

It was Hackmann who laid the foundations for the new construction. His work was carried on by Cheyne, Brückner, and Volz. The capstone was placed upon it by Marti.[16]

[15] In the criticism of chapters 36–37, the other main problem of Isa. 1–39, Duhm accepted Stade's results.

[16] Cf. Hackmann, Zukunftserwartungen des Jesaia (1893); Cheyne, Introduction to the Book of Isaiah (1895); Brückner, Die Composition des Buches Jesaia, 28–33 (1897); Volz, Die Vorexilische Jahwehprophetie und der Messias (1897); Marti, Das Buch Jesaia (1900).

In his literary criticism Hackmann agrees in general with Duhm though he arrived at his conclusions for the most part independently of Duhm. The methodical principle of his historical construction is that all investigation of Isaiah's eschatology, and for that matter of every problem connected with the book, must start from the prophecies which can be dated with tolerable certainty. The datable prophecies gather around the two great political crises in Isaiah's lifetime, the Syro-Ephraimite war in 735–734, and the revolt from Assyria and the campaign of Sennacherib in 705–701. It is to be assumed that in these crises the profoundest convictions of Isaiah would find classic expression. In chapters 6–8 are found the views of Isaiah, as developed in 735–734. In consequence of the refusal of Ahaz and the people to follow the prophet's counsels, his message at that time became a message of doom for both Israel and Judah. The only hopes which he cherished were concentrated upon his own immediate followers (8 16–18), who constitute the Remnant. With Duhm and Giesebrecht, Hackmann denied the Messianic character of Immanuel, and, with Duhm, he separated 9 2–7 from the preceding Syro-Ephraimitic prophecies. Thus the eschatological outlook in 735–734 was, so far as the nation was concerned, pessimistic in the extreme.

The situation in 705–701 was analogous to the situation in 735–734. The people refused to follow Isaiah's warnings not to rely on Egypt, and again the prophet announced doom. The prophecies which most accurately reflect Isaiah's views at this time are found in chapters 28–33 (for the date, see Giesebrecht and Duhm). Hackmann completes the work of Duhm, and denies the genuineness of all the hopeful predictions in these chapters except 28 23–29 and 32 15–20 (!), these two passages being ascribed to other periods of Isaiah's life. What is left of chapters 28–33 is thus a series of denunciations and predictions of doom. But contrary to Isaiah's expectations—here Hackmann introduces an important variation—Jerusalem was delivered (*cf.* Stade and Duhm). The prophet interpreted this as a special dispensation of Jehovah, who thus sought to give a respite to his people that they might repent. But the people, whose heads were turned by the unexpected deliverance, far from amendment,

plunged into mad revelry, which drew from Isaiah his direst oracle (22 1–4), foretelling the utter destruction of the nation.[17] The two groups, chapters 6–8, and 28–31 with 22, are thus the two foci from which Isaiah's eschatology is to be described.

Hackmann finds no period within the known lifetime of Isaiah in which the Messianic prophecies (9 2–7; 11 1 ff.; 32 1–5; 2 2–4) can be placed. Duhm had removed them to the last years of Isaiah's life; Hackmann finds this unsatisfactory, and pushes them beyond the prophet's horizon altogether. The argument against the genuineness of these prophecies is strengthened by several new and important considerations drawn from their character. The great anti-Assyrian prophecies, with their messages of encouragement, are either rejected or ignored, with the exception of chapters 10 and 18. These two chapters are placed between 705 and 701, but 18 is interpreted as a conditional promise (!), and the usual interpretation of 10, which infers from its denunciation of Assyria a deliverance for Jerusalem, is denied. Hackmann thus arrives at a consistent theory of Isaiah's eschatology. Beginning with some hope of a better future beyond the coming judgment, such as is expressed in 1 21–26 and 32 15–20 (!), Isaiah is convinced by the obstinacy of Ahaz that this expectation is vain, and the only hope he now allows himself is that expressed in 8 16–18, which concerns his immediate followers exclusively, and has nothing to do with the nation. The conviction of coming national disaster which was gained in 735–734 was intensified as time went on, till it reaches its climax in chapters 28–31 (expurgated of their consolatory sections) and 22. Instead of a prophet of eschatological hope, Isaiah has become in Hackmann's interpretation "a prophet of faith," who sets righteousness above patriotism, and, clinging to faith beyond the forms of faith, is ready to surrender his hope for the nation, and for Zion itself, with which the religion of Judah was so closely bound up. Thus, in the alternative, defined above, between the eschatology of doom and the eschatology of hope, Hackmann decides for the former. Of the four great eschatological doctrines in Isa. 1–39, the doctrines of the Day of the Lord and the Remnant are ac-

[17] In dating 22 1–14 after the withdrawal of Sennacherib, Hackmann followed a suggestion of Soerensen.

cepted, and the doctrines of the invulnerability of Zion and the Messianic King are rejected. And it is interesting to note that the criticism which has led to this result leads also to a renewal of the emphasis upon the ethical and historical in Isaiah's teaching upon which Robertson Smith insisted, as against the supernatural and apocalyptic elements which Duhm had stressed.

Cheyne's *Introduction to the Book of Isaiah* (1895) followed closely along the lines of criticism marked out by Duhm and Hackmann, but with a preference at important points—for example, in the rejection of the Messianic prophecies—for Hackmann's results. The *Introduction* has the adventitious importance of being the first comprehensive work in English on the advanced criticism of Isaiah; but it was perhaps unfortunate that the task of introducing the newer criticism to English-speaking students should have devolved upon Professor Cheyne. His great learning is cordially recognized by all Old Testament scholars. He is the possessor of a literary style which lends charm to all that he writes. He has in an unusual degree the gift of exegetical divination—a divination which, unfortunately, in his "Jerahmeel" period borders on the mantic; but his logical faculty is deficient. He lacks the ability to present his evidence in a convincing way, and his readiness to assume the thing to be proved is almost unlimited. In the *Introduction* he adopts the plan of criticising the chapters of the book *seriatim*. The student is accordingly plunged *in medias res*, since the first chapter happens to present some of the most delicate problems of the book; and one who is not thoroughly familiar with previous criticism is likely to become bewildered. Phenomena whose critical significance would be readily understood if they were presented in their proper setting make no impression when viewed in the isolated way in which they must be considered when the present order of chapters is followed.

It might be thought that Cheyne's method is a proper application of the principle of induction, and adapted to clear his results from the suspicion of bias in favor of any particular theory of Isaiah's eschatology.[18] But all fruitful induction starts from

[18] This seems to be the author's own view of his work; see Encyclopaedia Biblica, col. 2184.

facts which are in themselves well ascertained, and whose significance can be fairly well understood, and, with the principles derived from these facts as a starting-point, the more complicated phenomena can be studied. This is the method of Hackmann, whose criticism thus takes on the form of a closely knit inductive argument, and in spite of incidental weaknesses proceeds with cumulative power. Not so in the case of Cheyne's *Introduction*. It is hardly more than a vast collection of more or less detached observations and suggestions, whose value is consequently obscured for those who are not already familiar with the criticism of the Book of Isaiah. In two respects, however, Cheyne goes beyond anything attempted by Duhm or Hackmann, namely, in the development of the linguistic argument against suspected passages, and in the almost exhaustive collection of parallels in the later literature to the content of these passages. In the accumulation of linguistic evidence, Cheyne has expended his strength on a kind of proof the value of which is not estimated as highly as it used to be; but by his collection of parallels he has earned the gratitude of all subsequent investigators.

The scholars who carried on Hackmann's work in the most effective way were Brückner, Volz, and Marti. Brückner devoted himself to strengthening and refining Hackmann's criticism of Isa. 28–33, but his work does not compare with that of Volz in importance. Volz particularly assailed the genuineness of the Messianic passages, setting himself to prove that the idea of a Messianic king was alien not only to Isaiah's profoundest convictions, but to the most characteristic teachings of pre-exilic prophecy generally. If this can be demonstrated, the burden of proof rests upon those who defend the genuineness of the Messianic prophecies, and not upon those who reject them. There is a weakness in Volz's position, however, just at this point. He himself admits the presence of the Messianic idea, or at least of nearly related conceptions, in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, though, upon his thesis, these ideas agree with the ruling convictions of those prophets as little as the Messianic prophecies in Isaiah with his; and he tries to account for this by alleging that in the age of Jeremiah and Ezekiel the Messianic eschatology was in the air, and that the prophets were unconsciously influenced by

it. But, if so, may it not have been already in the air in Isaiah's day, and cannot Isaiah have been influenced by it in the same way? Volz gives no adequate consideration to this possibility, and until the question is settled his theory must be regarded as exposed to attack at a vulnerable point.

Marti, finally, sought to complete the criticism, begun by Stade, of the anti-Assyrian group of prophecies. He rejects all of them except chapters 10 and 18. By questionable criticism and exegesis he attempts to show that, in their original form, neither of these prophecies predicts the overthrow of Assyria, and hence that they do not imply the deliverance of Jerusalem; they give no support, therefore, to the opinion that, at one time in his life, Isaiah entertained a hopeful view of the future of Judah.

But the importance of Marti's commentary does not lie merely in its criticism of the anti-Assyrian prophecies. In it the criticism which we have been following since the time of Stade, and especially since Hackmann, reaches its logical conclusion. The commentary cannot be called an original work. It sets forth no new principles for the interpretation of Isaiah. In fertilizing power it is in marked contrast with Duhm's commentary. Marti's talent is for lucid exposition and orderly arrangement. He does not scintillate new ideas; he presents accepted ideas in clear and definite form. This estimate is not intended to depreciate the excellences of his commentary. Marti's special gifts of both analysis and synthesis are admirably displayed in it, and the volume is perhaps the best Baedeker which the student could have to the criticism of the past generation. The skill shown in handling the mass of matter accumulated by preceding scholars cannot be too highly praised. It is all analyzed with the greatest care, and the important things are brought out and disposed in a way that concentrates attention upon them. The eschatological problem, which we have seen to be the chief problem of the book, occupies the central place in the exposition. In the selection and arrangement of the material, and especially in the perfecting of the exegetical basis for the newer criticism, there is abundant opportunity for independence of judgment, if not for originality of conception, and independence of this kind the commentary unquestionably has.

Two fundamental propositions underlie Marti's work. The first is adopted from Hackmann: Isaiah "is not the prophet of eschatology, but the prophet of faith." By eschatology is here meant not the eschatology of doom, but the eschatology of hope, expressed most concretely in the two doctrines of the inviolability of Zion and the Messianic King. The second thesis, also, had been advanced by some of his predecessors, but the thoroughness with which it is applied is characteristic of Marti's commentary. This proposition is that down to the exile Isaiah's prophecies were preserved with but little change, except for accidental corruptions, but that in and after the exile extensive additions and interpolations were made to the collections of his oracles, in the spirit of the times, so that almost every prediction of doom now has its pendant of glowing promise. The reason for this can be readily understood. In the exilic and post-exilic periods, owing to the completely changed historical conditions the sense for the real meaning of pre-exilic prophecy was lost. The message of doom which was the heart, or, perhaps better, the conscience, of the earlier prophecy was no longer understood. What the people longed for, what they needed, under the foreign rule to which they were subject for centuries was a word of hope and courage. Now the interest of the scribes who collected and preserved the remains of the ancient literature that survived the catastrophe of the exile was not an antiquarian or historical interest; it was a religious interest. And to make pre-exilic prophecy religiously edifying to their contemporaries, the scribes used the predictions of national ruin, which had been fulfilled in the exile, as a dark background, against which the golden age to come shone out more glorious. Marti has endeavored to separate these two elements more consistently and completely than his predecessors, and this is one of the chief merits of his commentary. The following analysis, based on Marti, will enable the reader to see at a glance the results of criticism in this stage:—

I. Isaiah I–XII

Chapter				*Chapter*			
i	Judgment	offset	by	ii, 2–4 (5)	Eschatological	Hope	[19]
ii, 6–iv, 1	"	"	"	iv, 2–6	"	"	
v, 1–29	"	"	"	v, 30	"	"	
vi, 1–viii, 18 (19–21)	"	"	"	ix, 1–7	"	"	[20]
ix, 8–x, 4	"	"	"	x, 5–xii, 6	"	"	
i–ix, as a whole, culminating in				x–xii	"	"	

II. Isaiah XIII–XXVII

xiii–xxiii, Judgments on the nations, culminating in xxiv–xxvii, Eschatological Judgment of the World.[21]

III. Isaiah XXVIII–XXXV

xxviii, 1–4	Judgment	offset	by	xxviii, 5–6	Eschatological	Hope
xxviii, 7–22	"	"	"	xxviii, 23–29	"	"
xxix, 1–4 (6)	"	"	"	xxix, 5, 7–8	"	"
xxix, 9–15	"	"	"	xxix, 16–24	"	"
xxx, 1–17	"	"	"	xxx, 18–26, 27–33	"	"
xxxi, 1–4	"	"	"	xxxi, 5–9	"	"
xxviii–xxxi, as a whole, culminating in				xxxii–xxxiii, Eschatological Appendix I		
				xxxiv–xxxv, Eschatological Appendix II		

IV. Isaiah XXXVI–XXXIX

Narrative Section Eschatologized

It must not be supposed that the only work done on Isaiah in the twenty years from Stade to Marti was done by the school of advanced criticism whose history we have been following, but it can fairly be said that they have done nearly all the fruitful work, for it is they who have really grasped the problems of Isaiah

[19] In attaching ii, 2–4 to chapter i, Marti follows Lagarde; i, 27 f., also, is an eschatological gloss.

[20] Isa. vi, 13*b* and vii, 15 are eschatological glosses, and viii, 8*b*–19 is an eschatological fragment offsetting viii, 5–8*a*.

[21] Within chapters xiii–xxiii are various eschatological fragments or glosses, notably xiv, 24–27; xiv, 28–32 (especially verse 32); xvii, 12–14; and cf. xvii, 7 f.; xviii, 3, 5, 7.

and tried methodically to solve them. The hypothesis, more or less clearly defined, which has guided their investigation is that the present Book of Isaiah is the product of a long process of compilation, accretion, and redaction, and that even with the earliest collections of his oracles Isaiah had very little to do. When it is recognized that the present connections of the various oracles or groups of oracles are not original, the book falls apart into conflicting prophecies of threat and consolation, between which no sufficient transitions can be discovered. The next step is plain, namely, to deny the genuineness of the chief prophecies of consolation, for which no adequate occasion can be found in the historical situation in Isaiah's day, and which contradict the mission given to the prophet in his inaugural vision (Isa. 6).

If the position is to be successfully attacked, it must be in one or more of three ways: *First*, The attempt may be made to prove that the prophecies stand in the connections in which the prophet himself put them; and a hypothesis may be framed to explain the unmediated juxtaposition of doom and deliverance. *Secondly*, the question may be raised whether the eschatology of hope which recent critics ascribe to the post-exilic period accords in fact with the known eschatology of that period. If not, can the various elements in it be wrought into an organic unity with Isaiah's known eschatology of doom? *Finally*, if this cannot be done, is it possible to show that there was in Isaiah's day a popular eschatology, which Isaiah inherited, but did not succeed in fusing with his own ruling ideas? In that case the eschatology of hope found in the present form of Isaiah's prophecies might conceivably be genuine, even though not brought into organic relation with his other teachings. Isaiah would then be like Luther, whose original ideas radically conflicted with many of his inherited beliefs, though he himself was often unaware of the contradiction.

Most of the commentaries and introductions that appeared between 1880 and 1900, and even down to the present time, have either ignored the problems raised by recent criticism or have been contented with animadverting upon points of detail, without a thorough discussion of its fundamental principles. For this reason these works are, for the most part, of subordinate interest,

and a detailed criticism of them in this article is unnecessary.[22] But before proceeding to the next definite stage something should be said about some important monographs and essays upon the narrative section of Isaiah (chapters 36–38) and upon the anti-Assyrian prophecies.[23] Winckler adopted Stade's analysis of the narrative chapters (Isa. 36–39) with some modifications, but advanced the theory that there were two campaigns of Sennacherib against Judah, a successful one in 701, to which 2 Kings

[22] The following representative commentaries and introductions cited by the names of their authors may be mentioned. Cheyne (1880, 5th ed. 1890), suggestive of what was to come, but now largely antiquated; Bredenkamp (1886–87) and Orelli (1887, 3d ed. 1904), representatives of the strict conservative position; Delitzsch (4th ed. 1889), because of the piety and learning of its author, exerted an important influence in recommending the older criticism to timid students, but shows little apprehension of the fundamental problems of the book, which are too often glossed over by means of a somewhat sentimentalizing exegesis; Dillmann (5th ed. 1890), a lineal descendant of Ewald, and the best representative of the older critical position, characterized by solid learning, a thesaurus of the history of criticism and exegesis, but with a strong tendency toward harmonizing exegesis; the sixth edition (1908), edited by Kittel, has all the merits of the fifth, with important concessions to recent criticism, a work of permanent value; G. A. Smith (Expositor's Bible, 1889), a work of great originality and inspiration, which has perhaps done more to interest the lay reader and the preacher in Isaiah than any other work, but the glowing imagination which has accomplished this tends to fuse many sections of Isaiah into a false unity, and thus obscures the real problems of the book; Skinner (Cambridge Bible, 1896) and Whitehouse (Century Bible, 1905), two works whose value is not to be judged by their limited scope, both representing the principles of the older criticism; Skinner's introduction, an admirable exposition of Isaiah's religious significance on the basis of these principles; Whitehouse, to be especially commended for its wealth of archaeological illustration; Box (1908), an excellent translation in metrical form, with brief but illuminating introductions, and notes to the several prophecies, embodying the principles of Duhm and Cheyne; a handbook of results, not of processes; McFadyen (Bible for Home and School), elementary; Wade (Westminster Commentaries, 1911), a fair commentary of the reproductive kind, showing incidental traces of Duhm's exegesis, but making no very positive contribution to the subject; Kuenen's Introduction (Onderzoek, 1889), an admirable, condensed exposition of the older critical views of Isaiah, regarding many of Stade's positions as hypercriticism; Driver (Literature of the Old Testament, 1891) maintains the older critical positions; in the revised edition (6th ed. 1897) he describes many of the results of recent criticism, but occupies a very reserved attitude toward them; Cornill's Introduction (English trans., 1907) may be said, in general, to occupy Duhm's standpoint, but the discussions are not at all exhaustive.

[23] Winckler, Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen (1892); Meinhold, Die Jesaiaerzählungen, Jes. 36–39 (1898); Nagel, Der Zug des Sanherib gegen Jerusalem (1902); Prášek, Sanheribs Feldzüge gegen Juda (1903); to which I venture to

18 13–16 refers, and a second, which ended in a great disaster, after 691. This theory is defended by Prášek and in my own essay. Meinhold and Nagel reject this theory, but differ in their judgments on the narratives. Meinhold, on the ground of 2 Kings 18 13–16 and Sennacherib's own inscriptions, denies the historical credibility of the accounts, while Nagel defends it. The importance of the subject lies in its bearing upon the group of anti-Assyrian prophecies. If Isa. 36 and 37 relate to the campaign of 701 and are substantially trustworthy—that is, if there was a signal deliverance of Jerusalem at that time—and if Isaiah's threats and promises at that time are both accepted as genuine, then the promises were confirmed by the event, and the threats were not. If the signal deliverance in 701 is admitted, and the genuineness of the promises in 701 is denied, then Isaiah must be regarded as having been agreeably disappointed by the outcome (Hackmann). If, on the other hand, it is denied that there was any remarkable deliverance in 701, the threats were fulfilled, and the promises were not. This is the view of Meinhold, who accepts both groups of prophecies, and thinks that Isa. 36–37 has been made to agree with Isaiah's prophecies of deliverance. If the signal deliverance is denied and the consolatory prophecies are rejected, then there is perfect agreement between the situation in 701 and Isaiah's attitude toward it. Finally, if there were two campaigns, a successful one in 701 and a disastrous one after 691, it is conceivable that Isaiah's prophecies of doom may date from 701 and his prophecies of promise from the later period. In view of these various possibilities the problem of the narrative section in Isaiah is, as Meinhold contends, fundamental to any sound criticism of Isaiah's prophecies in 701.

Wilke and Küchler take up the other side of the problem, and discuss the attitude of Isaiah toward Assyria generally. Wilke denies the present sequences in the Book of Isaiah, but adopts a conservative position with respect to the anti-Assyrian prophecies. His discussion is very well arranged, and for that very reason the weaknesses in his position can be the more readily detected.

add my own essay, The Invasion of Sennacherib, Bibliotheca Sacra (1906); Wilke, Jesaia und Assur (1905); Küchler, Die Stellung des Propheten Jesaia zur Politik seiner Zeit (1906); Staerk, Das assyrische Weltreich im Urteil der Propheten (1908), (not accessible to me).

Küchler accepts in general the critical position of Duhm, but denies totally the trustworthiness of chapters 36–37. In consequence he must hold that Isaiah's expectations as expressed, for example, in chapter 10 were grievously disappointed.[24] In addition to the above essays, attention should be called to four other monographs which treat of various phases of our problem.[25] Meinhold's monograph on the Remnant is reactionary as compared with recent critical theories. It is a strange mixture of acute incidental exegesis and impossible combinations. For example, to explain how the righteous can be saved in Jerusalem while the wicked are destroyed—the question in which his essay really culminates—he suggests that the ungodly went out of the city to the war against Sennacherib (pp. 156 ff.). In Guthe's most recent exposition of Isaiah's teachings his earlier untenable theories are abandoned. He strongly inclines to the results of Hackmann and Marti, but finds in 28 16 and 1 21–26 evidence that toward the end of his life Isaiah entertained the hope of a national restoration—something that Hackmann will not allow. The Messianic passages are relegated to an appendix. This disposition of them is intended to manifest Guthe's serious doubt of their genuineness, though he is not quite prepared to reject them. The reader cannot find a more admirably balanced résumé of the chief results of modern criticism than Guthe's little book. Kennett's theory is that the present Book of Isaiah was compiled in the Maccabaean age, and that many of the prophecies in chapters 1–39 originated in that time—an extreme development of Duhm's opinion.

In the works just described no new principles of criticism or

[24] Küchler's monograph is also important for its polemic against another thesis of Winckler propounded in his Geschichte Israels (1895) and in his Keilinsschriften und das Alte Testament, namely, that the eighth-century prophets were largely actuated in their attitude toward Assyria by political considerations. Küchler shows conclusively that Isaiah, at least, was governed exclusively by religious and idealistic motives.

[25] Meinhold, Studien zur israelitischen Religionsgeschichte, Bd. I, Der heilige Rest (1903); Guthe, Jesaia (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, 1907); Kennett, The Composition of the Book of Isaiah (1910); Nowack, Die Zukunftshoffnungen Israels in der assyrischen Zeit (Festschrift Holtzmann, 1902, inaccessible to me).

interpretation are advanced, but only fresh exegetical or critical combinations, based on the general principles either of the earlier or the recent critical school. We have now to turn to a new formulation of the problem which definitely marks the third stage in the latest period of criticism. The parentage of the idea is to be imputed to Gunkel. In his *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit* (1895) he proved that in many passages in the Bible, and particularly in the first chapter of Genesis, there are borrowings, reminiscences, or allusions which can be traced to The Babylonian Cosmogonic Poems. The method he pursued was to take many phrases, words, and ideas in the Bible, and show that by themselves they are unintelligible; to be understood, they must be set in a larger context. The Babylonian Creation epic furnishes this context. In the application of this method it appeared that many ideas which now are found only in late portions of the Bible and which, for this reason, were supposed to be themselves late, had a long antecedent history in Hebrew literature or tradition. Gunkel himself suggested that the same method should be applied to the subject of Israelite eschatology generally, and in (Bousset und Gunkel) *Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments,* Heft 1 (1903), he sketched out a history of the eschatalogical idea of the Day of the Lord on the basis of this new method of research. But it remained for Gressmann in his *Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie* (1906) to subject for the first time the whole problem of Old Testament eschatology to a re-examination in the light of Gunkel's new method. The result for the criticism and interpretation of Isaiah was extraordinary.

We have seen how Duhm considered Isaiah to be the real founder of the eschatology of hope; and how, on the other hand, Hackmann, Cheyne, Volz, and Marti sought to show that the eschatology of hope was irreconcilable with the eschatology of doom proclaimed by Isaiah; and, further, how from the contradiction between the two sets of ideas they drew the conclusion that the eschatology of hope could not have originated with Isaiah, but must have arisen later. Gressmann grants the premise of these critics, namely, that there is no organic connection between the eschatology of doom and the eschatology of hope,

but he denies their conclusion. He raises the question whether the eschatology of hope may not be earlier than Isaiah, earlier than the prophecy of the eighth century altogether. If it were so, these prophets might have accepted the eschatology of hope as a part of their traditional faith notwithstanding the fact that it could not be combined with the eschatology of doom in an organic unity (see above, p. 504). The way in which Gressmann works out this point is very interesting; but only the briefest outline of his argument is here possible.

There are, according to Gressmann, three ways in which the existence of a preprophetic eschatology may be established: *First*, It may be inferred from the prophetic polemic; the prophetic antithesis implies a preprophetic thesis. *Secondly*, it may be inferred from those eschatological views which are not organically related to the fundamental convictions of the prophets, but stand in a more or less manifest contradiction to them. *Thirdly*, it may be inferred from conceptions or phrases which are not of themselves intelligible, and hence imply an antecedent history. By evidence of this kind Gressmann first seeks to establish the existence of a preprophetic eschatology of doom. Here he has his strongest case. It must be admitted that the Day of the Lord in Amos (5 18) is already a standing phrase. He uses it without explaining it, assuming that his hearers would understand it. The idea of the Day of the Lord must therefore be older than Amos. What is its history? What was understood by the phrase? If we turn to Zephaniah, the Day of the Lord appears as a cosmical catastrophe (1 2 ff., 18). According to the modern critical school (cf. Stade) Zephaniah was the first prophet to conceive the Day of the Lord as a cosmical catastrophe. But this position is untenable, since the conception in Zephaniah is altogether vague, not concrete and definite as we should expect if it was original with him. How the catastrophe is to come about is not clearly explained; contrast Zeph. 1 18 with 1 16. Moreover, Zephaniah is not the first prophet to express the conception of a cosmical catastrophe: it is plainly implied in the earlier prophets (see Amos 8 9; Hos. 4 2; and above all Isa. 2). But it did not originate with any one of these prophets; their conception is no more coherent than Zephaniah's. Finally, the idea of a cosmical catastrophe is itself

a mythical idea, and as such prehistoric; it cannot, therefore, have originated with the prophets.[26]

Gressmann surmises that in the development of the idea of the Day of the Lord there were three stages. There was, first, the mythical stage, in which some physical disaster, such as a flood or a fire or an earthquake, must have been in mind. In support of this assumption the prophecies against the heathen nations are alleged. The doom denounced in these prophecies upon all nations presupposes the idea of a cosmical catastrophe. The second was the popular Israelite stage, in which the primitive notion became blurred and indefinite, as we now find it reflected in the prophets, and at the same time the catastrophe was limited to the nations, whereas Israel was to escape. This stage may be inferred from the polemic of Amos (see Amos 5 18 ff.). Finally, there is the prophetic stage, in which the idea of the Day of the Lord is historical and moral. The Day of the Lord is a day of destruction, not solely for the enemies of Israel, but for Israel itself, because of its sins. This destruction is to be accomplished by a foreign foe—the Assyrians or the Chaldaeans, the Persians, the Syrians, as the case may be. The natural convulsions, therefore, which are described in Isa. 2 or in Zephaniah, are not to be taken in the original mythological sense. The prophets are speaking of the destruction of Israel by the kingdoms which Jehovah commissioned to execute his judgment. Yet the convulsions of nature are not to be interpreted allegorically any more than literally. They are nothing more than poetic formulas which the prophets borrow from the past to heighten the mysterious and awful effect of their predictions of doom. They describe the historical ruin of the nation poetically in the terms of the old mythical catastrophe.

In the same way, Gressmann tries to reconstruct a preprophetic eschatology of hope. In the pictures of the Golden Age, for example, there are many traits which would not naturally be suggested to the prophet's mind by the historical situation and the needs of the people. The predictions of freedom from foreign

[26] Gressmann argues, further, that Palestine was physically not the kind of a land in which the idea of cosmical catastrophe would be likely to arise, and infers from this that the whole notion is foreign.

oppression, restoration from exile, and the like, may be so explained, but others cannot be. The covenant with the beasts of the field (Hos. 2 20), or the idyllic description of peace in nature (Isa. 11 6–8), can only be explained by mythology. This is corroborated by analogies in other literatures. Thus the notion of the harmlessness of the wild beasts is especially associated in classical mythology with the animals that dwell in sacred groves—a garden of the gods. It is easy to imagine that the same notion existed in Hebrew mythology in connection with Paradise, the Garden of the Lord (Ezek. 28 13), and to infer that the Golden Age to come, in such passages as Isa. 11 6–8, is painted in the colors of Paradise. Similarly, such imaginative pictures of a transformed nature as those in Isa. 41 18–20; 48 21; 55 12 ff. may best be explained as derived from a myth of a restored Eden. This conjecture is supported by Isa. 51 3, where the new Jerusalem is described as Eden. It is not said in this passage that Eden itself will return, but Jerusalem is described in the terms of a restored Eden. The descriptions in Deutero-Isaiah thus disclose an old mythological background; but the prophet uses mythical features in a purely poetical way, to paint the glory of the restored Jerusalem, just as the mythical features of the eschatology of doom were seen to have lost their original meaning and to have become traditional poetic imagery. This use of mythological description is characteristic of "the prophetic style."

In the same way it is argued that the references to milk in Joel 3 18, where the figure is by no means self-explanatory, and to milk and honey in Isa. 7 15–21 are in origin mythical. In other religions milk and honey are the food of the gods; their natural place is in a description of the abundance of a garden of the gods. The phrase, "a land flowing with milk and honey," does not occur in the Hebrew stories of Paradise, but is a standing hyperbole for the productiveness of Palestine. Originally, however, it must have had a mythological connotation.[27] Gressmann contends that these prophecies and phrases, and many others of similar character, can best be explained by the hypothesis that there was an old myth of an eschatological Eden, the counterpart of the primitive Eden. But if the prophecies of eschatological hope

[27] Gressmann, op. cit., p. 212.

have a mythical background, the eschatology of hope, as well as the eschatology of doom, is prehistoric, and therefore preprophetic. By similar combinations he endeavors to establish the preprophetic origin of the idea of the Messianic King.

It must be admitted, I think, that Gressmann makes a very strong argument for the preprophetic origin both of the eschatology of doom and the eschatology of hope. Its real force can scarcely be estimated from the brief résumé given above. But granted that he establishes this part of his case, the genuineness of the hopeful prophecies in Isaiah is not thereby proved. It is quite conceivable that Isaiah may have adopted and modified the eschatology of doom without at the same time adopting the eschatology of hope, as indeed Gressmann himself admits that the pre-exilic prophets, as contrasted with the post-exilic prophets, were stormy petrels, whose main message was one of warning. In favor of such a supposition it may be urged that the eschatology of hope has not been made moral and historical in any such degree as the eschatology of doom. Yet why should not the prophets have been able to spiritualize the former as they transformed the latter? Gressmann's theory is that the eschatology of hope in the prophets is an unwilling concession to the popular preprophetic eschatology. But why was it necessary for them to make such concessions? Finally, the contradiction between the eschatology of doom and the eschatology of hope in the present form of the prophecies remains—a contradiction which Gressmann admits. All this would seem to make strongly against the genuineness of the eschatology of hope in Isaiah, even supposing it to be established that its ideas were current before his day. It is conceivable that the pre-exilic prophets resisted the popular eschatology of promise,[28] while the later prophets, under changed conditions, were more tolerant of it.

Gressmann has an extremely ingenious way of getting around these difficulties. He reminds us that the myth of a cosmic catastrophe which is supposed to lie behind the eschatology of doom and the myth of an eschatological Eden which is supposed to lie behind the eschatology of hope are both purely hypothetical. As

[28] Gressmann even conjectures that this optimistic outlook was cultivated in the schools of the "false prophets."

a matter of fact, no such myths have been discovered. They are matters of inference;[29] but Gressmann is sure of his inferences. He next assumes that these myths had been sundered in very early times, before they became known to the Israelites. They had once stood in an organic relation to each other; but this relation had been broken, and all memory of it had disappeared in remote times. The lack of connection between the eschatology of hope and the eschatology of doom which recent critics have made so much of, and which Gressmann admits, is to be explained by this early sunderance and disintegration of the great pair of eschatological myths. The unmediated juxtaposition of hope and doom in our prophetical books is but the inheritance from an already disjointed past. The juxtaposition of contradictory utterances thus becomes a feature of "prophetic style" once more, a convention of prophetic writing.

For this very subtle theory Gressmann thinks he can offer proof in one striking instance, namely, in the prophetic doctrine of the Remnant. Did the idea of the Remnant originally belong to the eschatology of doom or to the eschatology of hope? To the eschatology of doom, unquestionably, answers Gressmann. The Remnant implies a catastrophe, and was originally intended to emphasize the greatness of the catastrophe (see Amos 3 12; 5 2 f.; Isa. 6 11 ff.; 17 5 ff.). But in the prophets the Remnant is incorporated into the eschatology of hope. This reversal of significance was not made by the prophets themselves; for, when they speak of the Remnant, they assume that their hearers will apprehend the word as they do—the hope of the future is lodged in this Remnant. Thus Isaiah gives no explanation of the name of his son, Shear-jashub; he expects the people to understand the allusion.[30] Similarly Amos alludes to the Remnant of Joseph (Amos 5 14 ff.) without explaining it. If we may infer from the way in which Amos speaks of the Day of the Lord that his contemporaries were familiar with the idea and the phrase, it may on the same grounds be inferred that they were familiar with the idea of the Remnant.

[29] Gressmann is here at a decided disadvantage as compared with Gunkel. In Schöpfung und Chaos Gunkel had a real myth to start with, whose existence in the earliest times could be proved; Gressmann has none.

[30] Scholars have often conjectured that Isaiah explained the name in some prophecy now lost.

The transition from the eschatology of doom to the eschatology of hope through the change in the significance of the Remnant was not an original transition. An organic connection between the two eschatologies is not established in this way. The idea of the Remnant naturally belongs to the eschatology of doom. It can be transformed into hope only when the Remnant is identified with Israel. This is not explicitly done by the prophets, which shows that they did not originate this new conception of the Remnant, but adopted it from the popular eschatology. But if the Prophets could in this instance adopt the popular eschatology of hope, although it had no organic connection with the eschatology of doom, there is no objection in principle to supposing that they adopted other elements of the popular eschatology. "With the idea of the Remnant [interpreted as a hope], the rigid eschatology of doom is broken through. A breach is now made, through which the entire eschatology of hope, or at least a great part of it, can enter. . . . It must also be borne in mind that the material was traditional, and could therefore be handed on, without much concern about its consistency" (p. 243).

Gressmann consequently lays down the following canon for the criticism of the prophets: "The sole warrantable criterion upon which the genuineness of an eschatological passage may be denied is the contemporary historical situation presupposed in it. So long as this is not irreconcilable with the ascription of the passage to the author in whose book the prediction of future salvation (*die Heilseschatologie*) has come down to us, so long its genuineness may be maintained" (p. 243). Thus the criterion of religious ideas, which recent critics made the chief ground for denying the genuineness of the eschatological passages in Isaiah, is formally rejected by Gressmann.

Gressmann did not propound his theories in an apologetic interest; in fact, in the form in which he presents them they are radical in the extreme. The genuineness of the Messianic passages is indeed rehabilitated, but at what a price! They are the outgrowth of an alien mythology. As it was to be expected, however, Gressmann's rejection of the principles which have guided critics for a generation and his novel solution of the problems of the book were turned to account by scholars of a more con-

servative temper. In *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus* (1912) Sellin attempted to re-establish, on the basis of Gressmann's work, something very much like the old orthodox doctrine of Messianic prophecy. He denied, of course, that the eschatological ideas were derived from a foreign mythology, and tried to show that they all had their source in the revelation of Jehovah at Sinai. Mythical traits, the presence of which he admits, are only embellishments, borrowed from kindred ideas in other nations, and do not affect the substance of Israelite eschatology. With the work of Sellin criticism would seem to have boxed the compass, and to incline once more to positions held before 1880.

I have contented myself with giving only a résumé of Gressmann's positions so far as they bear upon the genuineness of Isaiah's prophecies, without going into a criticism of these positions which would be likely to lead rather far afield. But the reader ought fully to realize what an enormous drain upon his speculative faculty is required by Gressmann. It must be *assumed* (1) that there were originally two clearly defined eschatological myths, one of a world catastrophe, one of a restored Eden, for which there is no historical evidence but which are admittedly only matters of inference; (2) that these two hypothetical myths were once organically connected; (3) that before they entered into Israel the connection between them was forgotten, and that each myth became so disintegrated that at present we have only fragments of them left; (4) that the prophets adopted these *disjecta membra* from the popular uncanonical eschatology, but that, while they were able to ethicize the myth of doom, they were not able to ethicize the myth of hope, at least to the same degree (why not?); (5) that the prophets made no attempt to join together again the two hypothetical myths once hypothetically connected, but left the fragments in the same disjointed state in which they found them, except for the artificial and inadequate connection supplied at times (not always) by the doctrine of the Remnant. In spite of Gressmann's genius for brilliant combination, in spite of the great suggestiveness of his work, in spite even of the probability that there *was* a preprophetic eschatology of some sort, for the establishment of which thesis the greatest credit is due to Gressmann, yet when his theory is allowed

to stand out stark and stripped of incidental protecting exegesis, its inner weakness is revealed. The defence of Isaiah's prophecies by such a purely conjectural construction is precarious. Yet Gressmann has struck out a new mode of attacking the problem which may lead to important results.

From this survey of the history of criticism we turn to the most recent contribution to the voluminous literature on Isaiah, the commentary of Professor Gray.

Commentaries may be of two kinds, creative, of which small class Duhm's is a conspicuous example, or reproductive, like Marti's. The commentary of Professor Gray belongs to the latter type. From what has been said above about Marti the reader will understand that this implies no disparagement of Professor Gray's work. There is ample room in a reproductive commentary for learning, acumen, and independent judgment, and the volume before us exhibits all these qualities.

In the Introduction Gray adopts the three fundamental principles of the modern critical school, namely, that the Book of Isaiah is a collection of oracles of widely diverse age and character; that the oracles are in poetical form, and that differences of form often enable us to determine the limits of a prophecy or to recognize interpolations; and that in the outlook upon the future, types characteristic of earlier and later periods respectively may be discriminated.

On the first point he remarks: "The fact that the Book of Isaiah is not the work of the prophet Isaiah[31] but a post-exilic compilation, ought to be the starting-point in all detailed criticism, or interpretation of the Book" (p. xxxii). In a continuous work, like the history of Thucydides, the presumption is always in favor of the genuineness of any section, but this presumption does not hold in a compilatory work; "each piece must be judged by itself." On p. xcvi Gray turns this principle against Gressmann's canon, that the historical background of a prophecy is the only legitimate criterion for the determination of its genuineness.

[31] "Prophet *of* Isaiah" is a misprint. Other misprints noticed are "Chs. 28–32" for 28–33 (p. xlvii); "unlike" for alike, p. 32; "Cheyne, p. 29" for p. 27 (p. 110); "vv. 18–23" for 19–23 (p. 157); "8a–10" for 8c–10 (p. 148); "prophetic" for *anti*prophetic (p. 377, line 11). The last mistake results in a serious misunderstanding of the view criticised.

This assumes that the presumption is always in favor of the genuineness of a prophecy which is contained in a book bearing a prophet's name; but in a compilation there is no such presumption. In general, Gray does not seem to have been much impressed by Gressmann's discoveries.

In regard to the age of the compilation, Gray does not follow Duhm and the more radical critics in putting it in the Maccabaean period. Against so late a date he argues from the history of the canon, and especially from the age of the Greek translation. Here Gray puts the case admirably. The Maccabaean theory is based on one of several possible interpretations of a number of prophecies; and "a possible, but not necessary, theory of the interpretation and origin of a section may rightly be judged unproven if it conflicts with the probable, even though not certain, history of the prophetic Canon" (p. xliv). Gray himself inclines to a date toward the close of the third century B.C.[32] His criticism of Kennett (p. lix) is just and trenchant.

The discussion of the poetic form of the prophecies (pp. lix–lxviii) is also excellent. In a former number of the *Harvard Theological Review*[33] the attempt was made to apprise the reader of the state of this question at the present time. It is a pleasure to be able to refer him now to Gray's elucidation of the subject. It would be hard to find anything in brief compass more informing and satisfactory. In general it may be said that the poetical analyses of the various prophecies are among the strongest features of the book, and in this respect Gray has made a distinct advance upon the commentaries of Duhm and Marti. In keeping with the general scheme of the *Hand-Commentar*, Marti did not give a continuous translation of the prophecies. His results are therefore not apparent to the eye, and not easily judged. Duhm translates in metrical form, but practically says to the reader, "Trust my ear." He seldom seeks to justify his views of the poetical structure of the prophecies. Gray, on the other hand, has adopted a system by which the phenomena are made clear even to a student unacquainted with Hebrew, and the impartial way in which this is done cannot be too highly commended.

[32] A concise and clear statement of the author's theory of the successive stages in the formation of the book will be found in § 40 (pp. lv–lvii).

[33] Vol. V (1912), pp. 86 ff.

Most writers are so in love with their metrical schemes that they find it hard to resist the temptation to gloss over difficulties in the application. Gray always apprises the reader at the outset of the actual facts of the case, so that an opportunity is given to judge of the aptness of the metrical emendations he proposes.

In another connection (pp. liii–lv), Gray discusses the important question of the relation of the present form of the prophecies to the spoken word. His opinion is that the bulk of the [genuine] prophecies in the Book of Isaiah "are condensations into artistic poetic form of what Isaiah had said in public at greater length, but without the same restraint of form." This would seem to imply after all that Isaiah was an author. Just what effect this theory would ultimately have on the theory of the composition of the book, Gray does not tell us. This particular subject has not yet been sufficiently investigated. Thus far the Introduction has given clear, balanced, and sufficiently complete statements of the problems of the book. When we come to the eschatological question, however, the treatment is less satisfactory.[34]

Gray recognizes that it should be one of the main aims of a commentary on Isaiah to "disengage the work of that prophet from the later accretions which it has received, and so to recover . . . the spirit and teaching of a single personality in place of the confused and composite form that must present itself, if we attempt to treat the entire book as the work of a single hand" (p. xi). But it is also an important part of his task "to do justice to the other contributors to the book, and, above all, to approach with sympathy the work of, perhaps, many nameless writers that now forms a large part of it" (p. xii). These represent the convictions and hopes of the post-exilic Jewish church, and as such are of the greatest significance.

Of the first part of this double task Gray acquits himself in §§ 74–89, "Isaiah as Prophet and Teacher" (pp. lxxxi–xcvi). The second part, an examination of the religious ideas and expectations of the other contributors to the book, is touched upon only

[34] In passing, one inexplicable omission should be noted. In §§ 58–73, "Isaiah in relation to the political and social conditions of his age," there is no reference to Hezekiah's reforms. Since the attempt has often been made to connect the prophecies of hope in one way or another with these reforms, a discussion of their date and character is of great importance.

incidentally in the volume before us; it is to be hoped that it is the author's intention to treat this subject connectedly, including the eschatology of these authors, in the Introduction to the second volume. Otherwise, a serious omission in the Commentary would have to be recorded.

The survey of Isaiah's work as prophet and teacher will be disappointing to a reader who looks for an exposition of the development of Isaiah's ideas and expectations. After saying that the supreme interest in the study of Isaiah is to discover what he had himself learned from God, what he taught his own age, and what through it he has contributed to man's increasing knowledge and consciousness of God, Gray continues (p. lxxxiii):

> These questions can be answered up to a certain point; but, owing to the uncertainty that hangs over many questions of the literary origin of much of Isa. 1 1–39, . . . they cannot with advantage be pursued into the detail that has sometimes been attempted. Here, at all events, no fresh elaborate attempt will be made to trace development in Isaiah's conceptions and teaching, to bring to light conflicting conceptions in his view of the future, for example, or in his judgment of Assyria, and then to determine the chronological sequence of the changes. All the more elaborate structures of Isaiah's "theology" rest of necessity on shifting and insecure foundations; even if it were certain, and it is not, that passages such as 11 1–8; 9 1–6; 32 1–8 were the work of Isaiah at all, it is altogether uncertain at what period of his life he composed them, and how he came by, or how he modified, his conceptions of a Messiah.

I have given this quotation at length, because I believe it discloses the principal defect of the book. The author declines at the outset the attempt to solve the chief problem of Isaiah. He does not shun the task of improving on the metrical analyses of his predecessors, although the greatest uncertainty exists about the structure of Hebrew poetry; why should he refuse the obligation to formulate the eschatological problem more precisely, even if he feels that the critical foundations are "shifting and insecure"? If they are so, it is the first business of the critic to try to make them more stable and secure. As a matter of fact, Gray inclines, though it is an irresolute and swaying inclination, to that wing of the modern school of which Hackmann and Marti are the most conspicuous representatives (see especially his treatment of the

Messianic prophecies); but, in consequence of the over-cautious attitude avowed in the paragraph quoted above, the formulation of the eschatological problem, instead of being more precise and sharply defined than it was by Hackmann and Marti, is much vaguer and more blurred. My criticism is not directed against Gray's opinion that the eschatological problem is as yet not satisfactorily solved; it is that his commentary does not make as plain as those of his predecessors what, exactly, the elements of the problem are. I do not demand that he should decide among rival theories, but that a commentary at this date in the history of criticism should exhibit fully and clearly the different theories, with the critical and exegetical arguments by which they are supported or confuted, and the consequences that follow from them.

One example of the shortcomings of Gray's commentary in these respects must suffice. Isaiah 22 1–14 has been a cornerstone in many constructions of the eschatology of Isaiah. The first question is whether the passage is a description of what has occurred or a prediction of what will occur. Since the time of Soerensen a favorite theory has been that the passage is historical. This opinion is based mainly on verses 8–11 (and verses 6–7), which can hardly be construed otherwise than as historical, and on the prevalence of perfect tenses throughout the rest of the passage. But, if historical, the most natural place to put the prophecy is after the invasion of Sennacherib in 701. From this a very interesting inference is drawn: the last datable utterance of Isaiah is a prophecy of unmitigated doom, and the prophet's life closes as it began (see chapter 6) without hope for his nation. This is a fundamental point in Hackmann's construction, and when Isa. 22 is associated with chapters 28–31 (rejecting the consolatory pendants), which are prior to the arrival of the Assyrians before Jerusalem, we have a consistently gloomy series of prophecies from the time of Sennacherib.

There is a difficulty, however, in the way of this date for chapter 22. If we turn to verses 1–5 with the reference to the Day of the Lord (22 5), and to verses 12–14 which announce disaster for sin (see verse 14*b*), we are evidently in a time before disaster. This also best suits the careless attitude of the people. These verses are interpreted by Hackmann as expressing the frivolous joy of the

people after the final withdrawal of Sennacherib. In that case the destruction which is announced cannot refer to the invasion of Sennacherib, but must mean some other, undefined destruction in the future. But this does not seem to be the natural interpretation of the passage. Consequently, Duhm, on the ground of verses 1–5 and 12–14, puts the prophecy at the beginning of the revolt against Sennacherib, when the people were confident of the result of the new Egyptian alliance. The objection to this view is that verses 8–11 (6 f.), which are almost certainly historical, imply a time of the greatest distress and anxiety in the recent past, such as must have been caused by the appearance of Sennacherib under the walls of Jerusalem. Accordingly, we have a third theory, represented by Robertson Smith and Dillmann. This theory puts the prophecy in the midst of the campaign, after the humiliation of Hezekiah (2 Kings 18 13–16) and the supposed temporary withdrawal of Sennacherib, but before the final retirement of the Assyrians. This theory would account for verses 8–12 (6–7) as recalling the anxiety of the people at the approach of Sennacherib; for verses 1–5 and 12–14 as the result of the feeling of relief that ensued upon his temporary withdrawal; and for the stern warning of the prophet, who looked for a return of the foe. But the combination assumes the substantial truth of the narrative in Isa. 36 f. Another objection to it is the difficulty of finding a place for chapter 10, which is usually assigned to the same period. The only remaining possibility is to give up the unity of the section, and remove verses 8–11, and possibly verses 6–7. Then the passage can be placed most fittingly at the beginning of the Egyptian alliance, when perhaps, as Duhm suggests, Padi, the loyal king of Ekron, had been brought in irons to Hezekiah for safekeeping.[35] Such is the problem of Isa. 22 1–14. It is seen to involve the credibility of chapters 36–37; and through its relation to chapters 28–31, on the one hand, and to chapter 10, on the other, the passage is of fundamental importance for the question what Isaiah, in the time of Sennacherib's invasion, expected the outcome to be.

Let us see how Gray treats this problem. The people of Jerusalem may have given themselves up to revelry, "either because they do not perceive the issue of things, and see in a tem-

[35] See Sennacherib's inscriptions.

porary alleviation a permanent relief, or because, feeling the insecurity of the present, they are determined to drown their cares in wine and feasting (verse 13 f.)" (p. 363). Between these alternatives Gray does not decide, yet an analysis of the manifestation of the people's feelings should shed some light on the question. But what is the danger, whether past or imminent, and what might be the "temporary alleviation"? On page 364 we appear to be informed: "The period to which we might most probably assign verses 1–5, 12–14 is that of Sennacherib; what is described is the revelry to which the city gave itself up when the Assyrian king in 701 B.C. raised the siege, or blockade, of Jerusalem." Here Gray appears to decide in favor of danger past and the joy of deliverance. But he does not tell us what he means by "a temporary alleviation." Does he hold to the historical character of Isa. 36–37, and put 22 1–14 in the midst of the campaign, as Robertson Smith does; or does he hold that the prophecy is to be placed after the final withdrawal of Sennacherib? In the latter case Isaiah must have expected some immediate disaster from another quarter. The reader is not informed on these points. On the next page (365) we read: (22 1–5) "A rhetorical question addressed by the prophet to the merry-making city which has swarmed up to the flat roofs to watch thence (Judg. 16 27) the spectacle of Sennacherib's retreat (cp. 37 22), or something similarly pleasing, such as the entrance into the city of the captive Assyrian vassal Padi, king of Ekron (Duhm)." Here again alternatives are presented and this time, since 37 22 (which must be the final retirement) is introduced into the argument, it would seem as if the choice lay between the final withdrawal of Sennacherib[36] and a date at the beginning of the campaign. This alternative is presented as if it made no difference which of the two possibilities is accepted. As a matter of fact, it makes the greatest difference. The significance of the prophecy for the eschatology of Isaiah is involved in this choice.

In the Introduction the author has something further to say on the questions raised by Isa. 22 1–14. At p. xciii we read: "So later,

[36] The allusion to 37 22 in this connection is unfortunate. The joy at Sennacherib's retreat is countenanced by Isaiah in chapter 37; in chapter 22 it is rebuked. The comparison suggests the great critical difficulties in which the prophecies supposed to be delivered in this period are involved.

while Isaiah insisted that no harm would befall the city from Sennacherib, he may have held, and apparently did hold (22 14), that harm would befall it from another quarter, unless they repented." Here Gray appears to have decided in favor of a date for 22 1–14 after the final withdrawal of Sennacherib. But in the comments on the passage itself this theory is presented as only one of several possibilities among which the reader is free to choose. Yet the view which Gray himself thus tentatively accepts in the Introduction is a very important element in his theory of the eschatology of Isaiah.

If we turn, finally, from the historical criticism of Isa. 22 1–14 to the literary criticism, the same vagueness and irresoluteness is observable. For example on pp. 363 ff. the question of the unity of the passage is raised. About the difficult verses 6–7 Gray says: "If vv. 6 f. are a real sequence, v. 6 describes some of the elements (Kir and Elam) in the army which on the day of Yahweh will attack Jerusalem" (p. 364). A little further down on the page he says: "It is doubtful whether v. 6 fits into the political situation"; and in fine print mentions the views of some of his predecessors about verse 6, among which Winckler's is pronounced "most improbable." The reasons for the views are not given. These remarks are made in the general introduction to the chapter. When we come to the exegesis of verses 6 and 7 we read: "On the question whether these verses form part of the vision of vv. 2*b*, 3, 5, see above pp. 363 ff." We are thus referred back to the Introduction, in which the question is raised, but not discussed exegetically. Neither is it discussed exegetically in what follows (pp. 367 ff.). That is, the relation of the verbs and suffixes in verses 6 and 7 to the preceding context, or of the subject (a siege) to the following context, is not commented upon, though these exegetical questions properly belong to the criticism of the verses. But on page 368 we finally discover something for which we have been looking, namely, a discussion of the question whether there can have been an Elamite contingent in the Assyrian army in 701. A good résumé of the historical facts bearing on the question is given, and then the conclusion: "In the light of these facts other alternatives are: (1) to understand Elam as equivalent to such few Elamite mercenaries as might serve in an Assyrian army though

Assyria and Elam were opposed to one another, or soldiers from those small portions of Elam which Sargon had temporarily annexed in 711; (2) to see in the verses the work of a later writer (cp. 11 11; 21 2); (3) with Winckler to treat the poem as a celebration of an Elamite attack, directed against the interests of Assyria, on a Babylonian town (Sippar)." With this the matter is dismissed. Gray thus concludes apparently with allowing the possibility of Winckler's view which he had just before pronounced "most improbable." No attempt is made to help the student to a decision between the various possibilities, and no explanation of the verses is given if the decision is in favor of their being late.

The examination we have made of Isa. 22 1–14 illustrates another of the defects of this commentary. Not only does the author frequently leave us in doubt about his own conception of a problem or his judgment on disputed points, but the matter is at times so ill-arranged that the reader, even when he knows just what he is looking for, often has hard work to find it. This fault belongs in some measure to all the International Critical Commentaries, and is to be ascribed to the plan of the series. It is fair to say also that the character of the Book of Isaiah and the enormous volume of literature upon it makes the problem of ordering the material an unusually difficult one. But the fact remains that in the volume before us the matter is not arranged and presented with that clearness which is one of the chief excellences of a commentary.

After so much in the way of criticism, let it be said in conclusion that Professor Gray's work has very great merits. Scholars will find in it the history of criticism and interpretation concisely but comprehensively presented, even down to last year's crop of articles and dissertations. It is solidly learned, too, and the student of the Hebrew text will find in the exegetical notes a very useful apparatus. The author is eminently fair-minded in his statement and estimate of other men's opinions. The indecisiveness which has been spoken of before is a result of the same temper; he does not want to make up his mind on insufficient evidence. It may be that judiciousness is sometimes in excess, but it is the defect of a good quality, even though on occasions an exasperating one.

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Editors of the *Harvard Theological Review* take pleasure in announcing that in the next volume, beginning January, 1914, a new department of current literature will be introduced, in which it will be their endeavor to bring to the attention of their readers, as promptly as possible, recent publications in the various fields of theological study and in related subjects such as the history of religions, social ethics, and religious education. The department will include signed reviews by competent hands with short descriptive and critical notices. As hitherto, important books or groups of books will be discussed at greater length in special articles, and from time to time surveys will be given of the progress of learning in particular fields. In these various ways the Editors hope to attain two ends: *first*, early and comprehensive notice of new books in their field, and, *second*, deliberate and authoritative criticism of such as are of greater interest or more permanent significance.

In connection with this enlargement of its scope, the body of the *Review* will be printed in a new and somewhat larger type, which, it is believed, will be acceptable to many of its readers.

The Reverend Frederic Palmer, D.D., Lecturer in the Harvard Divinity School, has been added to the Editorial Committee, and will serve as Managing Editor.

THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Spiritual Culture and Social Service. *By Charles S. MacFarland.* pp. 222. New York: Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. cop. 1912. $1.00 net.

English Sects. A History of Nonconformity. *By W. B. Selbie.* (The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, no. 46.) pp. 256. New York: Henry Holt and Co. London: Williams and Norgate. 1913. 50 cents net.

Worship in the Sunday School. A Study in the Theory and Practice of Worship. *By Hugh Hartshorne.* pp. 210. New York: Teachers College, Columbia Univ. 1913. $1.50 net.

The Country Church. The Decline of its Influence and the Remedy. *By Charles Otis Gill and Gifford Pinchot.* pp. 12 + 222. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. $1.25 net.

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